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This dissertation analyzes how political competition and judicial institutions shape environmental
governance in democratic societies. The three chapters frame environmental problems in several
different ways. In the first chapter, environmental policy is framed as an ideologically contentious
public good. In the second chapter, two conceptions are juxtaposed: the environment as just
another policy domain subject to political haggling, or the environment as bringing about new fun-
damental commitments in society, prone to becoming constitutionalized through legal deliberation.
In the third chapter, the dynamic properties of technological transitions toward more sustainable
modes of production are emphasized.
Different types of institutions are considered in the three chapters. The first two chapters
examine how political and legal processes interact. They also consider the different ways in which
they channel the inputs and wishes of civil society. Chapter one is a formal model of the institution
of citizen suits – a prevalent institution in environmental governance – and its interaction with the
legislature. It shows that the reshaping of laws by citizens and courts after their enactment by
the legislature might improve the decision process of the legislature and the public good outcomes
that ensue. Chapter two is an empirical analysis of the dynamics of environmental legal rules. It
uses the network of citations to legal precedent to test whether the dynamic body of law governing
the environment is driven by political shifts in power or follows a process that is autonomous
from these shifts in power. The results suggest that environmental law is now constitutionalized
– its main principles entrenched in democratic culture rather than subject to the ebb and flow of
democratic turnover of power. Chapter three also considers the dynamic aspects of governance. It
uses a computational model to examine how political parties with different ideological commitments
towards renewable energy might strategically use the path-dependence of technological transitions
to shape policy over the long-term. It also examines how electoral pressures might constrain or
help them in this endeavor.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis examines how the structure of some democratic institutions affects environmental pol-
icy. Most of the political economy literature of the environment can be divided into the following
literatures: international political economy of the environment – specifically the making of inter-
national treaties and the effect of trade relations on domestic interests (e.g. DeSombre, 1995); the
management of local common pool resources (fisheries, forests etc...), examining local institutions
and their interaction with state institutions (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1992; Lam, 1998); domestic politics
– analyzing in particular public opinion (e.g. Jenkins, 2014; Aldy et al., 2012), the influence of inter-
est groups (e.g. Kim et al., 2014), bureaucracies (e.g. Vogel, 2003) and finally, the structural role of
domestic institutions (e.g. Bernauer and Koubi, 2009). The essays presented here are most closely
related to the latter set, which is still a nascent literature. The topics explored by this literature
include how electoral systems affect the strength of green parties (e.g. List and Sturm, 2006), the
development and role of environmental institutions (e.g. Aklin and Urpelainen, 2014), the influence
of corporatism, unions and employers’ associations on the formulation of environmental policy (e.g.
Neumayer, 2003). The essays in this thesis focus on the interaction between political and legal
institutions on the one hand, and on the influence of party competition on the other.
I wish to highlight two red threads present in these pages. First, each essay considers a different
form of political competition that arises from the division of power in a democracy. In the first
chapter, the competition is between the representatives of different jurisdictions and is organized
by legislative bargaining. In this analysis, environmental policy is simply conceptualized as a public
good : it is diffuse (affects everybody) and indivisible. The public good outcomes of the collective
choice process depart substantially from an efficient compromise between groups holding different
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preferences. In the third chapter, competition is between two parties as they repeatedly vie both for
vote shares and long-term influence over the energy infrastructure of the country. The manner in
which this competition plays out is found to have a large effect on the trajectory of environmental
change (here more specifically changes in the energy infrastructure). In the second chapter, I
empirically examine the hypothesis that the interaction between the branches of government can
lead to shifts in the implementation of environmental laws over time.
The second red thread is that the active participation of citizens in policy modifies the outcomes
of these competitive mechanisms. Most obviously, citizens as voters affect the strategies of parties.
The third chapter specifically examines how the electorate’s preferences affect the long-term strate-
gies of parties. Yet, citizens react to laws in many other ways than simply by voting. In the first
and second essay, I consider how citizens directly shape the implementation of laws by participating
in the formulation of a common law (or jurisprudence) about the environment, in courts of law.
The theoretical analysis in the first essay suggests that citizens’ participation in the interpretation
of laws over time may improve the compromise between groups holding different preferences. In
my empirical analysis of legal change (chapter two), I find that the implementation of environ-
mental statutes by courts over time is not perceivably influenced by the shifts in power amongst
elected politicians. Thus, the process by which civil parties iteratively negotiate and shape the
implementation of laws on the ground is at least as important in understanding the effects of laws
over time, and how they evolve, as are changes in the policy preferences of those holding power.
To fully understand how institutions affect policy outcomes, it is necessary to consider both how
power is exercised within institutions and how the reaction of citizens feeds back onto institutional
processes.
One could justifiably ask how the environment interacts with the institutional processes ex-
amined here, and in turn whether these institutions hold any special relevance for the process of
sustainable development. The same question can be asked more broadly about the whole quantita-
tive literature on the political economy of the environment. Indeed, in this literature, environmental
issues are conceptualized in ways very similar to any other public policy issue: a public good, the
provision of which generates winners and losers and therefore creates political conflict and agency
problems. This is certainly a broad and useful framing, and I adopt it in the first chapter. Yet,
environmental issues pose certain governance challenges that this framing does not capture well.
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First, socio-environmental processes operate on long time-scales and are dynamic: what happens at
one point in time affects what happens later on. The dynamic nature of energy policies is modeled
in the last chapter, and is increasingly tackled by political economists. Second, socio-environmental
systems are highly complex, making the formulation of a policy in terms of a level or bright-line
rule that can be implemented and enforced given specific incentive structures somewhat illusory.
One aspect of this complexity is that processes operate differently at different scales and in dif-
ferent localities. The implementation of environmental policy is therefore necessarily tied to local
policy-making, as general policies need to be interpreted in light of local circumstances. Another
aspect is that environmental legislation – much like the constitution or any aspirational principle of
governance – sets challenges rather than operational goals: protect ecosystems while maintaining
the benefits of life in an industrial economy. New technologies and new norms need to be developed
to solve it, but we do not know a priori how to solve the challenge. Environmental policy in fact
consists of searching for solutions in an unknown search space (Rodrik, 2013; Faber and Frenken,
2009; Folke et al., 2005). Due to the dynamic character of processes, the issues (and therefore the
search space) also change over time. The adaptive properties of the policy process – and the norms
and technologies the policy process brings forth – must therefore be analyzed. The predominant
framing of environmental policy, which can be generically applied to any policy issue, is incomplete.
The essays in this thesis only begin to hint at some of the unique and challenging characteristics
of environmental policy and sustainable development. The focus of this thesis on the politics of
the common law stems from the fact that the legal process incorporates information about local
contingencies while articulating general principles, and that it has the potential to adapt rules over
time and articulate norms of behavior. I contend that these institutional characteristics are relevant
for sustainable development and ought to be further studied.
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Chapter 2
Taking the Law to Court: Citizen
Suits and the Legislative Process
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Abstract
The institution of citizen suits is a decentralized and inclusive form of public contestation, which
allows citizens to influence the implementation of public laws in courts. How does this institution
influence the democratic process? In this paper, I propose a model of citizen suits and analyze
how this institution affects legislative bargaining over public and particularistic spending, when
the public good is the subject of an ideological conflict. I find that in most scenarios, citizen suits
induce legislators to craft more ambitious policies and help increase collective welfare. The results
rest on the distinctions I draw between the two institutions: between a representative legislature
that logrolls, and courts, staffed by unrepresentative but diverse judges, reacting to a policy agenda
set by citizens.
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2.1 Introduction
Citizen participation in policy-making comes in many guises. On June 30th, 2014, the Aransas
Project – a diverse coalition of citizens and towns – came before three judges of the Fifth Circuit’s
Court of Appeals in New Orleans, Louisiana. Twenty-three of the world’s only wild flock of whoop-
ing cranes – that most majestic of birds – had died because, they alleged, the government of Texas
had issued permits for excessive water withdrawal. Their action constituted a “taking” of crane’s
habitat, in violation of the Endangered Species Act. The group lost as judges deemed the cause
and effect relationship too tenuous1. A few days earlier, a district court of Colorado had ordered
the cessation of all coal mining exploration on a particular swath of wild public land at the bequest
of High Country Conservation Advocates. The permits had not evaluated potential harm to the
climate from the mines’ release of methane2.
So it is that multiple times a week, in the U.S., citizens of all stripes, be they firms, individuals,
advocacy groups or local officials, dispute public policy matters in court via the institution of
citizen suits. Judges rule, and their decisions, from broad matters of rulemaking to specific issues
of enforcement, affect the reach of a myriad public goods and their associated funds. Unlike in
contract law or tort law, parties are adjudicating for their conception of the public interest, without
necessary regard to personal interest or injury.
Sometimes called public law litigation, what I call citizen suits includes any form of contestation
of public policy by citizens in courts. In fact, the details may vary: litigation may be justified by an
appeal to constitutional rights, it may arise because a statute explicitly empowers citizens to enforce
its terms (as is the case in many environmental statutes) or it may arise because administrative law
guarantees fair consideration of all relevant interests in agencies’ decisions3. In U.S. environmental
law, this broad category would sum to about 1500 decisions a year, including over a hundred written
1Aransas Project v. Shaw, 2014 WL 2932514 (5th Cir. 2014)
2High Country Conservation Advocates v. United States Forest Service, 2014 WL 2922751 (D. Colo. 2014)
3In all cases, litigants must demonstrate standing. The doctrine of standing that is used to decide whether a
litigant has reason enough to sue, varies a lot depending on the statute and on the current doctrine of the court,
which has oscillated over time from narrow – requiring a specific personal interest in the case – to much broader
– granting standing for general aesthetic, scientific and other cultural interests. Throughout this history, however,
public interest groups have been able to bring cases to courts throughout the nation.
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opinions. In either one or all of these forms, the practice is taking hold in new democracies such
as India and Brazil (Brinks and Gauri, 2010), as well as in the European Union (Kelemen, 2006),
along with the global rise of judicial power (Tate and Vallinder, 1997; Ferejohn, 2002). Citizens’
access to justice in policy-making also seems normatively appealing: it constitutes, for example,
one of the three clauses of the Aarhus Convention, which focuses on the public’s rights in matters of
environmental governance (Rose-Ackerman and Halpaap, 2004). Qualitative studies ranging from
environmental policy, to welfare, to constitutional rights depict citizen suits as a vibrant activity,
which feeds into the rest of the political process (e.g. Melnick, 1983; Feeley and Rubin, 2000; Barnes,
2004). Yet, we know little about how citizen suits affect the policy process. The present theoretical
study seeks to spell out some of the mechanisms by which this institution may affect the law-making
process.
The present paper proposes a theoretical model to analyze the influence that citizen suits have
on decision-making in legislatures. It focuses on situations where actors are in conflict over the reach
of public goods that also require public investments. First, I argue that the institution of citizen
suits aggregates the preferences of the public. They offer a forum of inclusive contestation, from
which a compromise emerges. Second, I show that citizen suits aggregate preferences differently
than does the legislature, when confronted with the same public policy conflict and distribution of
preferences. Indeed, I show that the legislature, being simultaneously responsible for determining
the budget, public good spending and distributive spending, becomes embroiled in distributive
conflicts. Because of its majority voting rule, it is also often pulled by the extreme of one party,
despite logrolling, while at the same time dedicating a large part of the budget to distributive
spending and log-rolling. Third, in a world where citizen suits follow legislation and are thus
anticipated by legislators, I show that citizen suits modify the bargains struck in the legislature,
lessening the pull of distributive conflicts and balancing the power of the majority relative to that
of minority legislators. My analysis thus lends credence and precision to the claim that active
courts contribute to the search for compromise by empowering a plurality of citizens (Barnes, 2004;
Sunstein, 1995) and are thereby welfare-enhancing.
Although popular amongst activists and proponents of civic participation, citizen suits are con-
tentious because they seem to give inordinate power to judges. The clash here is well known:
many would accuse the courts of undue activism, responsible for unraveling the carefully woven
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compromises of the legislature (Friedman, 2002). After all, legislators are supposedly the true rep-
resentative of constituencies. Being in control of the budget, they should also have more capacity
to forge agreements than do judges, who are unaware of the trades that took place between leg-
islators and that enabled the legislation (Rodriguez and Weingast, 2007). Yet, what compromises
are legislators able to forge between opposing groups, absent the institution of citizen suits? To
answer this, I model legislative bargaining for the case where two groups of legislators stand in
conflict over the reach and funding of a public good, while legislators also bargain over the budget
and the distribution of particularistic goods. As in Volden and Wiseman (2007), legislators can
forge agreements from a rich menu, since a proposer can offer a mixture of the public good and of
transfers to secure the agreement of a diverse coalition.
To explore how citizen suits react to the public policy thus created by legislators, I consider a
process in which throughout the nation, people holding diverse opinion, advance claims in courts
regarding the public policy’s proper interpretation4. Laws being forever incomplete, judges resolve
ambiguities in a myriad different ways (Sunstein, 1995). Indeed, as the examples of the cranes
and of the coal mine demonstrate, both proponents and opponents of greater state support for
a particular public good may win or lose in court, depending on the merits of their claim and
the values of the judges. The many individual decisions of this decentralized litigation of public
law cumulate to form the concrete reach of policies on the ground. The model thus allows me
to characterize the compromise gradually struck between the law as originally legislated, and the
distribution of citizens’ and judges’ preferences.
In countries where public law litigation has become an expected part of the policy process, the
legislative and the litigation stages must be coupled as one sequential game. In doing this, I find
that litigation has both a direct and indirect effect on legislative outcomes. Recall that citizen suits
are assumed inclusive and litigation outcomes diverse and cumulative. The compromise they build
is consequentially moderate, with a pull towards an average of the preferences of citizens. As a
result, extreme legislation does not survive civil society’s downstream response: extreme legislation
(including legislative inaction) is by force moderated by the diversity of citizens who seek reform
4As pointed out by Zemans (1983), the legal system gives individual citizens access to government authority,
without the need for them to organize as a pressure group. Because it does not require collective action, this type of
public power is widely dispersed in the population.
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in courts. Absent citizen suits, the legislature tends to produce extreme proposals, featuring either
very low levels or very high levels of the public good. The direct effect of citizen suits is that
they shift very ambitious or very unambitious policy towards the center, bringing effective policy
outcomes closer to a compromise, which in most cases increases welfare relative to the choices of
an independent legislature.
The indirect effect of litigation is to undermine the bargaining position of legislators who benefit
from making extreme proposals – proposals that enact its most ambitious level despite opposition
by some, or those that minimize the public good and maximize the rents that go to the proposer’s
own constituency. There are two important consequences. First, citizen suits lessen the proposer
advantage that arises when proposers prefer particularistic goods to the public good. In a divided
legislature, the proposer’s advantage is great because the threat wielded by the opposition lessens
the future prospects of non-proposers in the proposer’s coalition. The addition of citizen suits
downstream greatly mitigates this proposer advantage by moderating the threat of the opposition.
Consequently, citizen suits also reduce particularistic spending, which is one of the mechanisms
by which the institution increases welfare in the model. Second, the bargaining position of the
minority improves in several scenarios. Indeed, absent citizen suits, the capacity of the majority
group to impose extreme positions greatly constrains the minority in its attempt to negotiate when
it has a chance. By introducing constraints on the set of feasible policies, citizen suits partially
relieve legislative constraints on the minority, thus allowing for more compromise.
2.1.1 Relation to the literature
Far from pitching the legislative and the judiciary branches against each other, to gauge their
relative merits as fora of policy-making, my analysis considers them as a system. The analysis
thus contributes to a growing literature that seeks to discover the properties of systems of diverse
institutions (e.g. Vermeule, 2009; Bednar, 2008), and more specifically how the legislature functions
in a larger institutional context. Examples include Matsusaka’s (2005) analysis of citizen initiatives,
McCarty’s (2000) analysis of the presidential veto, or Ting’s (2012) model of bureaucratic allocation
of the legislature’s distributional spending.
In my model, the courts and legislature have overlapping (although not equivalent) jurisdictions.
This reflects both constitutional design in the U.S. and the nature of the policy process – indeed,
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policy implementation can never neatly be divorced from policy formulation. In this regard, the
analysis keeps with the assumption that judges are policy actors, a common assumption in positive
analyses of inter-branch relations. Yet my approach differs in several important ways from prevalent
models. These models usually consider zero-sum policy games (e.g. Ferejohn and Weingast, 1992;
Shipan, 2000). Each branch is endowed with the same institutional characteristics. Specifically,
each contributes a different veto player to the policy game. In these models, judges are nothing
but politicians in robes and none of the players are considered representative of a particular public.
Instead, I capture important differences between the legislature and the courts in a non zero-sum
context. The legislature is made of representatives and bargains over multiple dimensions. In
contrast, the courts are made of unrepresentative judges but who must respond to agendas set
by citizens. Their decisions are uni-dimensional – focusing on public policy only, oblivious to the
distributional concerns of the legislature. My analysis shows that these differences lead to very
different policy decisions.
My model is closest to Rogers and Vanberg’s (2007) who show that judicial review by a diverse
court can improve the efficiency of a majority group’s decision. Unlike them, however, I portray
the legislature and the courts as representative of the same public, but representing it in different
ways. Both are imperfect representatives, yet diversely imperfect, and I ask how well they work
together. In this regard, I depart from the traditional concern over ”unguided” judicial review, in
which an unelected Supreme Court irrevocably modifies policy. The courts here are guided, since
citizens set the agenda. In a seminal paper, (McCubbins et al., 1987) argued that citizen suits
and other procedural controls of rulemaking empower the interest groups that initially favored the
legislation. Unlike them, I consider the implications of citizen suits given that they empower all
interests.
In considering pension reforms across countries, Jacobs (2011) has made the case that the
presence of more veto points – or more generally, the dispersion of authority – reduces the number
of redistributive policies that stand as an alternative to welfare-enhancing reform policies. These
redistributive policies would benefit narrow groups while shifting costs onto others (exactly what I
find in the legislative bargaining model), but if many groups can influence decision-making via the
presence of more veto players, these redistributive policies are blocked from consideration. Gehlbach
and Malesky (2010) similarly explain the positive relationship between the number of veto players
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and economic reform in postcommunist countries. The results in this paper provide an additional
mechanism for this alleged positive role of pluralism in increasing the odds of welfare-enhancing
reforms.
While taking a different starting point and a different method, this paper presents findings that
cohere with those of the popular constitutionalism scholarship. That scholarship finds that courts,
although staffed with unelected judges, are responsive to and representative of the plurality of
citizens’ preferences (?Eskridge and Ferejohn, 2010; ?). This paper also contributes to the literature
on advocacy groups and the effect of their strategies on the political process. Public interest
litigation, or citizen suits, is an institution that channels advocacy groups’ divergent viewpoints.
Thus, legal action is an advocacy strategy. A key question in this literature concerns the relative
effectiveness of different advocacy strategies. For example, is the private politics approach, explored
first by Baron (2001), more effective than political lobbying? More generally, do strategies that
seek to modify implementation decisions on the ground counteract or bolster political attempts
at policy reform? Some analyses, such as Kim and Urpelainen (2013), find that they can be
counterproductive, discouraging government action when it is warranted. My analysis highlights
the capacity of downstream legal action to constructively restructure the political conflict between
proponents and opponents, in many cases bolstering public good investment when it is warranted
and tempering it when the majority would otherwise impose an uncompromisingly ambitious policy.
As a result, for most of the parameter space, I find citizen suits to be welfare-enhancing.
The article divides into four parts. The first describes the model. The second establishes the
baseline results of the legislative game without citizen suits. The third couples the two institutions,
showing how citizen suits modify the policy process. Finally, the fourth part explores welfare
implications, considers the endogeneity of the institution of citizen suits, highlights the testable
hypotheses of the model and organizes a critical discussion of the more original assumptions of the
model. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2.2 The model
The model combines legislative bargaining over public and private goods in an ideologically divided
legislature with a model of citizen suits, which affect the public good component of the legislation.
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I will analyze two institutional environments. In the baseline environment, the legislature’s decision
is implemented as decided by the legislature. In the environment with litigation, the legislature
decides and at the stage of implementation, citizens can make claims in courts that may modify
the public good. I first present the legislative component of the model and then the citizen suits
component.
2.2.1 Divided Legislature and Public Good Provision
A legislature L of size n > 5 (odd) must legislate over the provision of a public good. Because
legislators typically log-roll across both distributive and public funding, I consider here a legislative
game in which funding must be allocated across the n districts and the public good y. There are
two groups of legislators who are in disagreement about the value of the public good. Type 1
legislators are proponents of the public good and have a marginal valuation for it of q1 > 0, while
type 0 legislators are opponents to the good, with marginal valuation q0 < 0. The legislature is
composed of a majority nM of legislators and a minority of size nm = n−nM . I will both consider
the case where type 1 legislators form a majority (the majority case denoted MAJ), and the case
where they form a minority (the minority case denoted MIN). In the first case qM = q1 > 0
and qm = q0 < 0, and vice versa for the minority case. The valuation of legislators can arise from
ideology, or can reflect the economic repercussion of the public good on the legislator’s district.
Bargaining happens via a closed rule process and majority rule voting. The horizon of play is
indefinite, the legislature moving on to a new round until a proposal is accepted by a majority of
legislators. In each period, a legislator is recognized at random to make a proposal. Any given
legislator is thus chosen with probability 1n , but with probability pM =
nM
n he is part of the majority
and with probability pm = 1 − pM , he is part of the minority. Legislator i recognized as proposer
makes a proposal consisting of a level of public good provision yi, non-negative transfers {xij}j∈L
to all legislators. The tuple (yi, {xij}j∈L) determines the overall budget raised by legislator i:
Bi = yi +
∑
j∈L xij . The status quo payoffs for all legislators is 0.
In the baseline model, I assume that what is legislated is implemented perfectly, so if the proposal
is passed, it fully determines payoffs. In the coupled model with litigation, once the proposal is
passed, yi is subject to legal appeals by citizens, with repercussions for Bi as well. Denote ỹi and
B̃i the effective values of yi and Bi after litigation in the implementation phase. In the baseline
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case, we have ỹi = yi. In the coupled model, we have ỹi = l(yi), where l(·) is the mapping between
the legislated public good and the effective public good level arising as a result of the citizen suits,
which I will describe subsequently. B̃i is the effective budget, reflecting the difference between the
legislated and effective public good level.
The payoff function of a legislator j from a legislation proposed by legislator i is:
uj = qj ỹi + xij − kB̃2i
k is a coefficient reflecting the marginal rate of increase of the cost of raising public funds. If the
whole budget were spent on the public good, the ideal public policy for a legislator with valuation




2k . For a legislator with valuation q0 ≤ 0, the ideal policy is y
∗
0 = 0.
The payoff function makes the implicit assumption that the amount of spending y on the public
good maps one-to-one into the scope of the policy entering the policy returns term qy in the payoff
function of legislators. This assumption may not be adequate in the case of regulatory decisions,
since more ambitious regulation does not necessarily lead to higher government spending. The
assumption works quite naturally for the case of sustaining an industry that can help promote a
public good, such as global warming mitigation, or in the case of welfare policy.
The specification of the legislative model is inspired from Volden and Wiseman (2007). However,
there are three crucial differences. The first is that the budget is endogenous. We will see that
this has the effect of attenuating the power of proposers, since everybody bears the costs of raising
funds. The second difference is key: in this model, legislators are divided in their valuation of y,
and the members of the minority have some probability of making proposals. We are therefore not
in a fully majoritarian setting, while at the same time, the often partisan conflicts over support
for public goods are taken into account (as in ?). Third, legislated and implemented policies may
differ because of downstream societal contestation.
2.2.2 Decentralized Citizen Suits
In the legislature, statutes are crafted as complex bundles of many narrower policies, and negotiated
jointly with other issues. In other words, y represents an overall ambition level for achieving
a public goal, and encompasses a large number of specific policies. In contrast, each litigation
resolves one narrow policy point within the broader legislation, in isolation from other issues. In
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my conceptualization of this appeals process, citizens present a claim to a judge as to the proper
reach of the law in their specific case, and this claim is accepted if the judge finds it preferable to
a literal application of the statute. A large number of such litigations happen in the society, each
with a different result. The effective scope of the public policy, denoted ỹ, arising in aggregate
from this flow of disputes, is modeled as the average of all these individual results. In addition, I
make the key assumption that litigation over the statute does not bear on the distributive decisions
{xij}j∈L. These distributive items are not part of the statute, but rather part of the spending bill,
or other appropriations’ bills.
To formalize this process, I consider that in judges’ and citizens’ minds, the public good could
feasibly take on any value between 0 and y∗1 =
q1
2k , which is the ideal level of the good for proponents
of the public good (type 1 actors). Any claim in [0, y∗1] can be brought to court at any time. Judges
know the level y of the public good specified in the legislation. However, litigants can argue to
judges that in their specific case, their claim c is more sensible. Litigants present their claims as
alternatives to the status quo one at a time, rather than present opposing claims simultaneously.
The judge must then decide between y and c5.
It is important to note that the claims are evaluated relative to the text of the statute and
independently of each other. I am thus ignoring the fact that higher courts can set far-reaching
precedents affecting a large number of cases in lower courts, and thereby effectively shift the status
quo6. The formal letter of the law is thus fixed, and the concrete case-by-case implementation
varies.
I assume that judges have idiosyncratic preferences about the public good but also care about
respecting statutory law (Bailey and Maltzman, 2011). Thus, in each decision a judge i maximizes
uJi (li) = −(li −
y+y∗i
2 )
2, where y is the legislation, li is the scope of the public good in a given
decision judge i makes (li ∈ {c, y} since the judge adjudicates between the petitioner’s claim and
the status quo y), and y∗i is the a priori policy preference of the judge. Let y
∗
i ∼ U(a, b) with [a, b]
5The assumption that any claim can be entertained, however distant from the letter of the statute, and that judges
know what the statute requires, may seem inappropriate. Instead, suits usually arise because there are windows of
ambiguity, opened by policy drift for example. A more sophisticated model where litigation happens withing such
windows of discretion lead to the same qualitative results in Section 4.
6Or, alternatively, I am considering only independent precedents.
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included in [0, y∗1]. Then the ideal points l
∗
i of judges (decisions about li that maximize u
J
i (li)) are
uniformly distributed on [a+y2 ,
b+y
2 ].
In the above, the assumption is that ideal points represent an equal weighing of judges’ a
priori preferences y∗i and the legislation y. Intuitively, the judiciary is composed of a possibly
very diverse set of judges, distributed similarly across all districts7. Yet all judges’ preferences are
pulled toward what the statute stipulates, so that the final distribution of judicial preferences is
partially exogenous and partially influenced by y. This assumption is strongly supported by recent
and careful work on the preferences of judges (Bailey and Maltzman, 2011; Epstein and Knight,
2013).
Consider two types of petitioners: type 1 who want to maximize y and type 0 who want to
minimize it8. Let r be the proportion of type 0 litigants in the nation. In most of the analysis, I
will assume that legislators truly represent their constituencies. In that case, districts represented
by legislators of type 0 are also populated with petitioners of type 0 and r = nmn . However, the
model readily allows us to decouple the distribution of citizen and legislator preferences, which I
will do in the discussion, considering both the case when legislators do not reflect the distribution
of citizen preferences, and the case when lobby groups active in the implementation phase do not
reflect the broader public’s distribution of preferences.
The petitioners are assumed able to ascertain the judge’s preference ahead of making their
claim. In so far as most disputes are negotiated with a judge and settled, it seems plausible to
assume that petitioners will try to estimate the judge’s preference and tailor their claim accordingly
rather than maximize the expected gain from presenting a claim to a completely random judge.
The effective reach of the policy y arising from a multitude of petitioner claims and judicial
decisions is the additive effect of all the disputes. Assuming a continuum of judicial preferences
7Federal judges are appointed federally, so it makes sense that judges should hold more diverse opinions than the
local population. They were also appointed at different times, by different coalitions of politicians. In addition, each
judge might be confronted with multiple different claims and may hold different preferences about those individual
narrow policy points. These considerations justify that there is a distribution of judicial preferences within a district
and across the country.
8None of the results hinge on having these extreme types of petitioners: the analysis remains qualitatively the
same if I assume instead that districts of type 0 and 1 are characterized by petitioners with preferred values of y
distributed over different intervals.
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and a very large number of disputes, ỹ can be modeled as the integral over the range of citizen and
judicial preferences, as will be shown in Section 2.4.1. This integral creates a mapping l : y 7→ ỹ.
The litigation process also modifies B. The effective budget is B̃ = B−y+ ỹ, such that the budget
is increased if litigation expands the scope of the public good, and decreased if litigation contracts
it.
2.2.3 Extensive Form of the Full Game
I now give the full sequence of the game. All moves in the legislation stages of the game are perfectly
observable. Moves in the litigation stages of the game are assumed to happen in parallel.
1. Legislation - Recognition Stage: In a given round, a legislator is recognized to make a proposal.
The recognition probability is 1n for all legislators across all rounds.
2. Legislation - Proposal Stage: The recognized proposer makes a proposal (yi, {xij}j∈L).
3. Legislation - Voting Stage: Each legislator casts a vote for or against the proposal. If a
majority is in favor, the proposal passes and bargaining ends. If a majority opposes the
proposal, the game returns to Step 1.
4. Litigation: Litigants throughout the population, independently and in parallel, file claims in
different court. Each judge chooses whether to accept the claim he received. These decisions
are reached independently of other judges and independently of other suits. The aggregation
of all these decisions yields an effective public policy ỹ = l(y) and effective budget B̃.
Strategies in the litigation stage consists of: 1) the judges’ decision to accept or reject a claim
given the legislated value of y and his own a priori policy preference, and 2) type 1 and type 0
litigants’ choice of claim given the legislated value of y and a given judge’s a priori policy preference.
The aggregation of these individual decisions affect the outcomes of Steps 1-3 in the sequence
above and we seek to characterize the stationary symmetric sub-game perfect equilibrium of the
legislative game with and without the litigation stage. We will assume that legislators do not
discount future rounds of bargaining (i.e. δ = 1). Because we consider stationary equilibria,
strategies do not depend on the history of legislative play. The equilibria we consider are symmetric
in the sense that legislators of the same type adopt identical strategies and are treated identically. I
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will thus index the strategies of legislators and their continuation values by their group membership
∈ (M,m). Strategies are defined by a proposal strategy that is a best response to the proposal
strategy of the other group and a mapping from proposal to voting choice. Although the strategies
are symmetric, eventual transfers are not: not all legislators of a given type receive the same
transfers in any particular proposal (although in expectation they do).
2.3 The Legislature Acts Alone
The legislative model allows us to analyze multiple bargaining environments: what bills can emerge
when the proponents of the public good form a majority? Is their behavior modified by the presence
of a minority group opposed to the public good? When the proponents are a minority, can they
obtain funding for their desired public policy by compensating some majority members? How is the
feasibility of such trades affected by the size of the majority group? There is a common structure to
the decision problems faced by the majority and minority proposers across these environments, as
well as some differences. The next Section defines the strategies available to both types of legislators
before considering the equilibria that emerge in these different legislative environments and which
will serve as a baseline against which the effect of the citizen suit institution will be analyzed.
2.3.1 Legislators’ Strategies
Denote Cj the coalition of legislators who vote in favor of the proposal of a proposer of type
i ∈ (m,M). It will be convenient to denote as xij the transfers by a proposer of type i to legislators
of type j whom he chooses to include in his coalition Ci, and xip the transfers to the proposer’s
own district. Not all legislators of type j receive this transfer since they are not necessarily in the
coalition. Thus, in what follows: xij =

0 for legislators 6∈ Ci
xij for legislators ∈ Ci
xip for the proposer
A proposer who is part of the majority always builds a coalition with other majority members9.
9This assertion is not obvious. The majority proposer could choose to cater to the public policy wishes of the
minority to reduce the number of majority members whose support it needs. However, this a more costly strategy
because the minority’s interest are contrary to that of the majority.
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The majority proposer thus has at most one participation constraint to satisfy, that of other major-
ity members. When qM ≥ 1, the proposer values the public good more highly than private spending
for his own constituency. He thus invests all funds in the public good, which automatically satisfies
the participation constraint of other majority members. Following Volden and Wiseman (2007), I
call this the “collective” strategy (C). For qM < 1, the proposer seeks instead to maximize xip his
share of constituency spending. Thus, the proposer tries to build a proposal in which he retains a
share of the budget while ensuring support of at least a majority of the legislature. This support can
be obtained with either private transfers or public investments10. I define as the “public” strategy
(P ) the strategy in which the proposer invests funds in the public good to secure the participation
of other majority members, but seeks to raise additional funds for his own constituency. In this
strategy, yM is set to satisfy the participation constraint of other members and the proposer gets
transfers xMp = BM − yM . I define as the “distributive” strategy (D) the strategy that consists in
relying purely on transfers. For this strategy, y = 0 and transfers are given to n−12 other members
picked at random.
A proposer who is part of the minority has a more complex problem to solve because the minority
must build a coalition Cm with a mixture of minority and majority members. Consequently, the
proposer must satisfy the participation constraint of both minority and majority members. The
following expressions represent the continuation values of the two types of legislators:
vM = pM (qMyM − kB2M ) + pm(qMym − kB2m + pcxmM ) +
1
n
(BM − yM ) (2.1)
vm = pM (qmyM − kB2M ) + pm(qmym − kB2m) +
1
n
(Bm − ym − nMpcxmM ) (2.2)
where xmM denotes transfers from a minority legislator to a majority legislator. pM and pm are
respectively the recognition probabilities of majority and minority members, while pc = 1 − n−12nM
is the probability that a majority member is chosen to complete the coalition Cm of the minority
proposer. The majority participation constraint is qMym + xmM − kB2m = vM .
We see that ym and xmM play the role of substitutes: if qMym increases, then xmM is allowed
to be lower. Thus, one strategy to obtain the support of the majority is to manipulate ym in
the direction favored by the majority (up if qM > 0 and down if qM < 0), thus minimizing the
10Because the payoff function is linear in the public good and in particularistic goods, one of the two coalition-
building instruments dominates (see Appendix).
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transfers xmM . I call this the “acquiescence strategy” (A) because it consists in acquiescing to the
public good policy preference of the majority. Alternatively, the minority proposer can increase the
transfers xmM , which allows him to choose ym that yields higher value to the minority (maximizing
qmym) even though it is less favorable to the majority. I call this the “opposition strategy” (O)
because the minority proposer attempts to push policy in the direction opposite to the wishes of
the majority and closer to the wishes of the minority.
We have defined three distinct strategies for each type of player: C, P and D for the majority
members and O, A and D for the minority members. Table 2.1 recapitulates those strategies.
Majority Proposer Minority Proposer
Strat. Description Strat. Description
C Maj. proposer invests fully in the PG:
y = B and xi = 0 for all i.
O The min. proposer maximizes qmym,
requiring transfers xmM to some Maj.
members.
P Maj. proposer uses the PG to get Maj.
members’ support.
A The min. proposer minimizes xmM , us-
ing the PG to satisfy Maj. members.
D The Maj. proposer uses transfers to
obtain support of n−12 members and
y = 0.
D The min. proposer uses transfers to
obtain support of n−12 members and
y = 0.
Table 2.1: A recapitulation of the strategies defined in the main text for both types of players
2.3.2 Equilibria of the legislative game
In presenting the equilibria, I distinguish three legislative scenarios: 1) the homogeneous case H,
in which all legislators have the same valuation for the public good, 2) the majority case (MAJ)
in which the proponents of the public good form a majority, and 2) the minority case (MIN) in
which the proponents of the public good form a minority. Remark 1 below states the equilibria
that arise for each of these scenarios from the combination of strategies defined in Section 2.3.1 (all
transfers not explicitly given are equal to zero). In each scenario, several equilibria arise. They are
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separated by threshold values of q1, the valuation of the pro-public good proposer.
Remark 1. 1. In the homogeneous case H, there are two equilibria:
• For qM < n−12n , the proposer uses the D strategy, yielding y
D
















2. In the MAJ case, there are three equilibria:
• For 0 ≤ qM < qPM , the equilibrium is DD where both types of proposers use the D




4nk and xij =
n+1
4n2k
to n−12 legislators, for i, j ∈
(m,M).
• For qPM ≤ qM < qCM = 1, the equilibrium is PO, yielding:








M − yPOM from majority proposals;
– xPOmM > 0 to
n−1
2 − nm majority legislators, y
PO








• For qCM = 1 ≤ qM , the equilibrium is CA, yielding yCAi = BCAi =
qM
2k for i ∈ (m,M).
3. In the MIN caes, there are three equilibria:
• For 0 ≤ qm < qAm, the equilibrium is DD, with the same values as above.
• For qAm ≤ qm < qOm, the equilibrium is DA, yielding:




mM > 0 for
n−1




m − yDAm −
(n−12 − nm)x
DA
mM from minority proposals;
– yDAM = 0, x
DA
MM > 0 for
n−1
2 majority legislators from majority proposals.
• For qOm ≤ qm, the equilibrium is DO, yielding:
– yDOm = B
DO
M − nMpcxDOmM from minority proposals;
– yDOM = 0, x
DO
MM > 0 for
n−1
2 majority legislators from majority proposals.
The Appendix shows that these equilibria are unique and shows why some of the combination of
strategies do not arise. Figure 2.1 plots the different regions of the equilibria of the MIN and MAJ
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Figure 2.1: Plot showing the equilibria that emerge from the combination of the strategies defined
in Table 2.1 in the (qM , qm) parameter space, with the blue lines indicating the thresholds. The
regions are shown for n = 21, nM = 12, and k = 0.1 for both the MAJ and MIN cases. Result 1
specifies how changes in the relative sizes of the minority and majority groups change those values.
case, separated by the threshold functions, while Figure 2.2 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes of
B and y for these scenarios, for selected parameter values.
The H case is useful as a comparison to the other two cases, to understand the effect of divisions
on the equilibrium outcomes. In the H case, if the proposer values the public good less than n−12n ,
he uses the D strategy. If the proposer values the public good more than n−12n , the proposer prefers
to invest in the public good. Wherever qM < 1, he would ideally like to keep some funds for his
constituency (P strategy) but under the assumption that δ = 1, he must invest all the funds in the
public good to satisfy the participation constraint of other legislators. Thus the outcomes of the
P and C strategy are indistinguishable in the homogeneous case, and we obtain BM = yM =
qM
2k
(panel 1 of Figure 2.2)11.
11This is unlike the result in Volden and Wiseman (2007) where it was found that y < B for q < 1. The assumption
that δ = 1 explains the different result. Unlike in a purely distributive policy space, the proposer advantage in this
public policy environment stems only from the impatience of legislators. The reason is that the public good confers
the same benefits on all legislators. All legislators are therefore part of the winning coalition and, in the absence of
delay costs, there is no drawback to rejecting a proposal that fails to maximize the public good.
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Figure 2.2: Homogeneous baseline: equilibrium values of B and y as a function of q, denoting the
regions with the different strategies.
MAJ: Equilibrium values of BM and yM (black, with yM dotted), as well as Bm and ym (red, with
ym dotted) in the DD, PO and CA equilibria.
MIN: Equilibrium values of Bm and ym (black, with ym dotted), as well as BM and yM (red, with
yM dotted). In all panels, n = 21, k = 0.1 and in the MAJ and MIN panels, nM = 12.
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In the MAJ case, the pro-public good proposer is the majority proposer. qPM , separates the D
and the P strategy, while qCM = 1 separates the P and C strategy of the majority proposer. When
the majority proposer uses the distributive strategy, the minority does so as well (there is no public
policy to oppose or acquiesce to), and we obtain the DD equilibrium. When the majority proposer
uses the public strategy, the minority proposer’s best response is to use the opposition strategy12.
We thus obtain the PO equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the minority sets yPOm = 0 and makes
transfers to n−12 − nm majority members, keeping the rest as rents. This strategy strengthens the
bargaining power of the majority proposer with respect to other majority members of his coalition
and he is thus able to set yPOM < B
PO
M and keep the difference for his own constituency (the wedge
between BM and yM in Figure 2.2 panel 2). Finally, when the majority proposer uses the C
strategy, the minority must acquiesce and we obtain the CA equilibrium, in which both type of
legislators raise qM2k and invest it in the public good. The minority proposer cannot limit the scope
of the public policy, because majority members would be assured of a better outcome by voting
down such a proposal. Thus, the presence of the minority has no impact on the equilibrium when
qM ≥ 1 because the majority is united. There are no internal divisions from which the minority
can benefit, as is the case in the PO equilibrium.
In the MIN case, the pro-public good proposer is the minority proposer. qAm, separates the
D from the A strategy, while qOm separates the A from the O strategy of the minority proposer.
The majority proposer uses the D strategy in all cases because the majority opposes the public
good. We thus obtain the DD, DA and DO equilibria. In the DA equilibrium, yDAm is set to
exactly satisfy minority members and transfers are made to n−12 − nm majority members, and the
minority proposer keeps the difference. As shown in Figure 2.2 panel 3, there is very little public
good investment but in the DO equilibrium, where all funds raised by the minority are used for
12Note that there are two other equilibria that could conceivably occur from combination of the majority and
minority strategies: PA, the combination of P , and A and CO, the combination of C and O. The Appendix shows
that given the assumption that δ = 1, PA is equivalent to the homogeneous baseline and that as long as qm < 0, PO
dominates for the minority. Again given the assumption that δ = 1, CO collapses into the CA equilibrium. Adding
a cost to delays would loosen the bargaining constraints and allow PA and CO to exist as distinct equilibria, but
these would only be dominant for small and fringe portions of the parameter space and distract us from the essential
difference between the PO and CA equilibria and the way in which they will be modified by citizen suits.
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maximizing the public good investment. As a result, yDOm is a larger share of the budget
13. For
all qm, however, we see in Figure 2.2 that the public good investments in the MIN case are much
lower than in the MAJ case for similar valuations by proponents.
Except for qCM = 1, the threshold functions that separate the equilibria are too cumbersome to
present, but the following result summarizes how the composition of the legislature affects them.





< 0: the larger the minority opposition, the lower the threshold at which the majority
proposer switches from building his coalition with a purely distributive strategy to building
his coalition by providing the public good.





> 0 and dq̄
A
m
d|qM | > 0: the stronger the majority opposition, the higher the threshold at
which the minority proposer switches from building his coalition with a purely distributive





> 0 and dq̄
O
m
d|qM | > 0: the stronger the majority opposition, the higher the threshold at
which the minority proposer chooses to maximize the amount of funds dedicated to the
public good.
This Result shows that in the MAJ case, a stronger opposition selects for the equilibrium in
which the public good is provided (PO equilibrium) for a much broader range of qM , which is
welfare enhancing. But in the MIN case, a stronger opposition simply makes it more expensive to
provide the public good, which favors purely distributive spending.
To understand why the composition of the legislature changes the strategies and equilibria, we
must understand how the minority and majority strategies interact to affect outcomes. Let us
consider the MAJ case first. The opposition strategy of the minority creates an important shift
in power dynamics within the majority. Indeed, the minority proposer sets yPOm = 0 and makes
transfers to a small number of majority legislators to gain their support. Since only a fraction of
13Again, this opposition strategy of the minority increases the bargaining power of the majority proposer relative
to other majority members, and he is thus able to raise the budget, allocating most of this increase to his own
constituency (DO equilibrium in Figure 2.2 panel 3).
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majority members receive these transfers in any minority proposal, the probability that a given
majority member will benefit from the minority’s compensatory transfers in a future PO minority
proposal is low. The continuation values of the majority legislators are consequentially strongly
reduced by the minority’s opposition strategy. This increases the bargaining power of the majority
proposer and allows him to use the public good as a cheap coalition building tool to extract rents,
an option he does not enjoy in the homogeneous case. The effect of the mechanism described above
increases with the size of the minority, which explains why the P strategy is all the more attractive
to the majority proposer when the minority is large, as stated in Result 1. Thus, paradoxically,
the presence of the opposing minority encourages public good spending for lower values of qM
14.
Turning to Result 1 MIN case, we see here that a stronger opposition leads the proposer to
resort to a distributive strategy rather than invest in the public good. The reason is that when
|qM | and nM are larger, the majority members part of Cm will require higher transfers to accept the
level of public good spending proposed. Strategies involving the public good become more costly
and require a higher value of qm to offset that cost. Thus in the MIN case, the presence of a
strong majority opposition encourages distributive spending. Figure 2.1 shows another important
difference between the MIN and MAJ cases. In the MIN case, qm must be very large relative
to |qM | for the minority proposer proposer to invest all funds towards pursuing the policy that
is in his group’s interest rather than settle with particularistic spending for his constituency. In
contrast, in the MAJ case, the proposer does so as long as he values the public good more than
monetary transfers (qM ≥ 1). Additionally, in the MIN case, for many values of qm, there exist
no majority size nM that allows the minority to use the opposition strategy. It thus takes very
special circumstances for the minority proposer to mobilize resources towards the provision of y in
the MIN case, contrary to the position of the majority proposer in the MAJ case.
Having shown that the composition of the legislature shifts the regions of the equilibria, let us
consider how the outcomes within each equilibrium change. Results 2 shows that in the “mixed”
equilibria (PO, DA and DO), the composition of the legislature has important implications. First,
14This is welfare-enhancing as long as nMqM +nmqm > 0, i.e. as long as the public good is Kaldor-improving. The




)2. For qM <
n+1
2n





Hence, the PO equilibrium is better because the budget burden is lesser with a share of it being used for the public
good.
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the size and strength of the opposition decrease the share of the budget dedicated to the public good
and increase distributive spending. Second, in the PO and DA equilibria in which y is only used
as a coalition building tool, I find that, paradoxically, the share of public good spending relative to
total spending decreases the more proponents of the public good value it.

































d|qM | < 0 in the MIN
case.
• The more proponents value the public good, the smaller its size relative to the budget in the











> 0 in the MIN case
The intuition for why a stronger opposition leads to more distributive spending is as follows. In
the PO and DA equilibria, it is because the opposition group increases the bargaining power of the
proposer allowing him to extract more rents. In the DO equilibrium, it is because a larger share
of the budget must be given to majority coalition members to compensate them. As we will see in
the next section, these are also the mechanisms by which citizen suits will have a welfare-enhancing
effect (by rebalancing the bargaining power of non-proposers and lowering the distributive costs of
building coalitions).
The second part of the result says that a greater proportion of the budget is appropriated by
the pro-public good proposer as the valuation of proponents increases. The intuition is that as the
returns to the public good increase, legislators need a lesser proportion of the budget spent on it
to compensate for the opportunity costs of raising the funds and of waiting to become a proposer.
Thus, public good provision in the legislature is monotonically related to the value of the public
good, but the efficiency with which it is provided decreases with its value15. Again, we will see that
this effect is mitigated by citizen suits.
15This is counter to previous findings showing that collective good spending decreases with its value, primarily
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The next section will show how citizen suits affect legislative equilibria. I therefore summarize
the salient features of these equilibria that will be modified by downstream litigation. First, we
have seen that there is some public good provision because it is attractive as a coalition-building
tool, but that much of the budget raised is allocated to distributive spending. The main reason is
that in many cases, proposers have more bargaining power than non-proposers when the legislature
is divided, which allows them to extract rents for their constituencies. Second, when the minority
values the public good, it can to some degree legislate to provide it, but it is always very much
constrained by the requirements of the majority. Third, there are areas of the parameter space
(specifically qM ≥ 1) where the minority has no voice at all. No matter how strongly opposed and
large the minority might be, it cannot influence the majority’s choice nor budge from the majority’s
preferred proposal when they themselves have an opportunity to make a proposal. As we will see,
by tempering the level of ambition of the majority’s legislation, citizen suits will here again affect
the balance of power, shifting it partially back to the minority.
2.4 Legislating with Citizen Suits
In this section, I show how legislative outcomes are affected by the institution of citizen suits. I
start by deriving the results of the litigation stage, and then work backwards to analyze how it
changes legislators’ choices.
2.4.1 The Reshaping of Legislation by Citizen Suits
Recall that at the litigation stage, many citizens independently bring suits in various regional
courts. Petitioners can present claims c to judges to locally shift the implementation of y to c.




2 reflects their respect
for the law as written and their preference. Petitioners will obtain their claim c from a judge i if
giving way to distributive spending as the product of legislative activity (Volden and Wiseman, 2007). The reason
for the difference is that the cost of raising the budget serves as a disciplining device. The budget itself is not affected
by the change in strategy because the local proposal differs from the collective proposal only in a distributional sense.
When BH < B
∗
H , there are collective returns to raising the budget and some of this return can be used to compensate
non-proposers. Once BH reaches the point at which there are no more collective returns, there also are no more funds
for compensating non-proposers.
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All citizens are oponents
All citizens are proponents
Diverse citizens
Faithful implementation
Figure 2.3: The mapping l(y) when the court is fully diverse (i.e. y∗i ∼ U(0,
q1
2k )), with q1 = 0.5
and 40% of citizens opponents.
|c − l∗i | < |y − l∗i |. If y∗i > y, then c will obtain for any y < c < y∗i . Conversely, if y∗i < y, c will
be successful if y∗i < c < y. In other words, any claim that lies between the legislation and the
judge’s a priori policy preference will be successful, because it strikes a better balance between the
legislation and the judge’s preference than the original legislation does.
I assumed that litigants can anticipate the decision of the judge. The best optimal action for
type 1 litigants who want to expand the legislation is to present a claim c = y∗i to any judge i with
y∗i > y and no claim to judges whose preference is y
∗
i < y. Similarly, type 0 litigants who want
to limit the legislation should present claim c = y∗i to any judge with y
∗
i < y and none to judges
whose preference is y∗i > y.
To obtain l : y 7→ ỹ, the mapping from the legislated public good to the effective public good at
the national scale arising from the decentralized litigation process, I integrate over the preferences
of judges and citizens (where r is the proportion of type 0 litigants):






















l(y) is thus the result of the aggregation of all the many local disputes, which modify y. The
exact functional form of Eq. 2.3 is derived in the Appendix, and is represented in Figure 2.3 for
several distribution of citizen and judge preferences. If the nation were fully inhabited by litigants
of type 1, the policy would be inflated (gray line), the more so the lower the initial legislation.
Vice versa, if the nation were fully inhabited by litigants of type 0, the policy would be deflated
(red line), with again a larger departure the farther the initial legislation from the wishes of the
population. The central line represents the outcome in a mixed nation (here with 60% proponents
of the public good). We see that the decentralized litigation process tends to level policy, bringing it
away from extremes towards middling levels. The reason is that citizen suits give citizens access to
decision-makers without the difficulties and corresponding limits of collective action. This form of
public power is widely dispersed, promoting the independent consideration of diverse viewpoints.
Because a public good results from many local implementation actions, the overall reach of the
public good reflects the aggregation of these diverse viewpoints.








2n ), valid for when
the judiciary is fully diverse (i.e. y∗i ∼ U(0,
q1
2k ).
2.4.2 Citizen Suits Lead to Shifts in Power in the Legislature
Section 3 spelled out the public policy consequences of conflict in the legislature and of factors
affecting the bargaining power of the majority and minority groups. I now ask whether the antici-
pation by legislators of the reshaping of policy downstream by citizen suits changes those balances
of power in the legislature, thereby changing public policy. I find indeed that they do. They do by
virtue of the fact that unlike bargaining in the legislature, litigation as conceptualized in this paper
averages the diverse preferences of the citizenry. As a result, extremely ambitious or unambitious
policies get pulled to the center in the second stage of the game, during the implementation of
the law. This undermines the bargaining power of legislators who benefit from extreme positions
(minimal or maximal values of y).
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The same strategies defined in Section 3 hold in this new institutional environment, and the same
combinations of strategies define the different equilibria that can arise when legislators anticipate
downstream litigation. However, downstream litigation changes the equilibrium values of the public
good in the different equilibria and the amount that proposers are able to spend in particularistic
spending. As a result, it also changes the attractiveness of the different strategies and thus the
thresholds separating the equilibria (now denoted with a l superscript to distinguish from the
baseline). Remark 2 presents the policy equilibria in the new institutional environment. To facilitate
exposition, I omit the transfers in the description of most of the equilibria. They are non-zero for
the same set of legislators as in Remark 1, but their magnitudes change as will become clear in the
Results that follow.
Remark 2. 1. In the MAJ case, there are three equilibria:










to n−12 legislators, for i, j ∈ (m,M).
• For ql,PM ≤ qM < q
l,C
M = 1, the equilibrium is PO, yielding:




2k from majority proposals.




m ≤ BPOm from minority proposals.











for i ∈ (m,M).
2. In the MIN case, there are three equilibria:
• For 0 ≤ qm < ql,Am , the equilibrium is DD, with the same equilibrium as in the DD
equilibrium above with l(0) = pmqm4k .
• For ql,Am ≤ qm < ql,Om , the equilibrium is DA, yielding:
– ỹl,DAm < B̃
l,DA
m = BDAm from minority proposals




M ≥ BDAM from majority proposals.
• For ql,Om ≤ qm, the equilibrium is DO, yielding








M from minority proposals.




M ≤ BDOM from majority proposals.
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In this new institutional environment, legislators bargain over the anticipated ỹ = l(y) and B̃
rather than over y and B, even though the official decision inscribed in legislation are expressed as
y and B. Since the litigation process has a deterministic effect on policy, legislators could in theory
adjust y and B to recover the payoffs they seek. However, Remark 2 shows that this is not the cae.
The key feature of citizen suits, from the point of view of legislative bargaining, is that the reaction
of civil society bans certain outcomes: the range of l(y) is smaller than the range of y, as shown in
Figure 2.3. Because both groups have access to courts, because the judiciary is diverse and because
individual decisions add up to determine the overall reach of policy, the public policy gets drawn
toward an average of the preferences of constituents16, ruling out policy outcomes close to either
of the groups’ ideal policy. Thus, policies cannot be minimal as wished by the opposition and they
cannot be maximally ambitious as desired by proponents of the public good. What emerges from
the suits is a compromise. Thus we see in Remark 2 that in the DD equilibrium, ỹDDi = l(0) > 0.
Similarly, in the PO equilibrium, the minority’s strategy yields ỹPOm = l(0) > 0 and similarly for





2k , the effective public good is lower than in the baseline.
We can see in Remark 2 that distributive spending is reduced in the coupled institutional
environment compared to the baseline legislative environment for a number of equilibria. Indeed,
in the DD equilibrium, the effective budget is the same but transfers are less because some of the
budget is spent on the public good. Similarly, the minority proposal of the PO equilibrium includes
less distributive spending, as well as the majority proposals in the DA and DO equilibrium. The
result below shows this to be a general feature in this institutional setting. It states that in most
equilibria, citizen suits boost the provision of public goods.
Result 3. In the DD, PO, DA and DO equilibria, citizen suits increase public good provision by
both types of legislators: ỹM > yM and ỹm > ym.
Recall that in absence of litigation, the bargaining power of public good proponents is typi-
cally weak as indicated by Result 2. However, with litigation, the compromise citizens craft in
courts changes the effective value of any legislation enacted, but it also changes the equilibrium
16Note that the process is responsive to the relative frequency of appearance in court of the two different groups,
so the pull is toward a weighted average.
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continuation values of legislators. For type 1 legislators, their future worst case scenario is now no
lower than l(0) = q1n1/n4k , in contrast to the previous institutional environment where it frequently
was y = 0, or a very low value of y. Thus, in many cases, type 1 legislators now have a higher
continuation value, and consequently, a higher bargaining power, than they had in the absence of
litigation, so their ability to bargain for the public good is heightened. For example, in the PO
equilibrium, recall that the minority was able to enact yPOm = 0, which considerably reduced ma-
jority members’ bargaining power relative to the majority proposer. The minority was able to play
off the internal divisions of the majority. In the presence of citizen suits, majority non-proposers
are in a much better position relative to the proposer’s attempt to extract benefits for his own
constituency because they are assured a minimum level of public good investment even when the
opposition makes a proposal. As a result, citizen suits increase the proportion of funds spent on the
public good as well as its absolute level. In turn, the overall amount of funds spent on distributive
spending is reduced.
The effect of citizen suits is very flagrant in the MIN case, as it causes an increase in public good
provision in all cases. Recall that the type 1 minority was able to invest in the public goods despite
opposition by the majority, but could do so only to a modest degree because of the high costs of
obtaining the acquiescence of majority members. In addition, in the DA equilibrium, the minority
proposer does not energetically seek to promote public good investment since he is interested in
bringing benefits home instead. The position of minority members who value the public good is
thus very weak. Citizen suits strengthen it by giving proponents a minimum guaranteed level.
In the DA equilibrium, this guaranteed level strengthens enhances minority non-proposers’ voice
relative to the minority proposer, via the same mechanism just described for the majority case.
In the DO equilibrium, it strengthens the whole minority relative to the majority: citizen suits
also decrease the bargaining power of majority members who oppose the public good. As a result,
majority members require less particularistic spending to support a bill, which allows the minority
to be more ambitious.
In the majority case, citizen suits boost public good provision only when the majority lacks
cohesion. We saw in Section 3, that when the majority is cohesive (the CA equilibrium), the
united majority unyieldingly seeks to bring the public policy to its maximal value, leaving no space
for compromise with the opposing minority. In that equlibrium, all legislators are bound to propose
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the maximal level of the public good. In the new institutional environment, such a high level of
investment is not feasible because of the resistance of some citizens. The minority gets a voice
in the courts, a voice it absolutely lacked in the legislature. As a result, the public good level
investment is more moderate, as stated in Result 4. We will see in the discussion that this has a
strong positive effect for overall welfare.
Result 4. In the majority case, when qM ≥ 1, citizen suits decrease public good provision by both







We have just considered the effects of citizen suits on public good provision within each of
the equilibria. Yet citizen suits also shift the equilibrium regions to some extent. They shift up
the threshold values q̄1 (valuation by proponents) at which strategies become increasingly more
geared towards providing the public good provision, thus increasing the parameter space in which
more particularistic strategies are used. The reason is that litigation reduces particularistic spend-
ing. Hence, to counterbalance, proposers are more prone to use strategies that allow for more
particularistic spending.
Result 5. All threshold functions q̄PM , q̄
C




m (MIN case) take higher values
under citizen suits.
This result seems to contradict to some extent the trend given by Result 3 (push towards more
public good provision). It does not because, as seen in Figure A.1, in all equilibria except the CA
equilibrium, the expected effective value of the public good is higher. Indeed, the within-equilibrium
increase in public good equilibrium is quantitatively more important effect than the shift towards
more distributive strategies.
Results 3, 4, and 5 are modulated by the size of the group of litigants in favor of the public goood.
To illustrate this, let us focus on the equilibria where litigation boosts public good investment (PO
equilibrium of MAJ case and DA and DO equilibria of MIN case). Let E(ỹ) = pM ỹM + pmỹm
stand for the expected outcome under litigation and E(y) = pMyM + pmym stand for the expected
outcomes in the absence of litigation. As before, n1 stand for the size of the population that is in
favor of the public good.
Remark 3. The difference in expected outcomes between the two institutional environments varies
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The support of a mobilized citizenry influence the outcome of the legislative process in a way that
matches our intuition: a greater number of supporters in the citizenry generates a more ambitious
policy. Even though it matches our intuition, this finding is not obvious. Indeed, the litigation
process is assumed to be perfectly anticipated by legislators, so legislators could theoretically shift
their choices exactly opposite to the shifts anticipated to happen in courts to obtain the same
final outcome. Citizens can influence public policy outcomes in this system because they change




With the knowledge of how legislators’ choice of y changes with litigation, we can now examine the
overall welfare implications. To do so, I consider the average expected payoff for all constituencies.
Thus, we consider W = nMn E(uM ) +
nm
n E(um) in the baseline case without citizen suits and in
the coupled institutional system (denoted W l, where l denotes the presence of litigation). The
following result indicates the conditions under which the coupled system dominates the legislature
alone. q̄ denotes the average valuation in the legislature.
Result 6. The decisions of the legislature coupled with citizen suits yield greater welfare than the
decisions of the legislature alone iff:
1. q̄ > 0 when qM < q̄
P
M (DD equilibrium)
2. q̄ < 34nMqM when q̄
P
M > qM ≥ qCM (CA equilibrium)
3. q̄ > 1n in the rest of the parameter space (PO, DA and DO equilibria)
To a first approximation, this result indicates that litigation generally increases welfare if some
investment in the public good is Kaldor-improving (q̄ > 0). This makes sense since litigation in most
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Figure 2.4: The difference in average expected utility ∆W = W l−W in the MAJ and MIN case.
The x-axis is the proponents’ valuation (qM in the MAJ case and qm in the MIN case), and the
contour lines represent variation in the opponents’ valuation (qm in the MAJ case and qM in the
MIN case). The discontinuities are due to the shifts in thresholds.
cases increases litigation and efficiency demands that y be positive for q̄ > 0. When the legislature
is small, if the equilibria is such that the proposer uses the public good to build a coalition, the
requirement is a little more stringent (condition 3 above). In those situations, the condition is
q̄ > 1n , reflecting the fact that any increase in the public good reduces distributive spending for the
proposer. In the CA equilibrium (condition 2 above), the condition is, on the contrary, that the
average value of the public good must not be too high, since litigation lowers it. The condition,
however, holds for a very large range of parameter values17.
Figure 2.4 shows the difference in welfare between the two institutional environments for a range
of parameter values. For low values of q1, citizen suits decrease welfare since citizen suits force a
minimum positive level of y even though the preference of the opposition is more intense than that
of proponents. The welfare loss however, is not very large because the investments arising due to
litigation are small (because judges weigh the current state of legislation in their decisions). In the
MAJ case, welfare is greatly increased for most parameter values.
The reasons for this improvement may differ, depending on the section of the parameter space.
In the region of the PO equilibrium, the improvement afforded by citizen suits is due to Result 3,
17Rewriting the condition as n̄M (qM ) =
qM (2n−3nM )
4(n−nM )
if qm = 0, it holds for nM < n̄M (qm) =
2
3
n, with n̄M (qm)
inversely related to qm.
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where we saw that citizen suits buttress the bargaining power of majority members relative to the
majority proposer and thus forces him to invest more. On the contrary, in the region of the CA
equilibrium (MAJ case), the coupled institution fares better because y is not as extreme as in the
legislature alone, thus representing a degree of compromise with the minority. In the legislature
alone, there is no compromise whatsoever since the majority is united in its objective and can
therefore impose its preference. However, with citizen suits, the extreme choices of the majority
are tempered by downstream litigation and this lets the minority make more moderate proposals
as well.
In the MIN case, the coupled system outperforms the legislature alone for qm > −nM qMnm ,
because in those cases, it reflects better than the legislature would on its own the high valuation of
the minority for the public good. By giving some voice to the minority when the latter values the
public good - but not full powers - the coupled system leads to legislation that creates more value
for the legislature as a whole. Without citizen suits, the payoffs of most non-proposers are negative
because a high budget is raised and channeled in large part toward distributive spending. Citizen
suits, by forcing some funds to be channeled in the public good, minimize the extent of this loss.
But in the MIN case, citizen suits can also lead to an over-investment in the public good, which
can also decrease welfare.
Note that neither institution is very sensitive to the relative intensities of the two groups. This is
why neither institution dominates the other over the whole parameter range. Because the legislature
generally tends to under-invest in the public good when either the minority values it, or the type
1 proposer prefers particularistic spending, thus creating a division within the type 1 group, as
soon as some public investment is efficient for the legislature as a whole, the coupled system tends
to fare better. Conversely, because citizen suits allow some mobilization by proponents even when
they value the good moderately and aren’t very numerous, the legislature alone outperforms the
coupled system when efficiency requires that there be no or limited public good investment.
The welfare improvements offered by the coupled system come along with more divergent payoffs
for each group in the PO equilibrium and the MIN case. The type 1 group is much better off
and the type 0 is much worse off in those cases. Thus, the difference in the ex-post payoffs of both
groups is higher. It is thus only in an ex-ante sense that the coupled system is better able to forge
a degree of compromise. Only in the CA equilibrium do we see ex-post payoffs of both groups in
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fact come closer to each other.
2.5.2 Endogenizing citizen suits
Given who stands to gain and lose, when and by whom can we expect citizen suits to be instituted?
As shown by the welfare analysis, from an ex ante point of view (before knowing the distribution
of preferences), the institution is expected to be beneficial. Hence, we can expect all legislators
to support a general procedural law that promotes citizen suits if legislators are equally likely to
fall in the camp of proponents or proponents over a large set of policies. In the United States,
the Administrative Procedures Act sets up a process for the courts to review agency decisions in
cases where a litigant can demonstrate that the agency’s rule was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law”. To have standing to bring such a case
to the court, a citizen must demonstrate a legal interest that falls within the interests that the
statute wished to protect. In other words, this is a way to ensure that publics with a stake in
the implementation of a statute have a real power to participate. We can interpret the APA as
coordinating legislators around procedural rules that benefit everyone in a repeated game context,
or “behind a veil of ignorance”.
Yet, individual statutes vary in how much they allow citizens and courts to intervene in their
implementation. Therefore, the endogeneity question should also be asked at the level of individual
pieces of legislation, when the preferences of legislators are known. For example, the legislative his-
tories of major amendments of environmental statutes reveal that there were strong advocates for
and against the institution of citizen suits. Proponents of strong environmental protection were also
proponents of citizen suits, arguing that they were necessary to ensure the implementation of the
law18. Opponents instead complained about the shift of power towards environmental protection
advocates19. The question of the endogeneity of citizen suits requires that we specify what is the
18For example, “If we are taking action for strong clean air legislation, then we must also ensure that the resulting
legislation is fully enforceable. Clean citizen suit provisions are the key to that.” statement by Cardiss Collins, 1990,
Legislative History of Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
19“ince the bill expressly provides for citizen suits against those who violate even the slightest provisions of the
bill, and since the Agency itself is subject to suit if it misses even one deadline or falls short on even one regulation,
the real driving force behind this bill will be the National Environmental lobbies with their army of attorneys.”
Statement by Steven Symms, 1990, Legislative History of Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
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status quo without citizen suits. From the arguments of proponents, they seemed to be concerned
that without citizen suits, the policy-process would be biased towards low implementation, presum-
ably because of the lobbying power of businesses, which is consistent with findings that business
groups dominate both administrative lobbying and legislative lobbying (e.g. ?). Remark 4 shows
that indeed, the only situations in which proposers would champion citizen suits is when the ma-
jority want to promote the public good and expects that without this institution, implementation
will be very weak.
Consider an extended action space in which each type of proposer either includes the institution
in the bill or doesn’t. Denote these two actions {Li = 1, Li = 0} for i ∈ (m,M).
Remark 4. If implementation is expected to be unbiased, (LM = 0, Lm = 0) is an equilibrium,
while (LM = 1, Lm = 1) is not.
If implementation is expected to be biased towards weak implementation, (LM = 1, Lm = 1) is an
equilibrium while (LM = 0, Lm = 0) is not in the MAJ case when the majority values highly the
public good qM ≥ 1.
Remark 4 implies that the vigorous support for citizen suits found in the congressional record
for a number of environmental statutes, for example, cannot be explained if legislators expect laws
to be implemented without bias in the absence of citizen suits. In practice, implementation always
involves an institutional process that empowers some groups to influence outcomes. In the bills
in which citizen suits was proposed and defended, legislators favoring the public good feared that
implementation would be dominated by the influence of firms. Citizen suits are seen as a way of
equalizing access to the policy process. In the model, this is represented by r = nmn : the proportion
of those trying to influence the implementation toward less ambitious levels of public good provision
should reflect the proportion of citizens holding this preference in the society at large. The status
quo that legislators expect without citizen suits can be thought of as equivalent to r = 1 (only
opponents influence the implementation of policy), or at least r > nmn
20. In this context, we show
that if r is large (i.e. the influence of members of the public who oppose y on its implementation is
20This is an approximation given that we don’t model the institutional process that prevails in the absence of
citizen suits in which firms have a high ability to influence implementation. We think of it here as similar to the
situation in which only firms would litigate, which has the effect of considerably reducing the range of values that y
can take in practice as shown in Figure 2.3
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large), the institution of citizen suits is an equilibrium when . This happens when the majority cares
considerably about the public good. The reason proposers in that case promote citizen suits is that
otherwise they cannot achieve the level of public good that they propose in their legislation. The
citizen suits in fact lifts the constraint imposed by the influence of well-organized and resourceful
members of the public by leveling the public field.
2.5.3 Testable implications
The results yield one clear testable implication: the broader citizens’ standing to sue in the process
of implementing a statute that legislates the provision of a public good, the more funding we expect
to go towards the public good and less towards particularistic spending21. This hypothesis could
be tested in a number of ways. First, at the federal level, it is possible to use the variation in
the standing doctrine of the Supreme Court, interacted with the variation across statutes in the
breadth and importance of citizen suits. Indeed, we expect that funding in the appropriations bills
for the agencies enacting each statute should decrease in periods when the courts use a narrow
standing doctrine and increase when the standing doctrine is broader, but more so for statutes that
include strong citizen suits clauses.
State laws also vary in their use of citizen suits, both at the constitutional level (for example
granting a right to a clean environment backed by citizen suits) and for individual statutes. Thus,
cross-sectional variation could shed light on the value of the hypothesis. Many states adopt the
same standing test as the federal courts and presumably follow the federal levels change in standing
doctrine over time. The approach sketched above for the federal level (using longitudinal variation
in standing interacted with the importance of the citizen suit provision in the enforcement of the
statute) should therefore also work at the state level.
2.5.4 Robustness and generality of the model
This paper has proposed a model of legislature and court interaction in which the courts are the
forum of a highly decentralized process of citizen participation in the shaping of policy. In doing
so, it departs from most models of inter-branch interaction, which focus on the Supreme Court.
21The only exception is when all legislators, including the proposer, cares more about funding the public good than
about obtaining particularistic spending.
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Being at the apex of the judicial system and responsible of handing down decisions that bind the
lower courts, the Supreme Court is usually seen as the real source of policy innovation in the court
system. Instead, this paper ignores judicial hierarchy and assumes that the court system generates
a very large number of diverse decisions. This assumption was justified by reference to 1) the very
large number of courts handing down decisions, 2) the geographical distribution of litigants, 3) the
temporal distribution of judicial appointments yielding diverse ideologies amongst judges, and 4)
the plurality of legality issues actually included in a statute and in the implementation of a public
policy. Nonetheless, given that the results of Section 4 and of the welfare analysis are fully driven
by the assumption that the judicial branch is a pluralist institution, the specific assumptions built
in the litigation model need critical examination.
Three of the simplifications made may specifically pose a question to the reader. First, one
may object to the assumed independence between judicial decisions reflecting my neglect of judicial
hierarchy. Higher courts can make far-reaching judgments that influence large classes of subsequent
cases. One answer is that the production of any public policy raises many more specific policy issues
and court cases address much more narrow issues than the legislative decision. As a result, even if
many cases are related, there still are a large number of unrelated cases (or lines of precedent). In
addition, the assumption of a large number of independent decisions justified treating the process
as deterministic: with enough citizen mobilization, it is reasonable for any legislator to expect that
the final policy will be the expectation taken over the distribution of citizen and judicial preferences
(shaped by the text of the statute). However, if a higher court can stir the litigation process in a
particular direction and there exists ex ante uncertainty about the higher courts future judgment,
then the process is perhaps better viewed as uncertain from the viewpoint of legislators, with some
probability of highly conservative or highly expansive court rulings. To reflect this, the model can
be modified by adding uncertainty as to the range of judicial preferences. Qualitatively, the results
remain unchanged. Citizen suits still undermine the proposers advantage unless the chance of a
highly conservative court ruling is high. Citizen suits also still contribute to a better reflection of the
minoritys interest. Thus, the qualitative aspect of the analysis are preserved once the assumption
of deterministic independence is relaxed, as long as some degree of pluralism is conserved.
A second objection is that there are no restrictions on citizens claims and judges decisions.
This is merely a simplification to make the analysis more transparent. Consider instead that
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the opportunities for litigation arise within the scope of ambiguity opened up by policy drift.
Specifically, let policy be shifted up or down periodically by exogenous events and let citizens have
the option of bringing a case to defend a more literal reading of the law, bringing policy back to y.
Thus, the only change here is in the range of claims citizens can bring forth, assuming that policy
drift introduces uncertainty. Judges preferences and decision problem remain identical.
Finally, I will relax the assumption that litigation is costless and that consequently, all potential
litigants – whether holding large or small grievances and large or small wallets – bring suit. What
happens when we add a cost to accessing the courts? An equal cost for all could let citizen suits
better reflect the intensity of preferences. Indeed, in the present formulation, citizen suits do not
at all reflect the intensity of the preferences of type 0 litigants (but it does reflect that of type 1
litigants since q1 gives the upper bound of claims and of judges’ preferences). With a cost, however,
litigants would only go to court if the claim they expect to obtain in court yields a sufficiently large
policy payoff relative to the cost. Specifically, the condition is that q(c − y) > K, where |q| is the
absolute valuation of the litigant, c the claim, y the status quo policy and K the cost of access.
If the cost is large enough relative to |q|, a litigant only goes to court when y is very far from
his own preference and he has access to a judge with very similar preference to his own. In such
a context, citizen suits can yield additional welfare increases, relative to what was shown in the
previous section, by virtue of being more sensitive to differences in the intensity of preferences of the
two groups. However, these improvements are highly sensitive on the cost being in a “productive”
range. A low cost offers no improvement over the costless version, while a cost that is too high
relative to the valuations and the scope of the disputed policy entirely crowds out litigation. Of
course, high costs can also have perverse effects if they apply differentially across the two groups.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper has presented a model of legislative bargaining in a situation of conflict over the provision
of a public good, in an institutional context in which citizens can subsequently influence the policy
in courts of law. In this model, citizen suits are found to strike a compromise between the formal
legislation and the diverse preferences of citizens. I showed that in some circumstances, when the
majority stands to benefit from the public good, the proposers of the majority and the minority
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groups in the legislature synergistically undermine the representation of the majority’s interest,
diverting a large proportion of funds towards particularistic spending. Citizen suits were shown
to alleviate this problem by enabling some minimum degree of public policy investments, thereby
strengthening the majority’s voice. In other circumstances, the legislative process is found to be
very weakly responsive to the minority’s interests. Citizen suits can, though imperfectly, help
temper this charateristic of majority institutions. They do so by forcing all legislators to take
some account of the full spectrum of citizen preferences rather than singly reflect that of their own
constituency.
Court action following legislation is often criticized for not faithfully representing legislative
intent, and the internal bargains struck by legislators. The diversity in court rulings is taunted as
evidence that judges are policy-motivated and not disciplined by the law, and are therefore usurping
legislative powers. Others consider it natural that the courts take on legislative roles, if a certain
policy question calls for a deliberative justification other than a majority justification, such as a
moral justification (Ferejohn, 2002). The analysis I provide here suggests instead that courts may
be able to productively tackle the same policy disputes as the legislature, and in doing so help the
legislative process. This paper conceptualizes the legislature and the courts as part and parcel of a
policy system in which citizens have formal means of prodding the legislature into enacting reforms,
and shows some mechanisms by which this sharing of authority is productive. The assumptions
about decision-making in courts that drive these results are that courts are decentralized, that
citizens set the agenda, and that judges hold diverse preferences, which are partially disciplined
by the legislative text. Also important is the fact that courts are called upon to rule on narrower
issues of implementation that additively determine the true impact of legislation on the ground.
This allows the expression of the diversity of citizen and judge preferences, without crushing the
influence of the general prospective rules negotiated within the legislature.
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Abstract
Laws – be they common law, statutes or the constitution itself – evolve continuously. People make
use of them, and discovering ambiguities or disagreeing on their proper application, ask courts
throughout the nation to re-interpret them. What are the political drivers of this process? This
paper analyzes a dataset of over 10000 U.S. environmental court cases, reconstructing the network
of citations to legal precedent for a period of forty years. This dynamic network provides full infor-
mation about the use of precedent over time and whether precedent is affirmed or undermined by
written opinions. The network is thus a reflection of the evolution of the legal rules of environmen-
tal governance in the United States. The paper introduces multiple statistics that capture dynamic
features of this network. These statistics are designed to capture significant changes in the content
of the law. Using these measures, the analysis tests whether legal change is affected by changes in
the preferences of pivotal legislators. Overall, the dynamic properties of this network reveal that
laws evolve largely independently from shifts in legislative power.
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3.1 Introduction
Every week, American judges write several hundred legal opinions that re-interpret, clarify or mod-
ify the meaning of public laws1 – whether they be statutes, constitutional clauses, or a regulation
issued by an executive agency. Judges write these opinions prompted by members of the public,
who put forth diverse arguments regarding what these public laws ought to mean and how they
ought to be enforced. This flow of decisions is incremental – each decision addressing a very specific
set of circumstances – yet, over time, creates policy by determining which behaviors are acceptable
and which are not. What political forces come into play in this policy process?
The rational choice theory of courts predicts that shifts in the policy preferences of legislators
should influence the decisions of judges. This paper therefore explores the question at hand by test-
ing whether changes in the ideology of key legislators influences the rate at which environmental
case law evolves over time. The focus on environmental case law is explained by the fact that few
studies examine the trajectories of environmental legislation over time, even though the difficulty
of maintaining a policy on the long-term is seen as a major obstacle to effective environmental
governance (Rodrik, 1996; Hovi et al., 2009; Jacobs, 2011). Furthermore, court decisions have had
an important role in the lives of the United States’ key environmental statutes. Together with the
Administrative Procedures Act, the environmental statutes of the 1970’s greatly expanded citizens’
access to courts as a means of giving voice to citizens in the policy process and of facilitating
enforcement. Legal action has accordingly become an important political strategy for special in-
terests, local associations and local authorities, leading to an uninterrupted flow of decisions over
more than four decades (see section 3.3). Yet, the statutes that provide the authority and the
framework for these disputes and decisions are themselves very stable. The Clean Air Act was last
amended in 1990, the Clean Water Act in 1981, the Endangered Species Act in 1988. Agencies and
courts are thus the principal organizations directly modifying policy in the face of changes in the
environment, the economy and changes in societal beliefs.
In the face of rapid changes in society, the stability of policy that appears flagrant to the observer
of statutes can hide a wide range of actual policy changes on the ground. Hacker (2004) shows for
1The focus is on public law – governing the relationship of individuals to the state and the public interest – as
opposed to private law – governing the relationship between private parties.
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example that the formal structure of social welfare policy in the United States stayed remarkably
constant, but that this stability hid a growing mismatch between welfare policies and the new social
risks faced by citizens. He brings our attention to the “subterranean political processes that shape
ground-level policy effects”, beyond the much more visible politics of formal reforms, and shows
that these processes, too, are political. He argues that conservative interest groups and politicians
actively prevented any adaptation of the policies to the changing social context and that incremental
changes in the direction of weaker protection had far-reaching consequences. Patashnik (2003)
examines the fate of several general-interest reforms, observing that if constituencies with a stake
in the reform are not powerful enough, reforms are easily corrupted after enactment. These studies
clearly show that to understand how institutional structure affects policies and social outcomes
over time, we must study the mechanisms that affect incremental decision-making in courts and
agencies, from the local to the national scale, and thereby build an account of how laws evolve over
time.
Positive political theory sees laws as epiphenomenal to the political game (Pierson, 2003). Both
their enactment and their post-enactment life depend on the resolution of political conflicts between
political actors holding different policy preferences – within the constraints set by principal-agent
relationships, coalition formation and the constellation of institutional veto players. Laws are thus
born out of political dynamics and remain beholden to the same political dynamics throughout
their life. Specifically, within positive political theory, separation-of-power (SOP) models make
predictions about how the interaction between the courts and the legislative branch will affect policy.
In these models, judges face the threat of seeing their decisions overturned by legislators. They
therefore make decisions that lie as close to their preferences as possible, but within the “gridlock
interval” – the policy interval delineated by pivotal legislative actors, which defines a policy area
immune from reversals (Ferejohn and Weingast, 1992; Spiller and Gely, 1992; McNollgast, 1994;
Shipan, 2000). In this model, important policy change thus requires shifts in the distribution of
preferences of pivotal legislative actors (Epstein et al., 2008).
This paper empirically tests the influence of changes in the preferences of political actors on the
evolution of U.S. environmental case law over four decades. It does so by analyzing the dynamics of
the network of citations to legal precedent in all court opinions that were written over that period
of time. A citation to precedent means a judge is referring to a rule articulated in a past case to
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justify his decision. A positive citation reaffirms the validity of the rule, while a negative citation
undermines its validity. In turn, citizens use that information to form their expectations about
which course of action will be deemed wrongful in the future. Rules articulated in opinions, and
references to them, thus constitute policy. In this paper, I use changes over time in the pattern of
citations and the structure of the network as a measure for changes in the rules of environmental
governance. This allows me to test whether the application of environmental laws is beholden to
politics in the way political economy models of law and politics posit (Rodriguez and McCubbins,
2006).
Several other papers have tested the prediction of separation of power models that courts are
constrained by the preferences of congressional actors (Spiller and Gely, 1992; Segal, 1997; Bergara
et al., 2003). The most recent of these papers exposes biases and data insufficiencies in the other
ones, and concludes that the congressional players posited by Krehbiel (2010) to be pivotal have
a discernible influence on the Supreme Court’s decisions. All these papers focus on the votes
of Supreme Court justices. As elaborated below, this paper attempts to move away from the
study of votes to the study of policy change. Furthermore, most important court decisions about
environmental law are not made by the U.S. Supreme Court. There is no reason why the separation
of power model should apply solely to the Supreme Court – its formulation makes it relevant to
any court decision that has policy implications. Instead of focusing on the votes of justices in all
Supreme Court cases, this paper focuses solely on environmental law – albeit the full record of
this body of law, generated by district courts and appeals courts throughout the twelve circuits,
as well as the Supreme Court. The important question is whether the strategic logic espoused by
separation of power models leaves a discernible and important trace in the legal record of opinions,
even though this record is built from decisions by numerous actors in a structurally decentralized
system. This paper concludes that it does not. It seems likely that to understand the trajectory of
environmental laws, looking at shifts in legislative preferences will provide little traction.
Methodologically, this paper presents a few innovations. First, it attempts to move from po-
litical behavior to policy substance, a move that has been called for by several scholars and seems
warranted if we are to understand the output of institutions (Lapinski, 2008). Second, in order
to study changes in policy substance in a large-N framework, I derive measures of legal change
from the network of citations to legal precedent, anchoring myself in existing analyses of the role of
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precedent as a carrier of legal policy. Finally, I use a combination of parametric and non-parametric
tests, based on the careful construction of a null model, to test the influence of changes in the dis-
tribution of preferences in the political branches. It is worth noting that a few papers propose
descriptive analyses of the network of legal citations formed by Supreme Court decisions (Fowler et
al., 2007; Fowler and Jeon, 2008; Leicht et al., 2007). With the exception of the pioneering study
of Hansford and Spriggs (2006), none use network analysis to test theories of the political and legal
drivers of legal dynamics, and none considers the entire court system.
Section 3.2 reviews the theory of congressional constraints on court decisions and discusses
the dynamic implications of this theory. Section 3.3 then presents the dataset and introduces the
measures of legal change proposed in this paper. Section 3.4 presents the results of the statistical
analysis, showing that there is little trace of the influence of congressional preferences in the evo-
lution of environmental case law – at least as conceptualized in this paper. Section 3.5 concludes
by outlining possible shortcomings in the analysis and putting the results in light of other theories
of the law and of policy processes.
3.2 Theory of the politically constrained court
As Pierson has noted, political scientists generally believe that ”policies, unlike formal institutions,
are relatively easy to change (or ’plastic’), they are essentially epiphenomenal” (Pierson, 2003). For
those who see laws as epiphenomenal to the political game, the main immediate effect of legislation
is to change the status quo policy2 and legislation has an effect on long-term social outcomes only
in so far as 1) those in charge of implementing legislation have sufficient incentives to implement it
faithfully (principal-agent theory), and 2) future policy-makers cannot easily change the status quo
policy (veto player theory). In this framework, courts’ decisions are conceptualized as movements
of the policy in ideological space, and these movements are theorized to be constrained by the
preferences of key players in the elected branches. In turn, courts enjoy autonomy only when
political actors are strongly divided (Rodriguez and McCubbins, 2006; Ramseyer, 1994).
This viewpoint was clearly formalized in a series of models called “separation-of-power” models.
2In this perspective, there exists no fundamental difference between law and policy – laws are conceptualized as
a point in policy space, thus implementing a policy outcome. This stands in contrast to other approaches in which
laws reflect and articulate a structure for normative reasoning.
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(a) Gridlock interval arising from pivotal
players p1 and p2 and the resulting stability
of different legal decisions.
(b) Possible dynamic scenarios for changes in political configu-
ration from one period to another. The green lines show the
movement of the left-most player between t and t + 1 and that
of the right-most player between t and t + 1. We can define the
swing interval as the sum of these movements. ∆G represents
the change in the size of the gridlock interval.
Figure 3.1: Static and dynamic versions of the separations-of-power models.
Figure 3.1a represents the main logic of the separation of power models: the preferences of pivotal
players (those who can defeat a policy proposal) in the policy space form an interval, called the
gridlock interval. Courts can change the status quo policy within that interval but are constrained
by the preferences of pivotal players outside of that interval because the pivotal players can agree to
modify the courts’ rulings. Since judges are assumed to maximize their satisfaction with resulting
policies, they will act strategically, moving policy as close to their ideal point as possible within
the gridlock interval.
If we consider this theory from a dynamic point of view, we see that changes in the gridlock
interval will induce changes in courts’ statutory interpretation decisions. Consider the first scenario
in 3.1b. As we move from period 1 to period 2, part of the policy space is uncovered. Any statutory
interpretation lying in that region becomes vulnerable to being changed since all pivotal players
would agree with that change. Additionally, part of the policy space becomes covered by the
new gridlock interval. All movements in statutory interpretation decisions in that region become
possible, thus opening a window of opportunity for legal change. Thus, both the newly uncovered
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and the newly covered regions offer opportunities for legal change.
As illustrated in figure 3.1b, I define S, the swing interval. S is the sum of the absolute movement
of the lower bound and upper bounds of the gridlock intervals from one period to the next. This
measure gives us the sum of the newly uncovered and newly covered regions. Comparing scenario
1 and scenario 2 in figure 3.1b, we see that the size of the gridlock interval can remain unchanged,
yet the swing be important, while the size of the gridlock interval can change but generate only a
moderate measure of swing. I argue that, even without taking into account the policy preferences
of judges, SOP models imply that larger swing intervals should induce more changes in statutory
case law. This argument is based on the assumption that legal change is a distributed process
that engages many actors and on the further assumption that the engaged public holds a wide
diversity of preferences (see section 3.3 for evidence supporting the assumption that law is shaped
in a highly distributed fashion). As a result, if courts are politically constrained by pivotal players
in the other branches of government, any change in the preferences of these pivotal players opens
a window of opportunity for some actor in society to push for a change in environmental law. If
the window of opportunity moves in the direction of allowing more pro-environmental protection
interpretations, environmental groups would exploit it, and if the window of opportunity moves in
a more pro-business direction, industrial associations would exploit it.
The relevant veto players in SOP models are typically the median voter of each house and the
president. The logic can easily be extended to include instead the pivotal players of Krehbiel’s super-
majority theory of congressional politics (the filibuster pivot, the President and the presidential
override veto player), or the key majority-party and committee players in Cox and McCubbins’s
(2007) theory of legislative decision-making. The gridlock interval and measure of swing used
in this paper are based on Krehbiel’s (2010) super-majority players. Indeed, the most recent and
careful test of the SOP model, by Bergara et al. (2003), found these pivotal players to yield the most
robust and significant influence on Supreme Court decisions. The appendix considers pivotal players
arising from alternative theories of legislative decision-making, particularly committee gatekeeping
theories3 Furthermore, given that many actors could play pivotal roles (depending on the type of
3It is likely that real legislative decision-making actually gives a key role to some actors in some circumstances,
and other actors in other circumstances. A legislative move to overturn a court decision may take a wide variety of
forms: formal statutory amendments that attract the attention of many legislators, obscure budget riders, budget
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decision that is made and the negociations that underlie it), the analysis also considers the effects of
changes in the median ideology of Congress, as a measure of the overall support for environmental
protection in Congress.
3.3 The Network of Legal Citations and Measures of Legal Change
One contribution of this paper is to show how we can make use of legal opinions – and specifically
their citations to precedent – to test political economy theories of regulation. In this section I first
introduce this novel dataset and highlight some of its key features before showing how I use this
data to derive measures of legal change.
The focus on precedents stems from the fact that “the doctrinal and therefore political content
of most opinions is only tenuously related to which party won the case” (Shapiro, 1964). It is not
the case outcome, nor the votes, but the written opinion that affects policy (see also Epstein and
Knight, 2013; De Mesquita and Stephenson, 2002; Hansford and Spriggs, 2006). Furthermore, it is
only because the opinion forms a precedent to be followed in similar circumstances in the future
that it has any policy-bearing content. Every attorney in the nation consults opinions to determine
which behaviors are likely to be condoned in a specific context in the future. And every attorney
checks how the opinion has been cited to verify that it is still “good law”. It is thus the content
of the opinion and the pattern of citation to it that helps attorneys, firms and citizens determine
what the current state of the law is.
3.3.1 The Legal Data
The dataset is derived from the Federal Reporter, published by Westlaw. The Federal Reporter
consists of the full record of every case for which an opinion was published. Westlaw clerks identify
each legal issue discussed in the opinion and classify this issue according to the Westlaw nomen-
clature of legal issues. In this nomenclature, there are 589 legal issues in environmental law. I
cuts, non-enforcement of rulings (Staton and Vanberg, 2008; Helmke and Rosenbluth, 2009). Given the diversity
of ways courts could suffer political backlash, courts may thus be sensitive to changes in the overall distribution of
politicians’ preferences. It would thus be fruitful to consider more probabilistic formulations of “gridlock” and swing
that capture the distribution of players who could act in a pivotal fashion on any one decision and captures our
uncertainty regarding his/her precise identity.
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downloaded all court cases since 1970 that include at least one issue classified as an environmental
issue. I thus obtained 12270 court cases. All the issues a case deals with appear in a list of head-
notes at the beginning of the opinion, which allows to disaggregate each case into its individual
decisions (see appendix figure B.1). Headnotes are a more meaningful unit of analysis than cases.
Indeed, each case is an idiosyncratic set of legal issues. Each headnote, on the other hand, deals
with a distinct issue and its governing rules. The claim summarized in a specific headnote can be
reversed by a future ruling, while other claims in the case, summarized in other headnotes, can
remain valid. Thus, the correct unit of analysis to study legal change are the individual claims as
captured by headnotes. After splitting the cases into individual issues by headnotes, and keeping
only environmental issues in the dataset, I obtained 49690 environmental decisions.
A citation network is composed of nodes and directed links. The nodes in this case are the
headnotes, i.e. a legal decision at a given point in time by a given court on a specific issue.
The directed links are the citations between headnotes. These citations are retrieved from the
argumentation in the opinion in which prior decisions are cited. These citations are usually positive
(affirming the validity of that decision), with a small percentage of citations being negative (refuting
or narrowing the scope of a prior decision)4. Since links can only go towards past cases, the network
is a directed acyclic graph, that is also signed – in plain English, a network connecting headnotes
to prior headnotes, either in a positive or negative way.
The resulting network of decisions spans the full federal judiciary hierarchy. Figure 3.2 shows
some features of this body of law. First, we see that the number of decisions per year seems to have
stabilized at around 1700 per year5. Decisions are cited positively about 2 times on average (this
is the in-degree of the node). However, this variable is characterized by a power-law distribution,
so that some decisions are cited hundreds of times while most decisions are hardly ever cited (the
downward slope over time is due to the fact that more recent cases haven’t had time to cumulate
as many citations). The number of past decisions cited in justifying a decision (the out-degree of
4To obtain the links, I paired the headnotes to the set of cases cited in the opinion in support of the headnote’s
resolution. Subsequently, by parsing the text of the cited cases, I could uncover the specific headnote thus cited and
the sign of the citation (negative or positive).
5This number refers to the number of headnotes, not the number of cases. There are about 300 cases per year,
and on average 6 environmental headnotes per cases.
CHAPTER 3. WHOSE LAW IS IT? NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1973-2013 53





















number of decisions made
Figure 3.2: Average negative and positive citations made and received by environmental nodes over
time, as well as the total volume of decisions over time.
the node) is distributed more evenly with an average of 1.5 citations, which, interestingly, has been
increasing in the last decade6. Finally, we see that the rate of negative citations is low, but has
been increasing over time, targetting decisions ranging from 1970 to 2005 at a rather even rate.
Figure 3.3 summarizes the distribution of court opinions throughout the federal court system.
56% of opinions come from district courts and 43% from appeals courts. Of these appeals court
opinions, only 18% come from the District of Columbia, which is the highest appeals court for
administrative law aside from the Supreme Court. Supreme Court cases make up only 1 % of all
opinions in this dataset. These figures demonstrate that environmental law evolves in a distributed
fashion – many courts contribute to it throughout the country, and only a small fraction of opinions
arise from the higher echelons of the judicial hierarchy7.
6This may be reflecting the increasing complexity of the law, or perhaps a desire of judges to anchor ever more
firmly their decisions in precedent to bolster their legitimacy in the face of increasing party polarization.
7Skeptics may argue that cases arising from the Supreme Court or the D.C court of appeals are much more
influential and highly cited and that we should therefore look at the distribution of citations instead of decisions.
Indeed, the distribution of citations shows that appeals courts decisions concentrate more citations than district
court decisions. Nonetheless, repeating the exercise with citation counts still shows that decision-making is highly
distributed. Indeed, about 18% of citations are to district court decisions, another 18% to Supreme Court decisions,
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Figure 3.3: The distribution of decisions across district courts and appeals courts of the eleven
circuits, plus the D.C circuit and the Supreme Court.
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The network is 98% connected, which shows that decisions are hardly independent of each other.
However, not all issues are as closely connected as others: the network is to a strong degree organized
in communities, i.e. groups of issues that are more likely to cite other issues in the group than
issues outside the group8. These groups can be identified using community detection algorithms,
such as that of Newman (2006)9. Appendix figure 3.2 shows that using this method, the body
of environmental law can be meaningfully split into eight categories: air pollution (CAA), water
pollution (CWA), environmental impact assessments (NEPA), plants and wildlife (ESA), historical
preservation, management of waste (RCRA), cleanup of hazardous waste (CERCLA) and judicial
review (specifically rules for legal standing and distribution of costs and attorney fees)10.
How do decisions build influence over time? Are younger decisions more likely to be cited?
How fast do decisions age? These patterns are important to grasp in order to build time-sensitive
measures of the importance of cases and build indicators of legal change. The probability of citing
a decision declines very slowly as a function of its age. More than 50% of citations are to decisions
that are more than 10 years old and 20% of citations are to decisions older than 25 years. This
can be put in contrast with scientific citation networks in which 50% of citations are to studies
that are younger than 4 years old and only 20% of citations are to studies older than 15 years
(Martin et al., 2013). Thus, legal norms stay relevant longer than scientific studies. Second, the
probability of citing an older case has increased steadily over time, indicating that the body of
law is cumulative. To understand how decisions mature, consider figure 3.4. It plots P (∆t), the
distribution of time from a decision to the decision being cited. This distribution is best described
by a log-normal survival probability function – a common function for decay processes such as this
one (Wang et al., 2013). The location parameter µ can be thought of as a measure of immediacy
– governing the time for a decision to reach its citation peak, while σ, the decay rate, captures
the decision’s longevity. We will use this distribution to adjust for time in deriving measures of a
9% to the D.C circuit appeals court, and the remaining 53% from other the appeals court of other circuits.
8The concept of community is central to network analysis. It is the equivalent for networks of the concept of
clusters, well known in the analysis of regular datasets
9See appendix for details on the community structure and the method of inference.
10These communities correspond well to the major groupings of environmental issues in the Westlaw nomenclature.
However, most of the procedural issues in the Westlaw nomenclature are too enmeshed with substantive issues to
form their own independent doctrines, except for the issue of standing and distribution of fees.
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Figure 3.4: Probability distribution of delay between decision and its citation (time is in days).
The best fit curve gives µ = 7.46 and σ = 1.14, indicating that immediacy is on average close to 5
years.
decision’s importance.
3.3.2 Measures of Legal Change
Rational choice theories conceptualize legal decisions as policy changes, or, equivalently, movements
in ideological space. How should policy change manifest itself in the network of legal citations? To
answer this, I use common descriptions of how common law develops and of judges’ use of legal
precedent to determine what patterns in the use of precedent are indicative of change in the content
of the law.
Legal opinions express rules and standards, which map the factual characteristics of a dispute
over a behavior to a judgment about the behavior (Dworkin, 1982; Lax, 2011). Yet, a given opinion
never stands alone; rather, it stands in relation to other opinions. Sometimes it restricts the scope
of a prior decision, or expands it, or simply refines an existing rule in light of local circumstances.
Indeed, a single opinion cannot define a doctrine in a comprehensive way. It usually takes a series
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of opinions to clarify a rule, or a set of rules (De Mesquita and Stephenson, 2002; Shapiro, 1972).
Court cases that lead to an opinion often feature a new, idiosyncratic feature. Each decision thus
comes with a justification – based on precedent – that interweaves the old and the new and feeds
in that line of justification for future cases (just as academic authors cite the literature to which
they are adding or with which they are arguing). This means that a highly novel case – one
that articulates a new rule, breaks with precedent or deals with an entirely new situation (casus
sui generis) – should attract a large number of citations by future decisions, because to become
operational, the rule needs opinions that will incrementally refine it.
Thus, important opinions tend to be highly cited because they require refinement. Hence, the
appearance of a decision that becomes highly cited over time is an indicator of novel change. But
citations themselves can also directly shape the influence of an opinion. Positive citations increase
the validity of the precedent (Hansford and Spriggs, 2006: say that it increases the “vitality” of the
opinion), whereas negative citations undermine its validity. Since future opinions that positively
cite well-established precedents are more legitimate – and more clearly understandable by the
population – a precedent’s citation count affects how influential it might be in future rulings, thus
affecting policy11(Wald, 1995; McGuire and MacKuen; Knight and Epstein, 1996). In other words,
because citation patterns convey information and signal the relative authority of rules, change in
the citation profile of an opinion represents a form of legal change as well (Hansford and Spriggs,
2006).
Given the role and meaning of citation to precedent outlined above, how would judges use
precedent if they wanted to shape the law12? First, judges may choose to preferentially cite certain
doctrines over others. Doing so can both allow them to justify a specific case outcome, which they
prefer, and to re-invigorate a particular policy-bearing doctrine, by signalling its current relevance
(Hansford and Spriggs, 2006). Second, judges may also propose new principles. A new principle
may explicitly seek to break with an old doctrine by overruling it. Or, more subtly, it may simply
11It is the role of clerks working at WestLaw and LexisNexis to determine whether an interpretation was positive
or negative. This information is then encoded in the court documents downloaded from these databases.
12The fact that every opinion is given a justification in terms of existing legal principles does not imply per se that
opinions are fully determined by past case law, even controlling for the idiosyncratic features of the case. The law
is often both indeterminate and complex enough to allow for contradictory justifications, so that a judge often has
some freedom in making the final determination and writing a justification (Posner, 2009).
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propose an alternative interpretation without explicitly overruling past approaches (a prominent
example is Chevron). This may occur, too, if citizens bring new issues to the courts that invite
new rulings.
With this understanding of precedent, I propose three indicators of legal change from the net-
work of citation to precedent: 1) novelty 2) controversy and 3) preferential reinforcement. Novelty
refers to the appearance of opinions that articulate new principles. They are revealed by their
importance in the network since they seed a new line of precedent and become highly cited over
time. Controversy involves actively undermining a past principle by citing it negatively, stating
that its scope should be reduced or that it is no longer valid. The more influential the opinion
being undermined, the more significant the change and the controversy. Preferential reinforcement
refers to the propensity to cite particular doctrines (i.e. precedents), thus reinforcing the authority
of one strand of the law over another.
Reformulating the claims of the political model in terms of the measures of legal change above,
I put forth the following hypotheses:
• H 1 Novelty and controversy increase as the swing interval increases.
• H 2 There are differential patterns of preferential reinforcement across periods that have
different levels of political support for environmental policy.
Hypothesis 1 relate the appearance of novel and important decisions, and the appearance of
decisions that explicitly overturn older ones, to the swing interval. As we saw earlier, the larger
the swing interval the larger the window of opportunity to change aspects of the law, under the
theory of the separation-of-powers.)
where Φ is the cumulative normal and µ and σ are the immediacy and longevity parameters. It is
thus straightforward to obtain λi given the total number of citations c
T
i and the observation period
T .
Note that the proposed measure of importance only takes into account direct or local influence
(only counting the in-degree). Measures that fully exploit the network structure of the data take
into account the indirect influence of a node: a node that is cited by other nodes that are themselves
highly cited is deemed important by virtue of the citations that exist downstream. Network analysts
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have defined a number of measures to assess the global importance of a node in the network, given
the full structure of the network (e.g. for citation networks, Kleinberg et al.’s (1999) authority
measure). However, these measures are difficult to apply to dynamic networks because they lack
comparability over time, as the network grows in size.





where t is a political period and j denotes the legal topic (out of the eight identified earlier). Novelty
in period t and for topic j is the sum of the importance scores for all nodes in topic j that appeared
during period t.
The measure of controversy focuses on nodes that are negatively cited during a political period.
It counts the appearance of negative citations, weighted by the importance of the decision being





The measure of controversy is the sum of the importance of the nodes in L−j,t, where L
−
j,t
represents the set of nodes in topic j that are negatively cited in period t.
Figure 3.5 shows the variation in novelty and in controversy from congresses 92 to 113 for each
of the eight areas of the law. First, we see that novelty and controversy capture different dynamics
of the law: novelty seems to vary in a stationary manner throughout the life of the environmental
statutes, whereas controversy increases over time, presumably reflecting the need to modify laws
over time to fit changing circumstances. Finally, there is variation in these measures for all topics
except for historical preservation, which will be dropped in subsequent analyses.
To formalize the idea of preferential reinforcement, we will compare patterns of citations during
political periods marked by support for environmental policy amongst congressmen and political
periods that do not have strong support for environmental policy. Define E(t) = 1 if median
support for environmental policy is positive in period t and E(t) = 0 otherwise. Let ti indicate the
period in which headnote (or node) i was published. Consider the following ratio:
R∆t =
P (“i cites j published at date ti −∆t”|E(ti) = E(tj))
P (“i cites j published at date ti −∆t”)
(3.1)
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Figure 3.5: Novelty and controversy from the 92nd to the 113th Congress, broken down by major
topics of environmental law.
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The ratio represents the fraction by which the probability of a node i citing a node j that is
∆t years older is increased if j was published in a political period marked by a similar ideology
(characterized by E(tj)) as the political period in which i was published, relative to the baseline
probability that a node i cites a node that is ∆t years older. Expressed this way, the comparison
controls for the time elapsed between the two decisions.
3.4 Results
I start by examining the proposition that novelty and controversy should increase with the overall
level of change in the constraints set by key political players – captured by the measure of swing.
To compute the swing interval, I first characterize the environmental policy preferences of Con-
gressional members in each year using roll-call votes on environmental issues from 1972 to 2014,
available from the League of Conservation Voters. The bayesian item-response model presented in
Clinton et al. (2004) is then used to infer ideal points from these votes13. These ideal points are
finally adjusted to be comparable over time and across the two chambers, using the model proposed
by Groseclose et al. (1999).
Figure 3.6 shows the resulting gridlock interval for each Congress, and the associated measures
of swing. These are calculated using Krehbiel’s theory of legislative decision-making, based on the
filibuster and presidential veto pivots. This filibuster-veto (FV) gridlock interval is given by:
GFV = [min(V −H , V
−
S ), F
+] if P ≤ min(V −H , V
−
S )
GFV = [F−,max(V +H , V
+




S ) ≤ P
F−(F+) designates the filibuster pivot in the Senate, the most liberal (conservative) senator needed
for a 3/5 cloture vote to end a conservative (liberal) filibuster. V −H (V
+
H ) is the ideal point of the
presidential veto player in the House – the most liberal (conservative) member of the House needed
to overturn a veto by a conservative (liberal) president. Since a 2/3 vote by both chambers is
needed, we take the most extreme of the relevant presidential veto players across the two chambers.
The measure of swing is then calculated as:







13The R package pcsl implements the model.
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Figure 3.6: Left: the FV gridlock interval and chamber medians for each Congress on a 1-D pro-
environment to anti-environment regulation policy space. Right: the resulting swing measure.
where G−t (G
+
t ) designates the lower (upper) bound of the Gridlock interval at time t (here the
gridlock interval is GFV but the same expression applies if the gridlock is defined based on other
players, according to alternative theories of legislative decision-making).
To test the hypotheses that novelty and controversy increase with swing measure, I run the
following time-series cross-sectional linear regressions on the panel of the six areas of the law:
Nj,t ∼ N(nj,t|µNj,t,ΣN )




1 St + β
N
2 Gt + β3Nt−1
and
Cj,t ∼ N(cj,t|µCj,t,ΣC)




1 St + β
C
2 Gt + β4Ct−1 + β5t
γj a vector of fixed effects, for each sub-network j (representing a distinct area of environmental
law).
This equation is estimated with Beck and Katz’s (1995) panel-corrected standard errors, which
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allow the distribution of errors to differ for each time series and also allows for contemporary
correlations in the errors of each time series. As seen in figure 3.5, the measure of controversy has a
clear time trend while the measure of novelty does not, which is reflected in the equation. Durbin-
Watson tests show that after including a lag in the equation, the series are no longer autocorrelated.
The results of the analysis are shown in figure 3.7. These graphs clearly demonstrate that the
chosen measure of swing has no influence on the chosen measures of legal change. These graphs
represent the detrended, deserialized and demeaned novelty and controversy values as a function
of the measure of swing. These residuals show no trend, as shown by the fitted black line. The
gray lines correspond to different realizations of the inferred distribution of (β̂1), confirming that
the distribution clearly includes β1 = 0 as a likely value. The regression tables are available in the
appendix. The appendix also explores different measures of swing based on different assumptions
regarding which actor is pivotal. None of these are found to have an influence on legal change, as
defined in this paper.
I now turn to the hypothesis of preferential reinforcement. To estimate the ratio R∆t defined
by Equation B.1, we need to estimate the probabilities P (j cites i), the probability that there
exists a citation from j to i. Karrer and Newman (2009) developed a model for directed acyclic
graphs that gives us an exact theoretical solution for this probability. To understand it, consider
the notion of a stub: a stub is the tail or head of an edge, pointing either in or out of a node.
P (j cites i) is equal to the probability that an outgoing stub of node j is connected to an incoming
stub of node i, times the number of incoming stubs of i and outgoing stubs of j (i.e. the incoming
and outgoing number of citations of i and j respectively). To test hypothesis 2, I reformulate the
ratio R in terms of the stub probabilities only (the probability that two stubs are connected given
that the stubs exist), controlling for each node’s indegree (kini ) and outdegree (k
out
i ). There are two
reasons for this. First, to estimate the statistical significance of the ratio, I simulate a large number




1 , ..., k
out
N ). Second,
the variation in the indegrees is captured by the novelty measure and modeled by the previous
regressions. In this hypothesis, we are interested in the pattern of where the citations go, taking as
a given the appearance of nodes and their respective indegree over time. Finally, the estimate of
the stub probabilities is less noisy than the estimate of P (j cites i). I follow (Karrer and Newman,
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Figure 3.7: Measures of novelty and controversy as a function of the logarithm of the swing measure,
after controlling for the fixed effect for each area of the law, and after removing the time structure
(serial autocorrelation and trend in the case of the controversy measure). Right: novelty measure,
Left: controversy measure.
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Figure 3.8: The distribution of the ratio statistic R̂ over the 1000 simulated null networks and the
value of R̂ in the observed network.
2009) to estimate the stub probabilities, as explained in the appendix.
The results of this analysis are presented in figures 3.8 and 3.9. Figure 3.8 shows the
distribution of < R̂ >, average taken over the different values of ∆, for the ensemble of 1000 null
networks and the value for the observed legal network. Recall that the null hypothesis says that
the choice of legal decision to cite is not influenced by the presence or absence of a congressional
majority that is in support of environmental regulation. Theoretically, under this null, the ratio R
should be close to 1. On the contrary, if the hypothesis of a political influence is true, the observed
ratio R is predicted to be higher than that of the null networks in which the citation patterns are
randomized. The specific sequence of nodes, which we take as fixed for the purpose of evaluating
this hypothesis, in fact induces a distribution of the statistic in the ensemble of null networks that is
centered a little above 1, at 1.067, with a standard deviation of 0.003. The statistic in the observed
network is 1.06, which is in fact lower than in the ensemble of null networks, clearly contradicting
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of R̂∆ in the observed network and R̂∆ in the ensemble of null networks
in which any politically driven pattern of citation is removed. The observed statistic is compatible
with the null that legal citations between political periods enjoying a congressional majority of
supporters of environmental regulation are no more likely than between political periods in which
the congressional majority opposes environmental regulation.
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the hypothesis that we are testing.
Figure 3.9 shows that R̂ in the observed network falls within one standard deviation of the
null distribution for most of the range of the ∆ considered, with larger deviations for larger values
of ∆. At large values of ∆, the estimates are driven by a much smaller set of observations, which
explains why the values are more erratic and may explain the more extreme deviations from the
null in that range.
3.5 Discussion
If courts felt constrained by Congress in the interpretation of environmental statutes, then changes
in the preferences of pivotal legislators would both create new political constraints and open new
windows of opportunity and should therefore trigger changes in the policy decisions of courts. This
paper proposed different ways of detecting changes in the decisions of courts. These measures of
change build on the idea that the influence of a decision is both shaped by citations made to it
and reflected by citations. They use temporal variation in the appearance of influential decisions,
in the appearance of negative citations and temporal variation in the probability of citing decisions
made under different political circumstances. It was found that changes in legislators’ preferences
– at least those legislators posited to be pivotal according to specific theories of legislative decision-
making – did not have a discernible influence on these measures of legal change.
Before discussing the meaning of these results, it is important to consider their robustness.
There are several ways in which the measures should be tested and refined. First, the measure of
importance λi is possibly too simple. Different decisions may have different life cycles, with the
immediacy parameter µ and the longevity parameter σ varying from one decision to the next (plots
of citation histories show that while all decisions follow a peak-and-decay pattern, the peak time
and decay rates vary greatly). Wang et al. (2013) propose a mechanistic model for the citation
dynamics of scientific papers that allows each paper to have its down logarithm decay function, with
idiosyncratic parameters µi and σi. The authors consider the probability of a citation over time to
be a function of this decay function, the intrinsic attractiveness (or importance) of the paper λi,
and its current number of citations. The latter factor reflects the fact that papers (or decisions,
or people) tend to receive attention in proportion to the attention they have already received. In
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modeling this rich-get-richer mechanism explicitly (technically called preferential attachment), their
measure of intrinsic importance λi captures the initial importance of the paper, before its influence
becomes inflated by popularity dynamics. The resulting measure is likely a more robust measure,
better reflecting the importance of a decision as it may have appeared to the actors at the time the
decision was made. Preliminary steps to adapt this model to the data presented in this paper show
that preferential attachment is less marked for laws than for scientific papers or internet pages, but
that the model fit with preferential attachment is better than without. The model by Wang et al.
(2013) is therefore a better model of the citation histories of decisions. Estimating µi, σi and λi
for each decision requires a bayesian model (Shen et al., 2014), which should be implemented in a
refined version of this analysis.
More importantly, the novelty and controversy measures capture only the magnitude of change,
not the direction of change. To measure the direction of a decision in policy space, it is necessary to
use the texts of the decisions. Grimmer and Stewart (2013) review the different natural language
processing methods and machine learning algorithms that are used to extract sustantive variables
from large amounts of textual data. In the case at hand, the goal is to build a classifier that can
sort decisions depending on whether they expand, maintain or narrow the scope of environmental
protection. O’Halloran et al. (2015) are amongst the first to apply these techniques to the automatic
classification of laws. Using a Naive Bayes Classifier with a feature selection algorithm on a new
dataset of all federal laws and agency rules enacted from 1950 to 2010 that regulate the financial
sector, they obtain a 67% accuracy in their task of predicting the level of discretion granted by the
law. Their experiment thus demonstrates the applicability of these techniques to monitor changes
in the policy substance of laws over time in large corporea of texts. A training set of 100 coded
decisions from the data in this paper has been developed and the important next step is therefore
to use this training step to develop directional measures of policy change.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the current measures, addressed above, the results pre-
sented in this paper suggest that adaptation of environmental legislation over time and across
localities via the legal process is largely autonomous from changes in the constellation of congress-
men’s preferences. One could object that the stakes in all but a small fraction of these decisions
are too low to warrant the attention of legislators. This of course is a valid explanation for the
null results presented. However, within the rational choice theory of how courts implement and
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interpret statutes, the model of courts constrained by pivotal legislators is the dominant paradigm.
It should be tested according to its capacity to explain shifts in policy happening in courts rather
than votes in the Supreme Court, even if these shifts are happening via many incremental decisions
throughout a decentralized system.
How might courts gain such autonomy? One possibility is that they are an important forum
for social learning (Heclo, 2010) – where the implications of legislation and regulations in specific
circumstances are debated and weighed in terms of the goals of the legislation and of the different
interests. As such, briefs, hearings and opinions generate information and ideas that are useful
to actors involved, including political actors (which might, for example, use this information to
better monitor the implementation of laws, as suggested by McCubbins et al., 1987). In a study
of changes in macroeconomic policy, Hall (1993) shows through a qualitative analysis that the
process of “puzzling” over policy, generating new ideas, is as much a driver of policy change as the
political pressures exerted by one organ of government upon another, or by constituencies upon the
state. Another possibility is that environmental legislation itself – rather than the organizations
implementing it – has gained autonomy from the daily struggles of congressional politics. Eskridge
and Ferejohn (2010) elaborate a theory of “super-statutes” to understand the evolution of some
pieces of legislation. Super-statutes, they contend, are laws that penetrate public normative and
institutional culture in a deep way, amending the constitutional order14. They arise when broad
parts of society wish to commit to a great principle. Such statutes generate intense disagreement
and continuous deliberation. This deliberation in turn resolves differences in a pluralistic way and
eventually creates a strong public commitment to the statute. This commitment gives the statute
the same power to shape policies and the behavior of decision-makers as does the constitution,
elevating it above short-term politics. Among the examples they give of super-statutes figure the
Sherman Act of 1890, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the environmental statutes of the 1970s.
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s (2010) theory echoes a larger set of theories that argue that the ar-
ticulation of legal rules helps citizens forge a common understanding of norms of social control
(Hadfield and Weingast, 2012), and in doing so can build long-lived and supple governance struc-
tures (Stone Sweet, 1999) that enjoy great levels of legitimacy (Gibson et al., 1998; Tyler, 2001) –
14Constitutional in the sense that ”a government is constitutional when its ordinary laws and regulations are
regulated by higher order norms and not merely by the will of government officials.”
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as long as these legal rules reflect society’s pluralism (Eskridge, 2005; Sunstein, 1996). The mecha-
nisms invoked by these theories involve the courts, where actors interpret the statute in a purposive
rather than a simple text-bounded way. This generates a dynamic common law, implementing the
great principle and adapting it to meet the challenges posed to that principle by a complex society.
Intense disagreement generates back and forths between the agencies, courts and elected branches.
But it is of a different nature than the back and forth described in rational choice theory, where the
ideal points of actors are fixed and where actors strategically push policy closer to their ideal point
in anticipation of others’ reaction. If the role of public institutions, instead, is to deliberatively
contribute to the formation of new societal norms by shaping preferences, then institutional actors
must clearly voice their reasoning and preferences, instead of strategically concealing them.
What is the implication of these mechanisms for courts’ autonomy and the dynamics of legal
change? Eskridge and Ferejohn’s (2010) theory suggests that courts and agencies gain autonomy
from elected officials by being responsive to a wide range of constituencies15. In doing so, they can
forge compromises and ensure that new important laws are interpreted in ways that are compatible
with other fundamental commitments of society. The autonomous behavior of courts allows for the
deliberation, which in turn gradually entrenches the law, further buttressing autonomy, as well as
the institution’s legitimacy. Through such a process, law comes to supersede short-term partisan
struggle and shape current policy debates, rather than being subject to them. The evolution of
public laws, then, should not mechanically follow changes in the preferences of elected officials, but
follow an autonomous course.
To ground this argument in a concrete example, consider the evolution of the Clean Water
Act’s interpretation. The Clean Water Act proposed a broad mandate to protect the waters of the
United States. Ensued a thirty-year long debate regarding which waters the federal government
could have constitutional authority over without violating States’ powers. More specifically, which
waters would satisfy the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, the clause that justifies the federal
government’s regulation of intrastate activities? In particular, could isolated bodies of waters, such
as wetlands, be included, although they did not explicitly fall under the category of “navigable
waters”, which are the waters that unambiguously satisfy the Commerce Clause? In 1977, the Army
Corps of Engineers and the EPA, with the acquiescence of the courts, expanded the meaning of the
15Hamilton quote
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term to include wetlands that “are in reasonable proximity to other waters of the United States, as
these wetlands are part of this aquatic system.”16. The meaning of the term was gradually expanded
to include more and more bodies of water and private properties impacting them17. Eventually,
this regulatory movement generated a backlash from the property rights movement. Court battles
ensued, forging a compromise between the government’s duty to protect private property and the
realization that most properties impact the water system due to its interconnectedness. Although
a compromise, Eskridge and Ferejohn (2010) note that the extent of waters protected by the Act
had by then far exceeded what was initially envisioned by legislators in 1970. Over the course of
this public deliberation, the authors contend, the norm that property includes civic obligations and
that the government has a duty to protect environmental systems had become part of the society’s
fundamental commitments. This commitment is of course to be continuously articulated in light
of what is feasible in different contexts, a task performed by the public, agencies and the courts on
an on-going basis.
Few studies investigate the trajectories of environmental legislation (see Baumgartner, 2006),
even though in most industrialized countries, these laws have now been in existence long enough
to warrant such an investigation. The fact that one legislature cannot bind future legislatures
might suggest that environmental policy might suffer from “electoral cycles”, just as budgetary and
macroeconomic policy seem to. This time inconsistency, always a lurking possibility for democratic
political institutions is often blamed for the failure to tackle long-term problems that affect diffuse
interests, such as environmental degradation (e.g. Hovi et al., 2009). This study is a first step
towards characterizing the trajectory of environmental statutes in the United States. It suggests
that these statutes give rise to a dynamic body of law, but that the time inconsistency that might
arise due to shifts in the preferences of legislators over time is not an important factor explaining
these dynamics.
16(1977 regulation of the Corps, cited on page 267 of the book)
17In 1986 the term was expanded to mean waters “which are or would be used as habitat by migratory
birds”(Migratory bird rule, page 268 of the book) and, in 2000, to include “ephemeral streams and drainage ditches”
as long as they have a perceptible “high water mark”.
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Abstract
Climate change mitigation requires sustainable energy transitions, but their political dynamics are
poorly understood. This article presents a general dynamic model of renewable energy policy with
long time horizons, endogenous electoral competition, and techno-political path dependence. We
calibrate the model with data on the economics of contemporary renewable energy technologies.
In doing so, we discover transition dynamics not present in economy-energy models, which ignore
politics, or in formal political economy models, which ignore long-term technological dynamics.
We show that the largest effects of partisan ideology on policy occur when the competing parties
disagree on the importance of energy policy. In these cases, the less ideological party appeases
the more ideological one, while the more ideological party attempts to appease the electorate.
The results demonstrate that political dynamics could have large effects on the development of
renewable energy and carbon dioxide emissions over time, influencing the ability of countries to
reach various climate mitigation trajectories.
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4.1 Introduction
In the study of environmental political economy, sustainable energy transitions have emerged as a
central topic of interest (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Schwoon, 2006; Verbong and Geels, 2007;
Walz, 2007; Agnolucci, 2008; Schmidt and Marschinski, 2009; Loorbach, 2010; Dangerman and
Schellnhuber, 2013). To a surprising extent, such transitions have already begun in forerunner
countries. While the International Energy Agency predicted in the year 2000 that renewables will
continue to play a negligible role in the energy economy at least until 2020 (IEA, 2000), reality has
proven this pessimistic prognosis wrong. According to the World Development Indicators, in 2012
Denmark generated 48 percent of its electricity from non-hydroelectric renewables. In Germany,
the share was 19 percent. Even in the United Kingdom and the United States, which have begun
investing in renewables much more recently, the shares were 10 and 6 percent, respectively. The
rapid growth rates of renewables and the policies underpinning them highlight the importance of
sustainable energy transitions as a core theme in political science.
Understanding sustainable energy transitions requires paying attention to politics (Torvanger
and Meadowcroft, 2011; Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013). Fossil fuels continue to dominate the energy
landscape largely because of a market failure, whereby their negative externalities are not priced
(Unruh, 2000). Due to centuries of industrial development based on fossil fuels, they enjoy tremen-
dous structural advantages over less mature, sustainable alternatives such as solar and wind power.
Therefore, government action is needed for a correction of incentives and to level the playing field
(Unruh, 2002; Loorbach, 2010). Indeed, a large body of literature in public policy argues that the
promotion of clean technology is a key strategy in climate mitigation (Barrett, 2009; Dangerman
and Schellnhuber, 2013; Smith et al., 2014).
The problem of implementing a sustainable energy transition is a dynamic one, and governments
cannot tie the hands of their future successors. The problems of time-inconsistency and path
dependence (see Pierson, 2000; Jacobs, 2011) are widely recognized among scholars as essential
for mitigating climate change and promoting sustainable energy (Kline, 2001; Sandén and Azar,
2005; Hovi et al., 2009; Laird and Stefes, 2009; Nilsson et al., 2011; Levin et al., 2012). However,
government incentives to promote a sustainable energy transition are still poorly understood. In
particular, the literature does not present models of the long-run political dynamics of sustainable
energy transitions. Our goal is to present such a model and use it to sharpen the social science of
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sustainable energy transitions.
How, then, does political competition influence sustainable energy transitions over long time
horizons? This article presents a dynamic model that can explain the sustainable energy policies
of different types of governments as circumstances change over long periods of time. The key
feature of the model is the inclusion of technological learning and electoral competition between
two governments. Similar to Aklin and Urpelainen (2013), one of the governments is ‘green’ (pro-
renewables) and the other ‘brown’ (anti-renewables). The strength of ideology is defined in terms
of a deviation from the cost-minimizing benchmark for renewable energy. For example, the green
party is willing to incur some additional energy costs to protect the environment and mitigate
climate change.
Governments accede to power through regular elections decided by a majority vote. The two
governments formulate policy strategies dynamically, taking into account the fact that current
policies influence both electoral outcomes and the future attractiveness of clean energy to the
opposing government, due to technological learning. To make the model realistic, we calibrate
the parameters using global and U.S. estimates of the parameters characterizing the economics of
the energy technologies considered, including the learning curves for wind and solar energy. The
dynamic model allows us to simulate energy policy trajectories over long periods of time. In practice,
we evaluate outcomes for a period of 50 years. This period is long enough for a dynamic analysis,
yet not so long that a scenario analysis is virtually impossible due to unknown and unpredictable
factors.
Our main finding is that political competition and partisan ideology exert powerful influence on
renewable energy development when the two parties show different levels of ideological commitment.
To understand this logic, consider the case of a highly ideological green party. Such a green party
is ready to make renewable energy investments at very high costs. To prevent a very costly ‘crash’
program in renewable energy development, the brown party accommodates and compromises by
making modest investments into renewable energy when in office. Therefore, the green party’s
strong political commitment to renewable energy, along with a willingness to impose very high
costs on the society, allows it to force the brown party to compromise.
This logic is largely robust to endogenous elections, whereby voters consider energy issues in
supporting the two political parties. While we see that public opinion about renewable energy can
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be a powerful incentive for the two parties, the central logic of dynamic strategies remains intact.
In this regard, we reaffirm the result in Aklin and Urpelainen (2013) that, even if energy policy is a
minor issue for the electorate, political competition is critical to understanding sustainable energy
transitions. At the same time, we also report the surprising result that strongly ideological parties
are often more sensitive to electoral considerations than their less ideological counterparts. While
this result appears counter to intuition initially, the logic behind it is powerful: a country with a
strong ideological commitment to certain energy policy cannot afford to lose elections, as such a
party suffers heavily from any deviations from its preferred energy policy.
These findings are significant for two bodies of literature. First, they add to the analytical
study of sustainable energy transitions. There is by now a large body of detailed case studies
on this phenomenon, including impressive longitudinal studies that track policy dynamics over
many decades (Verbong and Geels, 2007; Hvelplund, 2013; Smith et al., 2014; Rosenbloom and
Meadowcroft, 2014). Several scholars have also proposed both analytical (Aidt, 1998; List and
Sturm, 2006; Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013; Millner et al., 2014; Schmidt and Marschinski, 2009) and
computational (Schwoon, 2006; Fuss et al., 2008; Schwarz and Ernst, 2009; Zeppini and van den
Bergh, 2011) models of environmental and energy policy. What we add is a dynamic analysis that
captures both political competition and technological change in one unified framework. By doing
so, we shed new light on how political competition is shaped by long time horizons and processes
of path dependence, with potentially important implications for understand sustainable energy
transitions. For example, our result on asymmetric ideological preferences suggests that in two-
party systems such as the United States or United Kingdom, a future pro-renewable coalition could
achieve significant gains in political bargaining and competition with a less ideological opposition.
In today’s American politics, where the anti-renewables coalition is itself ideologically committed,
the outlook is much less bright.
The findings are also important for the growing body of literature on climate policy. In this
literature, the question of domestic political incentives to enact low-carbon policies has drawn a lot
of attention, with scholars emphasizing factors from public opinion (Shwom et al., 2010; McCright
and Dunlap, 2011; Ansolabehere and Konisky, 2014) to interest groups (Gullberg, 2008; McCright
and Dunlap, 2003) and economic side benefits (Rabe, 2004). While sustainable energy transitions
are not analytically equivalent to climate mitigation, the decarbonization of energy is an important
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component of strategies to avoid long-term climate disruption. Our results show how partisan
ideology, political competition, and public opinion interact in a dynamic setting over long periods
of time. The relative importance and effects of these different variables are modified by dynamic
strategies, and our model is flexible enough to allow scholars in various disciplines to explore the
dynamic implications of their premises and frameworks.
The article is organized as follows. We first present the key elements of our model, with technical
details relegated to the online appendix. We then present our primary analytical results on the role
of political competition in sustainable energy transitions over long periods of time. Before we offer a
concluding discussion, where we evaluate our analysis and summarize the limitations of the dynamic
model, we illustrate the substantive significance of our findings by simulating renewable energy
trajectories that are consistent with climate mitigation pathways in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment
Report.
4.2 A Dynamic Model of Political Competition and Sustainable
Energy Transitions
The technical details of the model are presented in the online appendix, and here we focus on
conveying the intuition behind the analysis. To summarize, we consider a model with two parties.
Both parties aspire to minimize the costs of energy production, but the “brown party” additionally
has an ideological commitment to fossil fuels (for example, a political party could prefer coal
because party activists live in communities that depend on coal mining for livelihood) and the
“green party” to renewable energy (for example, many party activists could be environmentalists).
For example, in the context of American politics today, one could say that Democrats are the green
party with a weak ideological commitment to renewable energy, while Republicans are the brown
party with a strong ideological commitment to sustaining the fossil-fuel economy. This model of
political competition allows us to evaluate the effects of ideological divergence on sustainable energy
transitions over long periods of time under various electoral settings. Because the model includes
technological learning over time, we can also investigate processes of path dependence.
In developing the model, we draw game-theoretic inspiration from Aklin and Urpelainen (2013),
who present a two-period model of sustainable energy transitions under political competition. In
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their model, political parties respond to external shocks, such as energy price surges, by selecting
the level of sustainable energy deployment. High levels of sustainable energy deployment produce
future political constituencies with a vested interest in renewable energy policy, such as wind
turbine and solar panel manufacturers. In terms of the energy-economic model, we draw on the
energy-economy specification provided by Fuss et al. (2008). Their model offers a simple but
flexible approach to assessing renewable energy and fossil fuel investments in a dynamic setting.
The model specification includes capital costs, operating costs, fuel costs, technological change,
and path dependence. Finally, our dynamic optimization strategy for the two political parties is
based on McKibbin et al. (1987). Their approach allows political parties to consider the economic
structure, electoral outcomes, and – most importantly – the political goals and strategies of the
other party.
4.2.1 Energy-Economy Model
The cost of energy production includes the installation and operating costs of power plants. There-
fore, it is a function of the share of renewables – actual generation, not just capacity – in the energy
mix, and of new investments. The share of renewables at time t is denoted st. Both fossil fuels
and renewable energy carry capital and operating costs, but only fossil fuels require payments for
fuels. The energy production costs are realized in each period. Specifically, the energy production
cost at any given time t is given by the following:
Γ(st, qt, P
f
t ) = F (1− st)QP
f
t + (4.1)
Of ((1− st)Q) +Oc(stQ) +
Cc(qt, st) + C
f (qt).
This is a standard accounting equation, where the first row represents the cost of fossil fuel. The
second row represents operating costs and the last row the capital costs. F is the quantity of fossil
fuel consumed and P ft is the price of fossil fuel inputs, such as coal. Next, O
f (·) and Oc(·) are the
operating costs of fossil fuel energy production and renewable energy production, respectively, as
a function of the energy production from those sources, as determined by st, the renewable energy
share. Both fossil fuels and renewables have annual operating costs, while only fossil fuels have an
additional input cost. The terms Cf (qt) and C
c(qt, st) represent the total capital costs, respectively,
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of fossil and renewable energy investment. Endogenous technological learning is captured by the
decreasing cost of clean energy capital, Cc(qt, st), as st increases.
Because of technological learning, the installation costs of renewable energy decrease as a func-
tion of installed capacity (McNerney et al., 2011). When parties make renewable energy invest-
ments, they also reduce the cost of future investments due to economies of scale and learning effects
(Jaffe et al., 2005; Klaassen et al., 2005; Nemet, 2006; Jamasb, 2007; Söderholm and Sundqvist,
2007; Shum and Watanabe, 2007). This assumption captures the notion that immature tech-
nologies, such as renewable energy, gain competitiveness over time. We calibrate the relationship
between accumulated capacity and installation cost using global data of solar and wind power
investments and costs provided by Nemet (2006). However, within any given period, we assume
capital investments to have an increasing cost on the margin. This assumption reflects both ca-
pacity constraints and the idea that learning cannot be instantaneous. Crash investments into
renewable energy are more important than gradual investments over time.
In each period, the only decision made by the policymaker – the party in power – is the level
of additional investment into (or divestment from) renewable energy capacity. We assume that the
policymaker can affect renewable energy production through policy instruments such as subsidies,
feed-in tariffs, tendering, and portfolio standards. However, these policy instruments are not explic-
itly included in the model. Instead, the policymaker simply selects renewable energy investment.
Under the assumption of forward-looking policymakers, and reflecting the standard game-theoretic
notion of dynamic optimization, these decisions are constructed as comprehensive strategies op-
timized over every future state of the world. The policymaker selects energy investments in the
current period considering how it and the competing political party act in the future. At the same
time, the policymaker also discounts those future outcomes relative to the present benefits at a rate
δ.1 In this regard, our model again draws on dynamic game theory.
We use the cost-minimizing path of investment as our economic baseline, computed from a
dynamic version of equation 4.1 over 50 years. This baseline can be interpreted as the path that
maximizes economic growth in the absence of negative externalities from fossil fuels. The purpose
of the baseline is to illustrate the outcome in the absence of any ideological competition between
political parties. The cost-minimizing path is based on assumptions and data from the literature
1Throughout, we keep δ constant at 5%.
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about capital costs, operating costs, and fuel prices. Because of technological learning over time,
this economic baseline features gradual increase in the share of renewable energy over time. The
baseline is not one a welfare-maximizing social planner would choose, however, because it does not
consider the social cost of pollution from energy production. Substantively, in the baseline the
government of the country is assumed to ignore concerns such as climate mitigation. We consider
this baseline useful because it allows us to see when and how a green party’s commitment to
sustainability can make a difference. Had we instead included these negative externalities to the
baseline, the interpretation of the green party’s ideological commitment would no longer be clear.
In the model, political parties face elections every four years. In one variant of the model, the
election probabilities are exogenous to renewable energy policy; in another variant, voters base
their decisions on the incumbent government’s energy policy. As it turns out, the main results are
not very sensitive to whether elections are exogenous or endogenous. In other words, we shall see
that each party’s expectations of future changes in power is a more powerful driver of policies over
renewable energy.
In the beginning of every period, the party in power – the incumbent – chooses its investment
strategy. In the majoritarian democracy we model here, the opposition cannot influence policy.
In turn, the incumbent’s strategy consists of a series of investment decisions in every possible
future state, so that it is optimal given the other party’s expected strategy. In a forward-looking
fashion, the incumbent prepares for various combinations of electoral defeats and victories over
time (Moe, 2005). In this regard, similar to Aklin and Urpelainen (2013) and Hovi et al. (2009),
our dynamic model assumes that politicians are self-interested but forward-looking. Each political
party understands that it may lose the next election, and considers this critical fact in their decision-
making. For example, a green party understands that, in the future, the brown party may show
less interest in the sustainable energy transition. These dynamic strategies are a key concern for
us.
This model of majoritarian democracy is obviously a simplification, but it is useful because it
draws on conventional models of voting and policy formulation in political science. In particular,
two-party competition has been found a useful and analytically tractable approach in models leading
to the “median voter” theorem (Downs, 1957; Stigler, 1972; Besley et al., 2010; Großer and Palfrey,
2014). We adopt this approach, as our goal is to provide a sharp characterization of the implications
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of political competition between parties for sustainable energy transitions. Future extensions of the
model could incorporate other interesting aspects of the problem, such as coalition formation and
variation in party strategy formulation, as recent computational research on partisan politics has
begun to do (Laver and Sergenti, 2011).
To be specific, party i = G,B maximizes the discounted expected value of the following per-
period utility function over the 50-year time period:
ut = −(st − (λiŝi + (1− λi)sEt ))2, (4.2)
where sEt denotes the cost-minimizing amount of renewable energy at time t, as determined by
equation C.2, depending on technological progress, and ŝ is the preferred share of renewable energy
based on ideology, equal to 0 for the brown party and 1 for the green party. This is a standard
loss function that assumes governments try to stay as close as possible to their ideal point, which
is composed of their ideological and economic interests. As the current level of renewable energy
capacity moves away from the ideal point, the political party suffers a loss of utility.
In the context of sustainable energy transitions, a plausible interpretation of this specification
is that the two parties have different material and ideological interests in regard to renewable
energy. For the green party, high levels of renewable energy are valuable because these energy
sources mitigate climate change and reduce air pollution. Furthermore, the supporters of the green
party could also have a vested material interest in policies that create demand for clean technology
(Neumayer, 2003; Michaelowa, 2005; Lewis and Wiser, 2007; Lipp, 2007). Conversely, the brown
party could be opposed to renewable energy because its supporters are active in the extraction,
transportation, and combustion of fossil fuels (Fisher, 2006; Pahle, 2008; Cheon and Urpelainen,
2013).
In this equation, λi ∈ (0, 1) is the weight of the parties’ ideological component. As the value of
this parameter increases, party i becomes increasingly ideological, in the sense of being increasingly
bent on promoting its preferred type of energy-producing infrastructure. The green party becomes
more interested in renewable energy, whereas the brown party becomes more opposed to renewable
energy. Note that the strength of the ideological commitment is allowed to be asymmetric, with one
of the parties more ideological than the other. In the extreme, one party is highly ideological while
the other party is only interested in cost-minimization. For example, scholars of American politics
have noted that ideological conservatives have increasingly managed to influence the positions of the
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Republican Party (McCright and Dunlap, 2003; Layzer, 2012), which is more hostile to renewables
than the Democratic Party, suggesting an increase in the value of λB in the United States. The
payoffs do not directly involve the costs of investments, because costs indirectly enter the valuation
due to the fact that the party endures direct disutility if investments represent a departure from
economic optimality.
On the basis of equations 4.1 and 4.2, we then develop a computation structure that allows
each party to select actions and evaluate possible future states of the world in parallel, similar to
McKibbin et al. (1987). Each party is characterized by the parameters λ (strength of ideology)
and ŝ (ideological preference for or against renewable energy) used in its utility function, and by
the discount rate used in that party’s planning process (which we keep constant and equal for both
parties). The states of the world are characterized by which party is currently in power and the
current share of renewable energy. Only the party in power is assumed to be capable of making
investment decisions, and each party maximizes a discounted sum of the payoffs in equation C.3 over
the long time horizon, taking into account the decisions made by the opposite party in each state
of the world. By dynamic optimization, we then obtain each party’s strategy, i.e. the investments
it would make in each period if it is in power and as a function of the contemporaneous share in
renewable energy. From these strategies, we can then compute renewable energy pathways for any
given 50-year sequence of election results.
In the variant with endogenous elections, the public is assumed to prefer the following share of
renewable energy:
se∗t = λe + (1− λe)sEt , (4.3)
where λe ∈ (0, 1) is the public’s environmental preference and, conversely, 1 − λe represents the
public’s interest in cost-minimization in the energy sector. As λe increases, then, the public becomes
more supportive of renewable energy. Drawing on work on environmental public opinion (Brechin,
2003; Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Ansolabehere and Konisky, 2014), this specification allows the
voters to exhibit varying degrees of concern about environmental quality. Besides their real income,
voters are also interested in the benefits of renewable energy, such as improved air quality and
contributing to the mitigation of climate change.
As described in the appendix, as a party’s investment decision moves farther away from the
public’s ideal point, the expected vote share of the party decreases. Therefore, each political party
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is punished by the electorate for policies that do not reflect the median voter’s preference (Downs,
1957). The two parties consider these electoral punishments as they formulate their strategies.
Each party understands that when they are in power, their probability of winning the next election
depends on their policy.
The model is solved by backwards induction, using a pair of Bellman equations that capture each
party’s valuation of future states and the cost of current actions. The state of the world is discretized
by renewable energy share, party in power, and the electorate’s approval of recent planner actions.
In each period, the party in power selects the action that provides the greatest present discounted
value. Election outcomes are determined probabilistically and payouts are averaged over possible
future states. This process repeats backwards, until an entire strategy is constructed.
4.3 Computational Results
As a political baseline, we explore scenarios where election outcomes are exogenous and the ideo-
logical commitments of the two parties are symmetric. In other words, the brown party and green
party are equally insistent on their preferred policies. Next, we let the strength of this symmetric
ideological commitment vary and compare outcomes under various scenarios.
4.3.1 Partisan Polarization under Symmetric Ideology
As the ideological preferences of the two parties intensify and diverge, renewable energy investment
strategies increasingly depart from the economic baseline. The result is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
In the figure, the y-axis shows the per-period, incremental investment (first difference) in terms of
the share of renewables in the total energy mix. It is shown as a function of the current renewable
energy capacity, again as the current share of renewables in the mix. The dashed line provides the
cost-minimizing economic baseline.
Except for very low levels of ideological commitment, the brown party invests in new fossil fuel
capital across all states of the world. For modest levels of ideological commitment, investments in
renewables are monotonically decreasing in the share of clean energy for both parties. The green
party invests in renewables most when the existing renewable energy capital is low, while the brown
party invests in fossil fuels most when the existing renewable energy capital is high.
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Figure 4.1: Investment policies of both parties, for various values of ideological divergence and a
moderate fuel price. The dashed line denotes the economic baseline policy. Green party investments
lie above brown party investments.
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These investment strategies are virtually identical to those of hypothetical actors who myopi-
cally consider their present-period payoffs without dynamic optimization. Although the energy
transitions literature emphasizes that long time horizons require complex strategies (Verbong and
Geels, 2007; Loorbach, 2010; Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013), if both parties have equally strong ide-
ological preferences, their political strategies reflect their true preferences. The reason is that each
party understands that if it increases or decreases the level of investment in renewable energy, the
competing party responds with the diametrically opposed strategy.
Notably, the modest role played by partisan polarization in this scenario contradicts some
arguments from the previous literature (Hovi et al., 2009). As long as the two parties are equally
ideological, they fully expect the other party to negate their policies in the future. Therefore,
partisan polarization itself need not result extreme strategies in our model despite the fact that each
party has full powers during their rule. Over time, variation in the party in power prompts moderate
renewable energy policy and investments. Even without any constraints on policy formulation, such
as supermajority requirements or the threat of a filibuster, policies and outcomes remain modest.
This lack of polarization effect is important, as it suggests that in a symmetrically charged political
environment, relaxing executive constraints may not have much effect on policy outcomes.
In the United States, for example, our result would imply that the Senate filibuster may not
be a binding constraint on climate policy. As long as partisan ideological polarization remains
symmetric at a high level, the policies of the competing parties will negate each other. Even
though a reduction in constraints on policy formulation would allow the incumbent party to enact
new policies, these could be easily negated by the opposition when it gains power.
4.3.2 The Case of Asymmetric Ideology
If one party is more ideological than the other, then both parties deviate from their myopic policies
to manipulate their opponent’s future behavior. This result is shown in Figure 4.2. For example,
if the green party is very concerned about the global negative effects of fossil fuels but the brown
party only wants to minimize the cost of energy generation, then the green party will over-invest in
renewable energy technology (relative to its myopic preferences) so that it becomes cheaper in the
future, which will induce the brown party to then favor renewable energy. Thus, with asymmetric
preferences, dynamic strategic incentives arise due to technological lock-in.
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Figure 4.2: Investment strategies of both parties, for various values of ideological divergence. The
dashed line denotes the economically optimal strategy. Green party investments lie above brown
party investments. In this asymmetric case, the brown party’s ideological commitment is fixed at
a low value, while that of the green party varies. In terms of outcomes, asymmetry drives the
investment of both parties up.
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A reciprocal dynamic occurs for the brown party. Since the green party’s strategy departs fur-
ther from the economic optimum due to ideology, the brown party is concerned about the excessive
costs of an accelerated transition. To forestall this, the brown party also invests in renewables
energy when in power, to avoid the costly crash investments coveted by the environmentalists. In
more strategic terms, the green party’s threat of paying a high cost for renewable energy is suf-
ficiently credible to induce the brown party to compromise. This result is notable in light of the
earlier literature, which does not predict that a highly ideological green party can force the other
party to accommodate (Hovi et al., 2009; Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013). Our analytical structure
prompts a deviating prediction because we consider a very long time horizon and allow the costs
of rapid deployment to be high.
For the case of the United States, this result is particularly noteworthy. In the current political
environment, partisan polarization has reached a high level, and this conflict manifests itself in
profound disagreements over environmental and energy policy (McCright and Dunlap, 2011). In
particular, it is noteworthy that the Republican Party is explicitly hostile to many environmental
goals, such as climate mitigation. In such an environment, our model predicts that even a strongly
committed Democratic Party might not be able to induce the political right wing to compromise.
However, if the Republican Party were to become more moderate, be it for strategic or demographic
reasons, we would expect to see a stronger association between the Democratic Party’s commitment
to renewables and federal policy.
4.3.3 Endogenous Elections
Qualitatively, the parties’ strategies remain unchanged when we make the probability of election
endogenous, that is, dependent on energy policy. In this version, voters care about energy policies,
as well as other issues, so that electoral outcomes are stochastic. For example, while voters will
penalize a party for excessive investments in renewable energy, even a party that over-invests in
renewables may win elections. This result is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The figure shows the evolution
of renewable energy under various scenarios. In particular, we compare cases of electorates with high
and low environmental ideologies. As baselines, we use both the cost-minimizing energy trajectory
and one where the parties simply invest according to their ideal points, without considering the
electoral consequences of this myopic and naive strategy.
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Figure 4.3: Investments of the parties as a function of the renewable energy share when both parties
are equally strongly ideological, for varying values of voters’ green ideological commitment. The
dashed line represents the economically optimal investments, and black lines represent the myopic
(single period preferred) actions of each party.
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Since parties care not only about election, but also the policy outcome, they still manipulate the
status quo in order to influence the entire future trajectory. This result, however, does not mean
that elections have no effect on strategies. Endogenous elections make the policies responsive to the
public’s preferences, which are assumed to combine cost-minimization with varying preference for
clean energy. Specifically, the brown party’s strategy now systematically involves more investment
in renewables than without the electoral response. The green party’s strategy involves more or
less investment in renewables, depending on the relative strength of the electorate’s preferences.
Counter-intuitively, the party that is the most ideological is most influenced by the electorate,
since it is the party that is the most motivated to win elections. This is why electoral support for
renewable energy is so important for a robust renewable energy transition, as shown in the next
section.
These results are important for theories of sustainable energy transitions for two reasons. First,
they show that electoral competition does not stop parties from dynamically responding to the
other party’s plans. As long as the two parties are interested in policy, and not only political
survival, they continue to adjust their policies in preparation for possible electoral defeats. Second,
they also show that the effect of electoral competition on policy interacts with partisan ideology
in a complex manner. In particular, high degrees of ideological commitment drive political parties
toward the median voter’s preference, as highly ideological policy positions make the thought of
losing the elections difficult to accept. This surprising result suggests, among other things, that
the high degree of partisan polarization in the United States over environmental policies cannot be
understood without considering public opinion. Even though McCright and Dunlap (2011) note
that partisan ideologies are more sharply diverging than public opinion among Republican and
Democrat voters, our model suggests that the sharp partisan polarization may result in policies
that reflect the preferences of voters. For example, a strongly anti-environmental Republican must
consider carefully the views of the electorate to avoid allowing a Democrat with the opposite
ideology to gain power.
4.3.4 Path Dependence in the System
Because our model is dynamic, we can use it to investigate “path dependence” in renewable energy
investment as a function of government policy. Scholars in the literature on sustainable energy
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transitions and climate mitigation frequently highlight the dangers and opportunities of path de-
pendence (Unruh, 2000; Laird and Stefes, 2009; Nilsson et al., 2011; Levin et al., 2012; Aklin and
Urpelainen, 2013). We investigate the extent to which initial policy decisions by either party have
durable effects on renewable energy trajectories over long periods of time.
Technically, we consider two measures of path dependence. First, we measure the variance of the
share of renewable energy in 2040 over all paths that have the same number of green electoral terms.
Taking a weighted average of these variances, where the weights correspond to the frequency of a
given count of green electoral terms in 1000 simulation runs, we obtain a total variance attributable
to sequencing. Intuitively, we compare all sequences of political power with the same number of
the green party in power, and compare the consequences of early versus late electoral victories.
Second, we compare the outcome in 2040 under two radically distinct electoral sequences. Letting
G denote green party rule and B brown party rule, these sequences are GGGBBBB (first greens
dominate, then browns) and BBBBGGG (first browns dominate, then greens).
The simulations are graphically illustrated in the appendix. To summarize, we find that the
degree of path dependence is heavily influenced by the ideological strength of the parties: for
there to be substantial path dependence, both parties must be strongly ideological. For example,
in the case of equally strong ideological commitment, the change in party sequence is associated
with a 15% difference in final outcome, but only 2-8% for the other scenarios. To see why this
is the case, consider what happens under the GGGBBBB sequence and the BBBBGGG sequence
when both parties are strongly ideological. In the BBBBGGG path, the brown party pursued
minor divestments while it was in power because the renewable energy share was still low. Once
the green party had a period of sustained control, it aggressively invested. In contrast, in the
GGGBBBB sequence, any investments in the early period by the green party is undone by vigorous
disinvestments by the strongly ideological brown party. The greater the ideological strength of the
parties, the more pronounced the different between these two paths.
These findings add nuance to earlier arguments and debates in the literature on first-mover
advantages in energy policy. A large body of literature emphasizes that technology development
is characterized by increasing returns to scale, and this characterization has been proven accurate
for the energy sector (Unruh, 2000). Our model shows that political incentives can modify such
path dependence. If a party with strong views about the utility of different energy sources governs
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a country for a long time in the early years of energy technology development, its achievements
can be undone by later governments. Once the technology is more mature, however, such a party
can relatively rapidly change the energy development trajectory. Indeed, these results are con-
sistent with the notion that renewable energy is now globalizing and differences across countries
shrinking, as even previously uninterested countries have now begun to invest into renewable energy
development.
4.4 Trajectories for Sustainable Energy Transitions
We now explore how partisan strategies unfold in time, producing energy transitions and climate
mitigation pathways in the long run. We compare our dynamic outcomes to various mitigation
pathways simulated by energy-economy integrated models in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report
(Clarke et al., 2014). The IPCC simulations are based on fixed economic policies and do not
account for the political drivers generating these policies. We find that a range of political scenarios
generate transitions close to the IPCC pathways needed to maintain CO2 levels under 450 ppm by
2100, despite the presence of an opposition party. Other political scenarios fail to generate such a
transition.
To generate transition paths, we simulate stochastic elections and use the strategies discussed
above to determine the resulting investments and the evolution of the renewable energy share over
time. Since renewables do not generate carbon emissions, our analysis of changes in the renewable
energy share are naturally related to the degree of carbon abatement required to achieve various
IPCC climate trajectories. Since the IPCC scenarios are based on assumptions about the use
of renewables, we can see how political factors influence the feasibility of the renewable energy
transitions required for various IPCC scenarios. We acknowledge that renewable energy is not the
only variable determining climate mitigation pathways, but we also note that the achievement of
IPCC mitigation scenarios does depend on national sustainable energy transitions. In practice, such
sustainable energy transitions feature an increase in the use of renewable energy. Therefore, our
simulations offer important insights into the political dynamics of renewable energy as a contributor
to climate mitigation pathways.
Figure 4.4 shows the mean and standard deviation of simulated paths for five distinct political
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scenarios, with the current renewable share of the United States (11%, 2010) as an initial condition.
We compare them to the U.S. median trajectory from the energy transition model ensembles used
in (Clarke et al., 2014), which were run under various policy scenarios (Kriegler et al., 2014). Two
baselines are of particular interest: (i) the cost-minimizing baseline from our model, plotted in
blue in the first panel, featuring a considerable increase in renewable technologies to 40% in 2060;
(ii) the 450 ppm policy, which shows the path of renewable energy that would arise if the world
adopted a global price for CO2 compatible with reaching 450 ppm by 2100. The median trajectory
for the 450 ppm policy reaches 95% of renewables in 2060 and is our normative benchmark. In the
appendix, we present similar plots for European countries.
In the green set of paths of the first panel of Figure 4.4, both parties are strongly and equally
ideological. Despite a brown party that is as staunchly committed to fossil fuels as the green party
is to renewables, the mean trajectory reaches about 65% renewables in 2060 from 11% in 2013. A
highly ideological and competitive political game generates a transition that arrives halfway between
our cost-minimization and our normative benchmark. However, the variance is considerable and
driven by variation in the number of times the green party is elected, as well as the effect of path
dependence on the trajectories. The red set of trajectories corresponds to a scenario where the
brown party is much more ideological than the green party. In this case, it is impossible to obtain
a transition. Not only is the brown party more active, but the green party is reacting to the brown
party’s stance by minimizing its own investments to remain in a low-renewable energy economy,
where the actions of the brown party are more economical.
The “reference policy” path shows the median renewable energy path for the U.S. projected
by the AR5 ensemble of models given the country’s current policies. Yielding a median trajectory
that is a little more than a standard deviation lower than the mean green path, current policies
qualitatively correspond to what one would expect when two parties are weakly and equally ide-
ological. In contrast, the “No Policy” median path, which corresponds to a complete absence of
climate policy, lies below our cost-minimizing baseline, adequately reflecting the pro-fossil fuel bias
of the current political-economic equilibrium.
The second panel adds the influence of the electorate, with the two parties as ideological as in
the upper trajectories of the first panel. In the blue set of paths, the electorate wants the most
economic policy; in the green set, the electorate is strongly pro-renewables. When the electorate is
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Figure 4.4: Simulation of renewable energy share in the United States, 2013-2060. The two panels
compare our simulations to various mitigation pathways in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report.
The bands represent the trajectories that fall within one standard deviation of the mean of all
trajectories (in an ensemble of 1000 simulations). Black lines show AR5 transition trajectories:
AR5 No Policy corresponds to a complete absence of climate policy; AR5 Ref. Policy shows the
median renewable energy path for the U.S. projected by the AR5 ensemble of models given the
country’s current policies; and AR5 450 ppm is a transition for the U.S. that is necessary to support
a 450 ppm world. Colored lines and prediction bands show mean and standard deviations around
modeled scenarios, across different possible election results. In the top panel, the green band is a
trajectory where both parties are highly ideological (nonetheless showing a greater transition than
the economic baseline), while the red band shows a total lack of energy transitions because only the
brown party is ideological. In the lower panel, the electorate either does not value energy policy
(blue), or does (green), where strong electorate values produce a trajectory near the 450 ppm curve.
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sensitive to cost only, the mean 2050 outcome is similar to that achieved in the exogenous election
case, but, interestingly, the trajectories are much variable because there is more path dependence
(since path dependence runs through the changing economic attractiveness of renewables). In
contrast, the pro-renewables electorate is able to push the mean 2050 share of renewables to 85%,
much closer to our normative 450 ppm benchmark. Additionally, the uncertainty is less in the case
of a pro-renewables electorate because the green party has an electoral advantage. This suggests
that robust renewable transitions require a vocal pro-renewable electorate.
4.5 Conclusion
The unsustainable nature of contemporary energy use highlights the need for sustainable energy
transitions, but the political feasibility of this phenomenon remains poorly understood. Because
sustainable energy transitions take place over decades, no single government can launch and sustain
them. Instead, the government must consider various electoral scenarios over long periods of time.
The problem is further complicated by technological change and the effects of energy policy on
electoral outcomes. In such a dynamic environment, political parties have to adopt strategies that
consider the implications of their policies over long periods of time.
This article contributes to the debate a dynamic model with technological learning and electoral
competition. In our model, two political parties, one with ‘green’ and the other with ‘brown’
preferences, compete for office and select renewable energy policies. The two parties have their
ideological preferences, and the strength of these preferences relative to cost-minimization may
vary. Each party understands that elections are competitive, and we analyze the model both
with and without elections that depend on energy policy. The dynamic simulations highlight the
importance of ideological commitment, as a highly ideological party can force a less ideological party
to accommodate its preferences. At the same time, highly ideological parties are also sensitive to
public opinion, as they find the idea of an electoral defeat particularly unpalatable. Taken together,
these dynamic incentives inject a degree of path dependence into the system.
To be sure, the computational model has its limitations. To draw sharp inferences, we have
assumed two competing parties in a starkly majoritarian setting without any checks and balances.
In parliamentary systems with many smaller parties, this strategy prevents the analysis of coalition
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formation and may therefore offer limited insights into some dimensions of climate policy. These
considerations offer interesting opportunities for futurer analytical models that add nuance and
detail to our general structure. We have also not considered the role of interest groups, such as
trade associations, labor unions, and the environmental movement. These interest groups may
significantly influence policy even in an environment with political competition. We have also pur-
posefully refrained from commenting on the international aspects of sustainable energy transitions,
such as transboundary externalities, global public goods, and the diffusion of clean technology
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Appendix A
Appendix - Taking the Law to Court:
Citizen Suits and the Legislative
Process
A.1 Decision Problem
Legislators’ decision problem: Majority proposers seek to maximize uM = qMyM+BM−yM−kB2M if
they invest in the public policy, and uM = BM− n−12 xMM−kB
2
M if they pursue a purely distributive
strategy. The choice of the majority proposer is constrained by the participation constraint of the
majority:
qMyM + xMM − kB2M ≥ vM (A.1)
where vM is given by Equation 2.1. Additional constraints are the requirement that transfers and
the public good investment be non-negative and the proposer’s own benefits also non-negative, so
BM ≥ yM + n−12 xMM .
Minority proposers will seek to maximize um = qmym + Bm − ym − nMpcxmM − kB2m if they
invest in public policy, and uM = BM − n−12 xMM − kB
2
M if they pursue a purely distributive
strategy. They are subject to the participation constraint of the majority:
qMym + xmM − kB2m = vM (A.2)
They are also subject to the participation constraint of the minority: qmym−kB2m ≥ vm, which
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does not always bind. vm is given by Equation 2.2. Additionaly constraints are that transfers and
public good investments are non-negative, in particular Bm ≥ ym + nMpcxmM .
Throughout the derivations below, I re-express the benefits xpi of the proposer as Bi − yi −∑
j∈Ci xij , i.e. what remains of the budget once the public good and the transfers are accounted
for. This allows me to express the choice problem in terms of the budget.
A.2 Proofs for The Legislature Acts Alone
A.2.1 Legislators’ strategies
Remark 5 below clarifies why we are justified to define coalition-building strategies either based on
distributive transfers or on the public good. It states that there are no situations where the returns
from modifying transfers depends on the choice of public policy, or vice versa. In other words,
there is no complementarity between the two coalition-building tools: one dominates the other for
a given set of exogenous parameters. Which is preferred depends on the exogenous parameters of
the model. Below D
2ui
DyiDxij
is the total second derivative of the utility of proposer of group i with
respect to the two coalition-building tools (yi: i invests in y; xij : i provides transfers to coalition
members of group j), where this utility is out of equilibrium. It captures the full costs and benefits
for the proposer of using transfers and the public good to build a coalition, including the variation
running through changes in the participation constraints.
Remark 5. For all parameters, D
2ui
DyiDxij
= 0. This implies that DuiDxij is a constant uniquely defined
by the set of parameters (qM , qm, k, n, nM ). If
Dui
Dxij
is negative, then the proposer minimizes xij.
This Remark also establishes that the equilibria defined in the main text are unique, since one
strategy is dominant given a set of exogenous parameters.

















When the budget constraint given by Eq. A.2 does not bind, we can consider Bm a free
variable and thus, the last term of DumDym can be dropped. Thus:
Dum
DxmM
= −nMpc + (qm − 1) dymdxmM .
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+ 1 (case 1). If yM is invariant, then of course
∂yM
∂xmM























In both cases, we see that ∂ym∂xmM is a constant. Thus, all terms in
Dum
DxmM
are constants. um is a
monotonic function of xmM , either increasing or decreasing depending on qM , qm, δ, p and (n, nM ).
Since an increase in xmM allows a decrease in ym, um is reciprocally monotonically increasing or
decreasing in ym.
When Bm ≥ ym + nMpcxmM does bind, xmM enters the budget term. We must consider the
variation of Bm with respect to xmM to ascertain montonicity of um. In this situation we have that
ym +xmM − k(nMpcxmM + ym)2 = pM (qMyM − kB2M ) +
1
n(BM − yM ) + pm(qMym− j(nMpcxmM +
ym)
2 + pcxmM ). This is a quadratic function of ym and xmM so ym can be expressed as a non-
linear function of xmM . We thus obtain a formulation for um that is entirely a function of xmM ,
the derivative with respect to xmM of which is thus a constant at xmM = 0 that depends on the
exogenous parameters.




constant, allowing us to define strategies in terms of whether they minimize transfers to specific
members or not, as explained in the main text.
A.2.2 Equilibria
Homogeneous case
In the D equilibrium, the proposer maximizes BM − n−12 xMM − kB
2
M where xMM =
1
nBM . We
thus obtain BM =
n+1
4nk .
In the P equilibrium, yM is chosen so as to obtain other legislators’ support and is thus a function of
BM . The proposer maximizes qMyM+BM−yM−kB2M , so in equilibrium qM
dyM
dBM
+1− dyMdBM = 2kBM .





and solving the participation constraint for BM =
qM
2k we get yM =
qM
2k . This is equivalent to the
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collective strategy.
The threshold is given by qM such that u
D = uP ⇒ n+14nk (1−
n−1









First, we show that the majority budget is the same in the P strategy as in the C strategy and
homogeneous baseline. yM is chosen to satisfy the majority’s participation constraint, and is
therefore a function of BM . Denote ȳM the public good investment needed to satisfy the majority’s
participation constraint. The optimality condition is qM
dȳM
dBM
+ 1− dȳMdBM − 2kBM = 0. At the same
time, we know that the majority proposer seeks to maximize his constituency benefits (BM − ȳM ),




2k , as in the collective strategy and the homogeneous baseline.
PO equilibrium In the PO equilibrium, the minority minimizes ym. In fact ym = 0 is feasible






. This condition holds for all parameter values as long as the
minority is no smaller than 30% of the legislature, and this is the equilibrium we characterize here.
Feasible means that there exists a budget such that the transfers needed for n−12 − nm majority
members to acquiesce are affordable.
Under the PO equilibrium, the continuation value of the majority is vM = pM (qMyM −kB2M )+
1
n(BM − yM ) + pm(pcxmM − kB
2
m). The equilibrium values yM and xmM of PO are obtained by
solving the participation constraints of the majority occurring under a majority member proposal
(Eq. A.1) and under a minority member proposal (Eq. A.2):
qMyM − kB2M = pM (qMyM − kB2M ) +
1
n
(BM − yM ) + pm(pcxmM − kB2m)
xmM − kB2m = pM (qMym − kB2M ) +
1
n




k + (n− 1)nm(kB
2
M − kB2m)








qM (n− 1)n+ 2nM
Bm is chosen to maximize the utility of the minority proposer subject to the minority’s partic-




m ), where B
interior
m maximizes
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the unconstrainted utility of the minority proposer (solving 1−nMpc dxmMdBm = 2kBm), whereas B
max
is the maximum value the budget can take without violating the minority members’ participation




mM )). The solution is B
max
m
at low values of qM because y
PO
M is low and therefore vm comparatively harder to satisfy.
PA equilibrium Under PA, qmym − kB2m = vM and qMyM −
q2M
4k = vM . Under PA, we have
vM = pMvM +
1
n(BM − yM ) + pmvM , indicating that yM = ym = BM =
qM
2k as in the homogeneous
baseline and the CA equilibrium (see below). We do not consider this equilibrium in the main text
because it is equivalent to the CA equilibrium.
CA equilibrium Under CA, (qmym − kB2m)(1 − pm) = pM (qMBM − kB2M ) ⇒ qmym − kB2m =
qMBM −kB2M . The minority must offer the same payoff to the majority as the majority can obtain
on its own terms, so ym = Bm = BM =
qM
2k as in the homogeneous baseline.
MIN case
Minority Budget Qualitatively, the first thing to note is that BMIN1 < B
MAJ
1 (contrasting
the budget chosen by the type 1 (minority) proposer in the MIN case to that of the type 1
(majority) proposer in the MAJ case, when they have comparable valuation q1). In the MAJ
case, at equilibrium the following holds: qM
dyM
dBM




= 2kBm. In the majority case, we additionally have
dyM
dBM
= 1, while in the minority case,
we have dymdBm = 1− nMpc
xmM
dBm
. Since xmMdBm > 0 ⇒
dym
dBm













2k(n2+n(n2M (qm−qM )+nM+1)+nM (2nM+1)(nM (qm−qM )+1))
.
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n2(−(nMqm + 1)) + n
(
n2M (qm − qM ) + nM (qm + 1) + 1
)
+ nM (2nM + 1)(nM (qM − qm)− 1)
×(
BMnM (BM (n− 1)np− n+ 2nM + 1)+
nq2m(nM − nnM )
(






n2M (qm − qM ) + nM + 1
)











n2M (qm − qM ) + nM + 1
)
+ nM (2nM + 1)(nM (qM − qm)− 1)
))




M ), where B
min
M solves xMM (BM ) = 0 (when BM falls under













n2M (−qM ) + nM + 1
)






m(n− 2nM − 1)
(






n2M (qm − qM ) + nM + 1
)











n2M (qm − qM ) + nM + 1
)
+ nM (2nM + 1)(nM (qM − qm)− 1)
))




M ), where B
min
M solves xMM (BM ) = 0 (when







A.2.3 Comparative Statics: the Share of Public Good Spending Varies with
the Composition of the Legislature
The demonstrations that follow use the Lagrangians arising from the proposers’ choice problems
as expressed at the beginning of the Appendix. For a number of the results, we want to know how
the optimal value of the proposer’s objective function changes given some parameter (describing
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the composition of the legislature). This parameter typically affects both the objective function
and the constraint. In general, consider the proposer i’s payoff function ui(yi, Bi, {xij}, θ) where
θ is the vector of parameters {n, nM , qM , qm, k}. The participation constraint of legislator of type
j is expressed as gj(yi, Bi, {xij}, θ) = 0 where j ∈ (m,M). Additionally λj are the lagrangian
multipliers. In what follows, we use the following relation for the comparative statics with respect






















i , {x∗ij}, θ)
∂θj
(A.3)
The functions u and g change for the different equilibria, so we will denote them u and g where
 is a place-holder for the name of the equilibrium. Similarly for the lagrangian multipliers, which
are denoted λM and λ

m respectively for the majority and minority constraint. To simplify notation,
we will omit the optimal values of the choice variables and thus u and g are to be understood
as taking their equilibrium value.
Result 1: We seek to show that in the MAJ case,
dq̄PM
dnm
< 0. The threshold is between the
DD equilibrium and the PO equilibrium. The proposer’s payoff from the D strategy depends
only on the size of the legislature, but not on the size of the opposition. So we only need to
look at how the payoffs of the proposer change in the PO equilibrium as nm changes. In the PO
equilibrium, the proposer’s payoff function is uPO = qMyM +BM − yM − kB2M and the constraint
is gPO = pm(qMyM − kB2M )−
1
n(BM − yM )− pm(pcxmM − kB
2
m) = 0. Applying equation A.3, and









+ 1) > 0
The shadow price λPOM is positive, because the constraint reduces the profit of the proposer, so the
overall expression is positive. Since the profit from the PO strategy increases with the size of the
opposition but the profit from the DD strategy is fixed, the threshold value of qM at which PO is
attractive relative to the DD strategy decreases.




> 0 and dq̄
A
m
d|qM | > 0. The threshold is between
the DD equilibrium and the DA equilibrium. The minority proposer’s payoff from the D strategy
is insensitive to nM or qM . So we only need to look at how the payoffs of the proposer change
in the DA equilibrium as nM and qM change. In the DA equilibrium, the minority proposer’s
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payoff function is uDA = qmym + Bm − yM − nMpcxmM − kB2m and the constraints are gDAM =
qMym+xmM−kB2m−pm(qMym+pcxmM−kB2m)− 1nBM−pM (−kB
2
M ) = 0 and g
DA
m = pM (qmym−
kB2m)− 1n(Bm − ym − nMpcxmM )− pM (−kB
2
M ). Applying equation A.3, we get:
duDA
dnM






xmM (1− n) < 0 (A.4)
The overall expression is dominated by the term −xmM , the increase in distributive transfers for
each increase in the size of the majority, and which subtracts from the proposer’s rent. Since the
profit from the DA strategy decreases with the size of the opposition but the profit from the DD
strategy is fixed, the threshold value of qm at which DA is attractive relative to the DD strategy
increases. Using the same logic, we find:
duDA
dqM





Thus, the threshold value of qm at which DA is attractive relative to the DD strategy increases
with |qM |.




> 0 and dq̄
O
m
d|qM | > 0. The threshold is between the DA equilibrium
and the DO equilibrium. Both the A strategy’s payoff and the O strategy’ payoff depend on nM and
qM . We have just looked at the way in which the A strategy payoff’s changes and will now compare
to the change in O strategy’s payoff as the parameters change. In the DO equilibrium, the minority
proposer’s payoff function is uDO = qm(Bm − nMpcxmM ) − kB2m and the constraints are gDOM =
qM (Bm−nMpcxmM ) +xmM −kB2m−pm(qM (Bm−nMpcxmM ) +pcxmM −kB2m)−pM (−kB2M ) = 0
and gDOm = pM (qmym − kB2m) − 1n(Bm − ym − nMpcxmM ) − pM (−kB
2
M ). Applying equation A.3,
and doing some algebra, we get:
duDO
dnM
= −qmxmM + λM
1
2nn2M
xmM (1− n) < 0 (A.6)
The comparison between the DA and DO equilibria is only relevant when qm > 1, so comparing
equations A.4 and A.6, we see that the change in profit from an increase in the size of the majority
is larger for the DO equilibrium. The reason is that the opportunity cost of the transfers to the
majority are larger, since they take away from what can be invested in the public good, which is
more highly valued than distributive spending. Since the DO equilibrium’s payoff declines more in
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response to a rise in the size of the majority, the threshold value of qm at which DO is attractive
relative to the DA strategy increases with nM .
Lastly, we look at the way qM changes the DO strategy profit:
duDO
dqM





y∗m under the DO equilibrium is higher than under the DA equilibrium (for the same parameter
values). As a corollary, λDAM < λ
DO
M because the majority constraint in the DA equilibrium is less
strong (given that less of the funds are invested in the public good, which the majority opposes).
Thus, comparing equations A.5 and A.7, we see that the change in profit from an increase in the
intensity of preferences of the majority is larger for the DO equilibrium. Again, this implies that
the threshold value of qm at which DO is attractive relative to the DA strategy increases with |qM |.
Result 2: We seek to show that dy1/B1dn0 < 0 and
dy1/B1
d|q0| < 0 in the PO, DA and DO equilibria.
This can be readily seen from the changes in the optimal value of the objective function derived
above.
In the PO equilibrium, the proposer is maximizing the rent to his constituency (because qM < 1).









+ 1) > 0: the optimal value of the objective function
increases with nm because the participation constraint of other majority members decreases. This
implies they need less of the public good to agree to the proposal, which is why the proposer obtains
more particularistic spending for his constituency. The exact same mechanism is at play in the DA
equilibrium: the participation constraint of other minority members decreases so the proposer can
offer a lower ym relative to the budget.
In the DO equilibrium, the proposer wants to maximize spending on the public good, but the
participation constraint of majority members increases with either nM or |qM |, which forces the
proposer to spend more of the budget on distributive transfers.
We now seek to show that d(B1−y1)dq1 > 0 in the PO and DA equilibria. Once again, let us look
at the change in the optimal value of the objective function, this time as a function of q1. In the
PO equilibrium, it is:
duPO
dqM
= yM + λ
PO
M pmyM > 0
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX - TAKING THE LAW TO COURT: CITIZEN SUITS AND THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 120
The optimal value of the objective function increases only if the rent BM − yM of the proposer
increases since that is what the proposer seeks to maximize in the PO equilibrium.
In the DA equilibrium, the situation is analogous:
duDA
dqm
= ym + λ
DA
m pMym > 0
which leads to the same conclusion.
A.3 Legislating with Citizen Suits
A.3.1 The Reshaping of Legislation by Citizen Suits















































+ (1− r)l if a < y and b < y
The last two cases reflect the fact that when the legislation lies outside of the range of judicial
preferences, one of the two types of litigants will not propose claims. This may occur if the
judiciary is not fully diversified. When a > 0, the judiciary on average has a tendency to expand
legislation, whereas b < y∗1 captures a conservative tendency (the courts tend to curb legislation).




2(a−b) if a < y and b > y
ry + (1− r) b2−a22(b−a) if a > y and b > y
r b
2−a2
2(b−a) + (1− r)y if a < y and b < y
In the analysis, the mapping of the extreme values plays an important role. y = 0 maps into
l(0) = n1q12k , while y
∗





A.3.2 Citizen Suits Lead to Shifts in Power in the Legislature
In this section, I compare the litigation model (L) with the baseline model (B). For the purpose
of following the proofs, variables in the litigation model are indexed by l, while the baseline is not
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indexed.
In all four equilibria we consider, we will show that the effective budget B̃ for a given player
type and equilibrium stays the same under litigation as in the baseline, when the solution is an
interior solution. To show that, note that proposers maximize qỹ + B − y − ncxj − kB̃2. Here
nc is the number of coalition members that receive transfers xj . Under litigation ỹ = l(y) and
B̃ = B+ ỹ−y, and under the baseline ỹ = y and B̃ = B. At the equilibrium, for both institutional
environments, we have (q − 1) dỹ
dB̃
+ 1 − nc dxjdB̃ = 2kB̃. To conclude that the effective budgets stay





follow the same functional form under both
institutions. We will do so in each of the four equilibria examined below.
Result 3: We seek to show that ỹPOM > y
PO




m , which requires
no proof since it arises directly from the way I conceptualized the institution of citizen suits. Indeed,
yPOm = 0, while ỹ
PO
m = l(0) > 0.




= 1. In the baseline case, we had dyMdBM = 1. We have verified the condition





We now want to show that xpM,l < x
p
M and thus that ỹM,l > yM . In equilibrium, the participation








xpM,l = pm(1− pc)xmM,l
As we see, xpM and x
p
M,l are positively related to xmM and xmM,l respsectively (which makes sense
because higher transfers indicate a larger departure of the minority from the majority’s wishes, and
a consequent lowering of majority members’ continuation value). If we show that xmM,l ≤ xmM ,
then we’ll know that xpM,l < x
p
M and thus that ỹM,l > yM . We must thus examine the decision of
the minority.
In the opposition strategy, the minority seeks to minimize ỹm. Since the minimum level of ỹ
is l(0), we consider the equilibrium that arises given ỹm = l(0). The minority proposer maximizes
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qml(0) +Bm,l − nMpcxmM,l − k(Bm,l + l(0))2, such that:





xpM,l + pm(qM l(0)− k(Bm,l + l(0))
2 + pcxmM,l) (A.8)
From Eq.A.8 and using the fact that xpM,l = nm(1− pc)xmM,l, we can re-express xmM,l as:
B: xmM (1 + (pMqM −
1
n
)nm(1− pc)− pmpc) = (1− pm)kB2m + pM (qMBM − kB2M ) (A.9)
L: xmM,l(1 + (pMqM −
1
n
)nm(1− pc)− pmpc) = (1− pm)(−qM l(0) + kB̃2m,l) + pM (qM B̃M,l − kB̃2M,l)
(A.10)
First, this allows us to check that
dxmM,l
dB̃m,l
= dxmMdBm , the condition that guarantees that B̃m,l = Bm.
Indeed, in either the L and B case, this derivative is −2kB̃M
1+(pM qM− 1n )nm(1−pc)−pmpc
= 2kB̃m. Knowing
that B̃m,l = Bm, we see that Eq. A.9 and A.10 result in xmM − xmM,l = pMqM l(0) > 0. Hence
xmM,l < xmM and thus ỹM > yM .
The exact difference between the level of provision of the public good between the two institutional
environments is :
ỹM − yM = xpM − x
p
M,l





We next seek to show that ỹDAm,l > y
DA





Result 5 also states that ỹM,l > yM (for both the DA and DO equilibria), but this requires no
proof since yDAM = y
DO




M = l(0) > 0.
Consider the participation constraint of the minority in the litigation and baseline cases:













M , then subtracting Eq. A.11 and A.12:
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m − xpm,l). However,
let us now consider the participation condition of the majority:
L: xmM,l = (−qM ỹm,l + kB̃2m,l)(1− pm) +
1
n
BM,l + pM (qM l(0)− kB̃2M,l)
B: xmM = (−qMym + kB2m)(1− pm) +
1
n
BM + pM (−kB2M )
⇒ xmM,l − xmM = (1− pm)(qM (ym − ỹm,l)) +
1
n
(BM,l −BM ) + pM (qM l(0))
If the budgets are constant, and if we suppose ỹm,l < ym, then the last line is negative: the transfers
to the majority under litigation have to be smaller than in the baseline. We concluded earlier that




m,l. However, it is impossible that while Bm = B̃m,l, all three
inequalities hold: xpm > x
p
m,l, ym > ỹm,l and xmM > xmM,l. This shows that it is impossible that
ỹm,l < ym.
We now check that, indeed, the effective budgets stay the same. Since the minority proposer












. So all we need to check is that
dxmM,l
dB̃m,l
is equivalent under both institutions.
The following checks the needed equality:







(1− pmpc) = −qM
dỹm
dB̃m




In the absence of litigation:






(1− pmpc) = −qM
dym
dBm




Turning to the majority’s budget, we must check how
dxMM,l
dB̃M,l
is affected by litigation. The


















We now turn to showing that ỹDOm,l > y
DO
m : In the DO equilibrium, B̃m,l = ỹm,l + nMpcxmM,l.
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So ỹDOm,l > y
DO
m ⇔ xDOmM,l < xDOmM .
L: xmM,l = (−qM ỹm,l + kB̃2m,l)(1− pm) +
1
n
BM,l + pM (qM l(0)− kB̃2M,l)
B: xmM = (−qMym + kB2m)(1− pm) +
1
n
BM + pM (−kB2M )
⇒ (xmM,l − xmM )(1− qMpMnmpc) = −
1
n
l(0) + pMqM l(0) < 0
Where we have made use of the fact that ỹm,l − ym = nMpc(xmM − xmM,l) and that BM,l −BM =
−l(0). Since 1− qMpMnmpc > 0, we get that xmM,l < xmM and therefore that ỹm,l > ym.
Result 4: In the CA equilibrium, we have BM,l = yM,l =
qM
2k and consequently B̃M = ỹM,l =
l( qM2k ). The minority sets ỹm,l and B̃m,l to satisfy:





)2) + pm(qM ỹm,l − kB̃2m,l)










Similarly to when the legislature acted alone, the minority is constrained to set the public policy
to the same level as the majority and invest all funds into it. However the maximum value of the
policy is now l( qM2k ) <
qM
2k .








m > q̄Am and q̄
l,O
m > q̄Om : the threshold
functions get shifted upward under litigation.
The change in the utility from the distributive strategy for a player with valuation q is:










Remembering that BDD = B̃DDl , we have:
∆uDD = (q − 1 + n− 1
2n
)l(0) (A.13)
To understand how q̄PM changes, we will compare ∆u
DD to ∆uPO for q = qM . The change in
utility from the PO strategy is:
∆uPO = (qM − 1)(ỹPOM,l − yPOM ) (A.14)
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It is immediate that ∆uCA is smaller than ∆uPO for qM ≥ 1. Indeed, at qM = 1, ∆uPO = 0 and
when qM ≥ 1, ∆uPO becomes positive, whereas ∆uCA < 0 since citizen suits prevent the majority
from getting their optimal public good funding level. Therefore q̄l,CM > q̄
C
M .
The change in the utility from the DA strategy (minority case):
∆uDA = (qm − 1)(ỹDAm,l − yDAm )− nMpc(xDAmM,l − xDAmM ) (A.15)
The minority and majority constraints give us:
pMqm(ỹ
DA
m,l − yDAm ) = pMqml(0) +
1
n
(yDAm − yDAm,l − nMpc(xDAmM,l − xDAmM ))
xmM,l − xmM = −pMqM (ỹm,l − ym) +
1
n
l(0) + pMqM l(0)




n2pM (qm − 1) + nMpc(1 + npM (1− qM ))
)
n(npMqm − nMpcpMqM )
)l(0)
The factor preceding l(0) is negative and smaller than q − 1 + n−12n for parameter ranges that are
relevant. Thus ∆uDA < ∆uDD. As a result, the threshold q̄Am,l is higher than q̄
A
m in the absence of
litigation. To understand why this is the case, consider Eq. A.21. The first term is the utility lost
to having to devote more resources to the public good, equivalent to (q− 1)l(0) in Eq. A.19. Both
terms are on the same order. The second term is the difference in the distributive goods that need
to be transfered to form a coalition. These transfers are lower under litigation. In the case of the
DD equilibrium, these transfers are l(0)n lower than without litigation, and going to
n−1
2 members.
In the case of the DA equilibrium, the reduction in transfers is of the same order but only need
to go to nMpc members. Thus the gains in utility from lower transfers in the DD equilibrium are
more consequential than in the DA equilibrium q̄l,Am > q̄Am and q̄
l,O
m > q̄Om : the threshold functions
get shifted upward under litigation.
The change in the utility from the distributive strategy for a player with valuation q is:










Remembering that BDD = B̃DDl , we have:
∆uDD = (q − 1 + n− 1
2n
)l(0) (A.16)
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To understand how q̄PM changes, we will compare ∆u
DD to ∆uPO for q = qM . The change in
utility from the PO strategy is:
∆uPO = (qM − 1)(ỹPOM,l − yPOM ) (A.17)





It is immediate that ∆uCA is smaller than ∆uPO for qM ≥ 1. Indeed, at qM = 1, ∆uPO = 0 and
when qM ≥ 1, ∆uPO becomes positive, whereas ∆uCA < 0 since citizen suits prevent the majority
from getting their optimal public good funding level. Therefore q̄l,CM > q̄
C
M .
The change in the utility from the DA strategy (minority case):
∆uDA = (qm − 1)(ỹDAm,l − yDAm )− nMpc(xDAmM,l − xDAmM ) (A.18)
The minority and majority constraints give us:
pMqm(ỹ
DA
m,l − yDAm ) = pMqml(0) +
1
n
(yDAm − yDAm,l − nMpc(xDAmM,l − xDAmM ))
xmM,l − xmM = −pMqM (ỹm,l − ym) +
1
n
l(0) + pMqM l(0)




n2pM (qm − 1) + nMpc(1 + npM (1− qM ))
)
n(npMqm − nMpcpMqM )
)l(0)
The factor preceding l(0) is negative and smaller than q − 1 + n−12n for parameter ranges that are
relevant. Thus ∆uDA < ∆uDD. As a result, the threshold q̄Am,l is higher than q̄
A
m in the absence of
litigation. To understand why this is the case, consider Eq. A.21. The first term is the utility lost
to having to devote more resources to the public good, equivalent to (q− 1)l(0) in Eq. A.19. Both
terms are on the same order. The second term is the difference in the distributive goods that need
to be transfered to form a coalition. These transfers are lower under litigation. In the case of the
DD equilibrium, these transfers are l(0)n lower than without litigation, and going to
n−1
2 members.
In the case of the DA equilibrium, the reduction in transfers is of the same order but only need to
go to nMpc members. Thus the gains in utility from lower transfers in the DD equilibrium are more
consequential than in the DA equilibrium and q̄l,Am > q̄Am and q̄
l,O
m > q̄Om : the threshold functions
get shifted upward under litigation.
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The change in the utility from the distributive strategy for a player with valuation q is:










Remembering that BDD = B̃DDl , we have:
∆uDD = (q − 1 + n− 1
2n
)l(0) (A.19)
To understand how q̄PM changes, we will compare ∆u
DD to ∆uPO for q = qM . The change in
utility from the PO strategy is:
∆uPO = (qM − 1)(ỹPOM,l − yPOM ) (A.20)





It is immediate that ∆uCA is smaller than ∆uPO for qM ≥ 1. Indeed, at qM = 1, ∆uPO = 0 and
when qM ≥ 1, ∆uPO becomes positive, whereas ∆uCA < 0 since citizen suits prevent the majority
from getting their optimal public good funding level. Therefore q̄l,CM > q̄
C
M .
The change in the utility from the DA strategy (minority case):
∆uDA = (qm − 1)(ỹDAm,l − yDAm )− nMpc(xDAmM,l − xDAmM ) (A.21)
The minority and majority constraints give us:
pMqm(ỹ
DA
m,l − yDAm ) = pMqml(0) +
1
n
(yDAm − yDAm,l − nMpc(xDAmM,l − xDAmM ))
xmM,l − xmM = −pMqM (ỹm,l − ym) +
1
n
l(0) + pMqM l(0)




n2pM (qm − 1) + nMpc(1 + npM (1− qM ))
)
n(npMqm − nMpcpMqM )
)l(0)
The factor preceding l(0) is negative and smaller than q − 1 + n−12n for parameter ranges that are
relevant. Thus ∆uDA < ∆uDD. As a result, the threshold q̄Am,l is higher than q̄
A
m in the absence of
litigation. To understand why this is the case, consider Eq. A.21. The first term is the utility lost
to having to devote more resources to the public good, equivalent to (q− 1)l(0) in Eq. A.19. Both
terms are on the same order. The second term is the difference in the distributive goods that need
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to be transfered to form a coalition. These transfers are lower under litigation. In the case of the
DD equilibrium, these transfers are l(0)n lower than without litigation, and going to
n−1
2 members.
In the case of the DA equilibrium, the reduction in transfers is of the same order but only need
to go to nMpc members. Thus the gains in utility from lower transfers in the DD equilibrium are
more consequential than in the DA equilibrium and q̄l,DAm > q̄DAm .
Change in utility from the DO strategy:
∆uDO = qm(ỹ
DO
m,l − yDOm ) (A.22)



















The difference in welfare between the litigation case and the baseline case is denoted ∆W = W l−W .
Majority Case
DD equilibrium: In the DD equilibrium, ∆W = q̄l(0), where q̄ is the average valuation. There-
fore, the litigation case dominates the baseline as long as q̄ > 0.







(qM ỹM − kB̃2M ) +
nm
n














(qmỹM − kB̃2M ) +
nm
n
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Figure A.1: y for the MAJ and MIN case with and without litigation The parameter values are
nM = 21, nm = 12, q0 = 0.5, and p = 0.1. The judiciary is assumed fully diverse, and legislators
preferences exactly mirror the distribution of preferences amongst citizens.





















We have the following equilibrium relations in the PO equilibrium:
xpM,l − x
p
M = yM − ỹM





(yM − ỹM )
xpm,l − x
p
m = −ỹm +
nM
nm
2nM − (n− 1)
n− 1
















(yM − ỹM )+
nM
n2






2nM − (n− 1)
n− 1
(ỹM − yM ))
= (q̄ − 1
n
)
(nmỹm + nM (ỹM − yM ))
n
It follows from Result 3 that the second term is positive. As a result ∆W > 0 iff q̄ > 1n
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CA equilibrium: In the CA equilibrium, both parties invest the full budget in the public good
and moreover choose the same amount. The differences in welfare levels are thus simply given by:







∆W = q̄(ỹ − y) + k(y2 − ỹ2)
∆W is positive as long as q̄ < (3nnM )qM4n , which holds iff qm <
qM (2n−3nM )
4nm
. In other words, the






(q̄l(0)− kB̃2M ) +
nm
n
(q̄ỹm − kB̃2m) +
nM
n2










(q̄l(0)− k(B̃2M −B2M )) +
nm
n




(B̃M − l(0) +BM ) +
nm
n2
(B̃m −Bm − ỹm + ym)
As shown earlier, the effective budgets stay the same. The expression thus simplifies to:









So as in the majority case, PO equilibrium, the litigation case dominates iff q̄ > 1n .




(q̄l(0)− kB̃2M ) +
nm
n
(q̄ỹm − kB̃2m) +
nM
n2

















pc(xmM,l − xmM )






















Again, the litigation case dominates iff q̄ > 1n .
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A.5 Endogeneity of Citizen Suits
We do not present full proofs for the claims of this section, because the arguments follow fairly
directly from the results presented in earlier. The action space is L = 0, L = 1 and the strategy
profiles are vectors (LM , Lm), giving four possible equilibrium outcomes.
• Case 1: MAJ case with a status quo that corresponds to unbiased implementation
It is clear from earlier results that u0,0m > u
1,0
m for all parameter values. Indeed, the minority
proposer could use the institution to gain more legislative support at less cost from majority
members, but we already established that the minority proposer in fact prefers to use distribu-
tive transfers to minimize the amount of the public good provided (the O strategy prevails),
so it is not advantageous to promote citizen suits.When qM > 1, the minority proposer would
support citizen suits to obtain a better compromise, but the minority proposer cannot afford
the transfers needed for majority members to join his coalition and accept the institution.
It is also clear that u0,0M > u
0,1
M . Indeed, this would simply add more constraints to the pro-
posers on how to balance the public and private goods to compose his coalition. At best,
it makes no difference to his payoff, and at worst it decreases his payoff by forcing him to
invest at least l(0) in the public good instead of investing at level he finds optimal for his own
political advantage.
Now suppose lM = 1 and lm = 1, can one of the legislators benefit from revoking the institu-
tion? For low values of qM , either benefits because the public good is not valued enough by
any legislators, to the point where individual transfers are in fact a cheaper way of building
a coalition. For all values of qM < 1, the minority proposer gains to revoke the institution
(beyond the direct avoidance of the public good) because it guarantees the support of the
minority at a very low or zero cost. When qM > 1, the majority proposer clearly wants and
can revoke the institution.
• Case 2: MAJ case with a status quo similar to r = 1 (a lot of resistance in the implementation
of the policy in the absence of citizen suits)
If r = 1, then l(0) = 0 but l(y) < y for all y > 0. This means that some values of y that the
majority proposer wants to implement are out of reach unless he/she institute citizen suits
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(lM = 0, lm = 0) is no longer an equilibrium.
Now suppose lM = 1 and lm = 1, can one of the legislators benefit from revoking the
institution? The reason that leads the majority proposer to institute citizen suits when lm = 0
continues to hold when lm = 1 since now majority proposers have a higher continuation value
and are going to demand even higher values of the public good to give their support to the
proposer’s coalition. Thus, the stability of the (lM = 1, lm = 1) equilibrium hinges on whether
the minority proposer can afford to revoke it, which we now turn to. As we saw in the main
section, the minority chooses the opposition strategy and in doing so, can afford to bring the
public good to very low levels (and for most parameters, to y = 0). This implies that for
all parameter values at whicht the opposition strategy is attractive, the minority proposer
can use transfers to revoke the citizen suit institution. Thus the citizen suit institution is an
equilibrium institution only when qM ≥ 1 or the majority is very large (at which point the
acquiescence strategy is preferred and the minority is forced to make the same proposal as
the majority).
• Case 3: MIN case with a status quo that corresponds to unbiased implementation
It is clear that u1,1M > u
0,1
M , since the majority opposes the public good and only needs the
support of other majority members who oppose the public good as well. Thus are never an
equilibrium in the MIN case. Additionally {lM = 0, lm = 0} is an equilibrium. Indeed, it is
clear that u0,0M > u
0,1




m because the minority proposer wants the freedom to
offer just enough of the public good to satisfy the participation constraint of the minority
members, and no more than that.
• Case 4: MAJ case with a status quo similar to r = 1 (a lot of resistance in the implementation
of the policy in the absence of citizen suits) As above, {lM = 1, lm = 1} cannot be an
equilibrium for the same reason as above since the majority has all the reasons to revoke the
institution in their proposals. For qm large enough, the minority proposers could promote
citizen suits if in their absence they cannot achieve the public good gains they want and can
afford to propose (in the DO equilibrium).
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Appendix B
Appendix - Whose Law Is It?
Network Analysis of the Evolution of
U.S. Environmental Law, 1973-2013
B.1 Legal Data
B.1.1 Data collection
The data was collected by scraping WestLaw Campus, using the selenium webdriver (as a python
package). A search was conducted for each environmental legal topic. Each search yielded a list
of links to all opinions containing a headnote on that topic. Then, the script downloaded the
html version of each of these opinions, with citing references. Documents that were too large were
requested in person to WestLaw Campus.
The documents were parsed with a custom script, retrieving: the court, the parties, the date of
the decision, the outcome of the case. In addition, it retrieves each headnote, with the code of the
legal topic it addresses and the text, and matches it with the section of the opinion that addresses
the issue (figure B.1). Within the text of the opinion, the script retrieves the citations to precedent
used in arguing the issue. Finally, at the end of the text, the script retrieves which future case
cited each headnote, with the sign (positive or negative) of the citation.
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Figure B.1: Sections of a court case as it appears in Westlaw. The header section gives the court,
the parties and the date. The headnote section lists every headnote (here showing headnote 8)
and links to the relevant section of the opinion (section 8). In this body, one can find the citation
used to make the argument (highlighted in yellow). Finally, the citing references section indicates
whether the headnote of interest (headnote 8) was cited positively or negatively (highlighted in
red).
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B.1.2 Community detection
In networks that are random, the distribution of edges among the vertices is highly homogeneous.
Real networks are highly organized an display order in the distribution of edges among vertices.
They typically show high concentrations of edges within special groups of vertices, and low concen-
trations between these groups. This feature of real networks is called community structure. Many
algorithms exist to detect communities within networks. They differ based on what mathematical
or algorithmic definition of community they rely on (Fortunato, 2010). Several popular algorithms
pick the community structure that maximizes the modularity, defined as 12m
∑
ij(Aij−Pij)δ(Ci, Cj).
A is the adjacency matrix of the network (with the entry Aij equal to the number of edges between
i and j), m the total number of edges of the network, and Pij represents the expected number of
edges between vertices i and j in the null model (usually taken to be the random network with
the same global distribution of edges). The function δ is equal to 1 if vertices i and j are in the
same community, zero otherwise. The modularity is maximal for networks that concentrate a high
number of edges within communities.
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The dynamic citation network of decision was transformed into a static network of citation to
topics. In this network, the nodes are the topics and the edge between two topics represent the
existence of at least one citation between headnotes of these topics. The edges are weighted by
the number of such citations. I used the multi-level algorithm of (Blondel et al., 2008), which
maximizes modularity through by iteratively agglomerating nodes into coarser networks. In the
first phase, all nodes form a distinct community, and the algorithm checks whether a node should be
transferred to the community of one of its neighbors. In the second phase, communities thus formed
are represented as nodes and the algorithm again checks if local mergers improve the modularity.
So on until no mergers improve the overall modularity. This algorithm is available in python for
weighted graphs, and yielded a high modularity score and meaningful communities. The resulting
communities are shown in figure B.2.
B.2 Results
B.2.1 Regression table and residual plots
Tables B.1 and B.2 show the details of the regressions performed to test the first hypothesis. In
addition to the filibuster and presidential veto pivots discussed in the main text, the tables present
the results from defining the swing interval so as to take into account the gatekeeping power of
committees. I follow Spiller and Gely (1992) and define the committee gatekeeping (CG) and floor
median (CGFM) gridlock as:
GCGFM = [min(Hc, Sc, HM , SM ),max(Hc, Sc, HM , SM )]
where Hc and Sc are the median preferences of the relevant house and senate committees. Here I use
the House committee on natural resources, the House judiciary committee, the Senate committee
on environment and public works and the Senate judiciary committee as key committees. HM
and SM are the median points of the chambers. The committee gatekeeping and presidential veto
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(CGPV) gridlock is defined as:
GCGPV = [min(Hc, Sc, HM , SM ),max(Hc, Sc, H2/3, S2/3)]ifP isdemocrat
GCGPV = [min(Hc, Sc, H1/3, S1/3),max(Hc, Sc, HM , SM )]ifP isrepulican
Table B.1: Regression table showing the null effect of the swing measures on novelty
FV pivots CG and floor median CG and pres veto
log(Swing) -22.83 -29.06 -22.81
(21.70) (15.73) (19.45)
Gridlock -34.22 53.35 4.54
(72.91) (57.48) (53.51)
Lag 56.25 54.77 55.40
(7.60) (7.51) (7.58)
topic FE YES YES YES
N 126 120 120
R2 0.88 0.89 0.89
Resid. sd 265.55 262.12 264.64
Standard errors in parentheses
Durbin-Watson tests were done to verify that there was no serial correlation in the residuals.
B.2.2 Estimating the preferential reinforcement ratio
The probabilities of citation in Eq. B.1 are highly sensitive to the degrees of the nodes. This
makes the estimation noisy. Since we are here more interested in the pattern of citations, given a
sequence of node degrees (the trends of which are captured by novelty and controversy and studied
via Hypothesis 1), I control for the degrees of the node, following Karrer and Newman (2009).
Consider the notion of a stub: a stub is the tail or head of an edge, pointing either in or out of a
node. To control for the in- and out-degrees, we can consider the probability that a stub at node
i is connected to a stub at node j (instead of the probability that an edge exists). This leads to a
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Table B.2: Regression table showing the null effect of the swing measures on controversy
FV pivots CG and floor median CG and pres veto
log(Swing) 10.89 -11.78 -11.78
(15.55) (12.24) (12.24)
Gridlock -64.60 40.92 40.92
(107.20) (46.65) (46.65)
Congress 28.43 22.80 22.80
(6.90) (5.01) (5.01)
Lag 0.20 0.24 0.24
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
topic FE YES YES YES
N 130 123 123
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77
Standard errors in parentheses
reformulation of Eq. B.1 as:
R∆t =
P (“i cites j published at date ti −∆t”|E(ti) = E(tj))
P (“i cites j published at date ti + ∆t”)
(B.1)
where E(i) = E(j) means that both the periods to which i and j belong are characterized by the
same absence or presence of majority support for environmental policy.
To estimate Eq. B.1, consider a window I of nodes around a node i and another window J∆t
around node j of age ti + ∆t. In practice, I use windows of length one quarter of a year
1. We can
estimate the probabilities in Eq. B.1 by 1) counting the number of edges between nodes in the
two windows, and then dividing by the number of in-stubs in the first window and out-stubs in the
second and then 2) averaging these counts over all pairs of windows I and J separated by ∆t years.
Formally, define lnm to be 1 if a link exists between a particular node n in I and a particular node
m in J∆t. Also denote X endbeg the set of nodes in the network spanning period (beg, end) (here we’ll
1Window size should be as small as possible, but large enough to allow good statistics. The exact size will be
determined by experimentation.
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use beg = 44 years and end = ∆t years). Then:
R̂∆t =
〈 ∑
n,m∈I×J∆t if E(i)=E(j) lnm∑















The averaging is done over the set of nodes in the X endbdg .
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Appendix C
Appendix - Political Competition and
Sustainable Energy Transitions over
Long Time Horizons: A Dynamic
Approach
C.1 Model Overview
We use a new dynamic programming model, which accounts for investment and operation costs,
endogenous technological learning, election probabilities, and the full range of possible future re-
sponses and fossil fuel prices. Parties choose actions in each state of the world and time period
that are optimal in expectation, in the face of future opportunities, uncertainty, and retaliations.
The model is described in three phases. First, a “baseline” model estimates the economically
optimal investments plan, under uncertainty in fuel prices. Second, the political model incorpo-
rates two parties with different objectives and uncertainty in election outcomes. Third, the energy
platforms are included as a factor determining election results, so that optimal trajectories account
for this effect. This “endogenous elections” model has three major forms: short-sighted retrospec-
tive voting, in which only election year actions affect election probabilities; decaying retrospective
voting, in which actions have geometrically decaying impacts on future elections; and cognitive
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hierarchy, in which parties refine their assumptions about the actions of the other party to create
an optimal opposing platform.
The basic assumptions of each model are outlined below, with additional details in the subse-
quent sections.
C.1.1 Baseline Model
In the baseline model, the planner selects the optimal investment of renewable energy qt MW at
every time t = 1, ...,H to minimize the present value of energy production costs over a planning
horizon H. The social planner discounts the future at rate δ. We do not model specific policy
instruments, but instead assume that the planner selects the most expedient available instrument
to achieve a desired change, if any, in the mix of energy sources.
We denote the share of renewable energy at time t in the mix of energy sources as st. Thus, qt
is the action variable while st is a state variable, the endogenous status quo policy. The evolution
of st over time follows st = st−1 + qt/Q, where Q is the total energy capacity. If qt is positive, net
investments are made in renewables, while if qt is negative, net investments in fossil fuel energy are
made. The total amount of energy production (Q) remains constant in this analysis.
We model the cost of energy production similarly to Fuss et al. (2008). The yearly cost at time
t for a total capacity Q is a function of both st and qt.
Γ(st, qt, P
f
t ) = F (1− st)QP
f
t + (C.1)
Of ((1− st)Q) +Oc(stQ) +
Cc(qt, st) + C
f (qt)
This is a standard accounting equation, where the first row represents the cost of fossil fuel. The
second row represents operating costs, and the last row represents capital costs. F is the quantity
of fossil fuel consumed per MW and P ft is the price of fossil fuel inputs, such as coal. Next, O
f (·)
and Oc(·) are the operating costs of fossil fuel energy production and renewable energy production,
respectively, as a function of the energy production from those sources, as determined by st. Both
fossil fuels and renewables have annual operating costs, while only fossil fuels have an additional
input cost. The terms Cf (qt) and C
c(qt, st) represent the total capital costs, respectively, of fossil
and renewable energy investment. Endogenous technological learning is captured by the decreasing
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cost of clean energy capital, Cc(qt, st), as st increases. This process is described in section C.4.1.
We solve the dynamic model using dynamic programming in a structure similar to Fuss et al.
(2008). The algorithm determines the optimal action for each state of the world and each time
step over the planning horizon. The state of the world at any point in time is described by the
share of energy produced by clean technologies (st) and the price of fossil fuel (P
f
t ). The possible
actions in each state are discrete levels of investment in or disinvestment from clean energy (qt).
The economically optimal investment from each state is denoted qEt (st−1, P
f
t ). It represents the
choice that minimizes the discounted sum of all energy expenditures (fuel costs, operating costs,
and construction costs), as described above. Throughout, we will refer to this in terms of the






Q . This is an implicit function of the current state,
not an exogenous trajectory.
Fuel prices evolve stochastically according to an AR(1) process to which, in some experiments,
we add an increasing time trend (Appendix, C.4.2). One of the strengths of a computational
approach is that we can solve for rational policies despite uncertainty about fuel prices in the
future. We estimate the evolution of prices using Monte Carlo simulations at each step in the
planning horizon. The optimal strategy in each state is the one that maximizes Vt in the Bellman
equation,
Vt(s, P
f ) = min
q














The value function is described in terms of the share of renewable energy, s, and the price of
fuel, P f . We average over all Monte Carlo simulations of the fuel price evolution, MCi(P
f ) for
i = 1 . . . n, to determine the discounted value as a function of future fuel costs.
C.1.2 Political Polarization
In the next iteration of the model, we add political polarization by introducing a ‘brown’ and
‘green’ party (denoted B and G respectively) with differing energy preferences (Shipan and Lowry,
2001; Neumayer, 2003). The brown party is opposed to renewable energy, while the green party
is supportive of renewables. For example, members of the green party could be worried about
the global environmental effects of fossil fuels. In this variant of the model, electoral outcomes
do not depend on energy policy. Therefore, the variant can be used to identify the effects of
political polarization on sustainable energy transitions without electoral considerations (Urpelainen,
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2012). However, both parties account for the possibility of losing elections (Alesina and Tabellini,
AlesinaTabellini1990).
The two ideological parties hold intrinsic preferences over energy policy outcomes over all pe-
riods, independently of whether or not they are in power. This assumption is based on the idea
that politicians are, at least to some extent, motivated by policy (Moe, 2005; Hovi et al., 2009).
They may do so either for ideological reasons or to cater to their core supporters. There are two
aspects to the valuation of the energy mix: the (dis)satisfaction derived from renewable energy
and its economic costs and benefits. The ideal point is thus a weighted average of the party’s
consideration of the environment and the economy (Aidt, 1998). The intrinsic payoff function for
party i ∈ {B,G} is a loss function
ut = −(st − (λiŝi + (1− λi)sEt ))2, (C.3)
where ŝ is the preferred share of renewable energy based on ideology, equal to 0 for B and 1 for
G. Next, λi is the importance of the ideological component. The payoffs do not directly involve
the costs of investments, as costs indirectly enter the valuation due to the fact that the party
endures direct disutility if investments represent a departure from economic optimality. We expand
the computation structure from above by allowing each party to select actions and evaluate states
of the world in parallel, similar to McKibbin et al. (1987). Each party is characterized by the
parameters λ and ŝ used in its utility function, and by the discount rate used in that party’s
planning process. A new dimension is added to the state of the world, representing which party
is currently in power. Only the party in power is assumed to be capable of making investment
decisions.
The parties’ utilities are informed by the economically optimal strategy, in terms of the ideal
next-period clean energy share from the given state of the world, sEt+1(s, P
f ). Let the incumbent
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party be denoted party I, and the opposition be party O. Then the optimization equations are
V It (I, s, P
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where s′(q) = s + qQ . Party O does not perform the optimization step, and instead just responds
to the action chosen by party I, which is denoted as q∗. The stochastic Monte Carlo simulations
results are now divided into MCf , the fuel price evolution, and pe, the probability of the incumbent
party being elected. pe is 1 on non-election years. Note that the first parameter of both V
I and
V O is I, since these equations reflect the decision-making process when party I is in power. We
solve the corresponding equations separately for states of the world where party O is in power.
C.1.3 Endogenous Elections
The final version of the model introduces endogenous political competition. Given the importance
of dynamics for energy policy, standard analytical approaches are not suitable for modeling the
consequences of political competition for renewable energy deployment over time. The voters con-
sider the energy policy of the incumbent government in deciding whether to support the incumbent
or a political competitor. By comparing this third version of the model with the political polariza-
tion variant, we can uncover the role of the electorate in shaping the dynamic incentives of political
parties to invest in renewable energy. As we show in the paper, the more ideological the parties, the
greater their stake in strategically controlling the transition path, and the greater their incentive
to satisfy the electorate in order to stay in office and continue to control energy policy. For this
reason, even a weakly responsive electorate has an influence on the transition strategies deployed
by the parties.
The electorate compares either the recent performance or the policy platforms of the two parties.
That is, we consider both “retrospective voting” (Fiorina, 1981; Ferejohn, 1986) and forward-looking
voting based on policy platforms (Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984). Since both approaches
to voting are plausible, it is important to investigate if the results depend on the behavior of
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the voting population. In both variants, the re-election probability of the incumbent increases
or decreases as a function of how much more favorable it seems to the electorate relative to the
opposition. The electorate is sensitive both to the environmental impact of the energy mix and its
economic optimality.
To keep the analysis tractable, we model the electorate in an aggregated way, stipulating a
median preference for the electorate. Formally,
se∗t = λe + (1− λe)sEt (C.5)
is the preferred renewable energy share of the electorate at time t, where the electorate puts weight
λe ∈ [0, 1] on having an economy based 100% on renewable energy and weight 1− λe on economic
optimality. These preferences over states of the world induce preferences qe∗t over investment
actions qt, which are represented in Figure C.1 for different values of λe and contrasted to those
of the parties. This formulation allows us to examine the relationship between the population’s
environmental preferences and energy policy.
Let qit represent the investment by party i ∈ {A,B} at election period t. Then, let ∆ =
|qe∗t − qBt | − |qe∗t − qAt | measure the relative improvement for the electorate in party A’s over party
B’s policy. Let p be the probability of election of party A, a function of ∆. If ∆ = 0, then both
parties are equally far apart from the electorate’s preferred policy, and thus p = 0.5. In what
follows, we let p vary as a function of ∆ as in Figure C.1 and described by the following equation:
p =

0.5 + b log(a∆ + 1) if ∆ ≥ 0
0.5∆− (b log(−a∆ + 1)− (0.5(1−∆))) if ∆ < 0
(C.6)
In this formulation, b determines how much the probability of an electoral victory depends on
energy policy. As b increases, energy policy becomes more important as an issue in the elections.
In our analyses, we use b = 0.5, reflecting reasonably weak electoral sensitivity to energy policy.
Additionally, we set a = e0.5/b− 1, which ensures that p = 1 when ∆ = 1 and p = 0 when ∆ = −1.
The simplest implementation of this model is to assume voters only look to the actions of the
party in power in the election year to inform their decision. We call this “short-sighted retrospective
voting”. In this model, the electorate compares qIt−1, the policy implemented in the previous period
by the incumbent party to qOt−1, the policy the electorate assumes would have been adopted by the
opposition period if in power. In this case, ∆ = |qe∗t − qOt | − |qe∗t − qIt | and p(∆) according to
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Figure C.1: First panel: Shape of the aggregate election response function given by equation C.6.
Since (−0.2, 0.2) is the range of possible disagreements over the action variable q, the response
function is plotted on that range. Second panel: Preferred actions of the electorate for varying
values of λe, compared to the present preference of parties for λi = 0.06 (dashed lines).
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equation C.6 represents the re-election probability of the incumbent. Reasonable choices for qOt are
the economically efficient investment qEt , or the myopic policy, q
O∗
t , the maximand of the party’s
utility function. Since the policy choices of the parties are sequential, we can use the same dynamic
optimization algorithm as above. The optimization equations are identical to equation C.4, except
that the Monte Carlo election function depends on qt, q
E
t (·), and the state of the world. Additional
details and the two improved implementations of electorate opinions are described in section C.6.
C.2 Energy-Economy Mitigation Pathways from AR5
This section explains how we compared our renewable energy transition simulations against the
path of renewable energy technology deployment that we think is needed to keep global CO2 levels
under 450 ppm. We also compared our simulations to the path of renewable energy technology
deployment that is projected under current policies or in the absence of any policy.
The data for these mitigation pathways were obtained from the AMPERE Scenario database, a
sub-section of the IPCC AR5 Scenarios Database (http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/
researchPrograms/Energy/IPCC_AR5_Database.html). The AMPERE project was a collabora-
tive effort among 22 institutions in Europe, Asia and North America over a course of three years.
It used 9 energy-economy models to examine the evolution of fuel mix, technology, emissions and
costs for a large range of different policy scenarios, including a harmonized carbon price policy set
to reach 450 ppm in 2100, fragmented policy scenarios where different parts of the world act at
different times and restrictions on the availability of certain technologies. For an overview of the
scenarios and of the architecture of the underlying integrated energy-economy models, see Kriegler
et al. (2014) and Clarke et al. (2014).
For our Figures, we considered three policy scenarios in the AMPERE database: AMPERE3-
Base (no climate policy guiding energy decisions), AMPERE3-RefPol (current domestic policies,
roughly corresponding to the unconditional commitments of the Copenhaguen accord) and AMPERE3-
450 (a global price for carbon set to reduce carbon sufficiently to meet the 450 ppm target). The
AMPERE study also uses a reference scenario for the growth of population, the growth in power
consumption and in GDP growth. For each of the three policy scenarios, we used the evolution
of the quantity of electricity produced from fossil fuels (excluding plants with carbon capture and
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storage) and the evolution of the quantity of electricity produced from renewable sources from
the 12 models in the database. To approximate the share of renewables (s), we took the ratio of
electricity from renewables to the ratio of the sum of both types of electricity. Figures 4.4 and C.5
show the median value of this variable across the 9 models.
C.3 Main Results: Formal Statements and Figures Referenced in
the Text
C.3.1 Equilibrium Strategies
To begin with, we characterize the effect of ideological divergence on investment (Figure 4.1 in the
main text). By ideological divergence, we refer to increases in λB and λG. An increase in λi makes
party i more willing to sacrifice economic welfare for achieving an ideological preference in energy
policy.
Result 7. As λB and λG increase, investment in renewable energy investment strategies increas-
ingly depart from the economically optimal investment path.
This result shows that as partisan polarization increases, brown and green parties choose in-
creasingly diverging strategies. Even for modest values of λ, the brown party always invests in
fossil fuels. For almost all values of λ, strategies of the parties are monotonically decreasing in the
share of clean energy. The strategies are in the positive investment range for the green party and
in the negative investment for the brown party.
Although obtained by dynamic optimization, the investment strategies are virtually identical
to the choices of hypothetical actors who would only consider their present-period payoffs without
any dynamic strategizing (see Figure C.13). Henceforth we will call this the myopic strategy. The
reason is that any attempt to modify the path of future play by the incumbent would be later offset
by actions of the opposition party.
The following result sheds further light on when strategic incentives play a role in this system.
We now relax the assumption that both parties are equally ideological, allowing differences in their
ideological commitments (Figure 4.1, second panel, in the main text).
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Result 8. Let ∆λ = |λB − λG| denote the difference in the ideological strength of the parties. As
∆λ increases, departures from the myopic strategies of parties increase due to the dynamic strategic
effects arising from technological lock-in.
If the two parties are ideological to differing degrees, then behavior becomes strategic (see
Figure C.14 for an explicit comparison with myopic strategies). In particular, when λG is high and
the green party’s strategy thus departs significantly from the economic optimum, the brown party
increases investment in s in order to bring the economy into a state where the actions of the green
party are more economically optimal. At a higher s, the actions of the green party are closer to
economic optimality, and this reduces the cost of clean energy investment. Strikingly, the brown
party invests more in renewable energy to prevent the green party from imposing extremely high
costs on the economy through the rapid scaling of renewable energy. This strategy may initially
appear counterintuitive, but it is entirely rational. By accommodating the highly ideological green
party, the brown party avoids the high economic costs of a crash program of renewable energy
deployment coveted by the environmentalists. If the brown party chose a lower level of investment,
the green party would go all out and make expensive investments to promote renewable energy.
Figures C.2 and C.3 show that the effect of the re-election probability p on investment choices
is also conditional on the difference in ideological strength of the parties. Variation in strategy due
to p indicates that parties find it worthwhile to manipulate the future path of play and diverge
from the actions they would prefer if they only considered their present-period payoff since p only
affects the continuation value of the game.
We now turn to the model with endogenous elections. The following establishes that the qual-
itative results from the model without endogenous electoral competition remain unchanged if we
introduce elections (see Figures C.17 and C.17a in Section C.6.2).
Result 9. Results 7 and 8 of the exogenous election variant of our model are maintained under
endogenous elections. First, as ideological strength increases, partisan strategies are pulled away
from economic optimality. Second, when ideological commitment is asymmetric between the parties,
dynamic strategic incentives arise due to technological lock-in.
The following results highlight how endogenous elections change the outcomes of the interaction
(Figure 4.3 in the main text). Let αi = qi∗t − qit, where i = G or B, denote the difference between
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Figure C.2: Investment strategies of both parties, for increasing values of λ = λG = λB, for a fuel
price of $3000/TJ and in period T=5. The dashed line denotes the economically optimal strategy.
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Figure C.3: Investment strategies of both parties with fixed λB = 0.01 and λG increasing for a fuel
price of $3000/TJ and in period T=5. The dashed line denotes the economically optimal strategy.
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party i’s preferred investment without politics (qi∗t ) and its chosen investment given dynamic elec-
toral incentives (qit).
Result 10. When the ideological commitment λi of the two parties is equal, α
i has a sign (–/+)
such that each party’s strategy is closer to that preferred by the electorate, irrespective of the current
state of the world, with endogenous electoral competition as compared to the case without.
This latter result is as we would expect. Endogenous elections make the policies responsive
to the public’s preferences. Specifically, the brown party’s strategy now systematically involves
more investment in renewables than without the electoral response. The green party’s strategy
involves more or less investment in renewables depending on the weight put by the electorate on
the environmental dimension.
Next, we consider the relationship between the parties’ ideological strength and the degree to
which parties are swayed by the electorate’s preference.
Result 11. When the ideological commitment λi of the two parties is equal, α
i increases with λi.
This result is less intuitive. The more ideological the parties are, the more responsive they
are to the electorate, in the specific sense that their chosen actions increasingly depart from their
preferred actions in absolute terms. This does not mean that both parties end up closer to the
electorate. Indeed, they do not. Figure C.4 illustrates these relationships. The political line shows
the distance between the electorate’s wishes and the action actually chosen by party i (this can
be denoted αie,pol = q
e∗
t − qit), while the apolitical line shows the distance between the preferred
action of the electorate and myopic strategy of party i (this can be denoted αie,apol = q
e∗
t − qi∗t ).
Here, αi is the wedge between the two lines since αi = αie,apol − αie,pol. As λi increases, we see that
this wedge increases, as stated in Result 11. The distance of the brown party from the electorate
(αBe,pol) nonetheless increases with ideological strength.
C.3.2 Trajectories for Sustainable Transitions
Figure C.5 presents the simulated renewable energy transition for the case of the European Union
with several mitigation pathway scenarios from the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report. All parameter
values for our simulations are the same as in the U.S. case except for the starting share. This
difference in the starting share of renewables means that the cost-minimizing path already presents
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(a) Distance between qc,e∗t , the preferred investments of the electorate and q
c,B
t , the actions taken by the
brown party. When compared to the distance between qc,e∗t and q
c,B∗
t (myopic action of the brown party -
dashed lines), we see that elections make the party more responsive to the electorate and the wedge created
by elections increases with λi.















































(b) Equivalent graph to C.4a for the green party. There is an inversion of the sign of the distance to the
electorate because for some values of λe, the electorate is more moderate than the green party.
Figure C.4: Distance between the electorate’s wishes and the actions of each party, as a function
of parties’ ideological strength (λi). Top Panel: brown party, Bottom Panel: green party.
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a strong renewable transition path. Additionally, the “Reference Policy” (reflecting current policies)
is projected by the IPCC integrated models to lead to a strong renewable transition path, close to the
450 ppm normative benchmark. With respect to our modeling framework, such a path corresponds
to a political scenario in which the green party is more strongly ideological than the brown party, or
possibly to a scenario where a mobilized pro-renewable electorate is driving outcomes. In contrast
to the U.S. case, the “No Policy” path corresponds to our cost-minimizing trajectory, which makes
sense in light of the weaker hold of fossil-fuel interests in E.U countries relative to the U.S. It is
important to note that our political model is not well suited to the political institutions of Europe
and thus the figures should be taken as merely suggestive.
C.3.3 Path Dependence
Figure C.6 illustrates the degree of path dependence in our model. First, we measure the variance
of s(2040) over paths that have the same count of green electoral terms and take a weighted
average of these variances (where the weights correspond to the frequency of a given count of
green electoral terms in 10,000 runs) to obtain the total variance attributable to sequencing. We
denote this statistic V arseq. Second, we compare the outcome in 2040 under two radically distinct
electoral sequences. Letting G denote green party rule and B brown party rule, these sequences
are: GGGBBBB (first greens dominate, then browns) and BBBBGGG (first browns dominate,
then greens).
Section C.7 presents an innovative way of quantifying the extent of path dependence in our
model. It presents the share of clean energy as a vector field and uses the curl of the vector field
to quantify how dissipative it is.
C.4 Baseline Model: Modeling Details and Further Results
In the baseline model, a planner is assumed to follow the cost-minimizing path of energy develop-
ment over a long time horizon. The planner’s interest is simply to generate energy at the lowest
possible total cost, and we do not comment on the normative merits of this approach. The structure
of the model follows Fuss et al. (2008), and is calibrated based on real data for energy technologies.
The technological learning curve is calibrated to global data, and describes a multiplicative factor
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Figure C.5: Simulation of renewable energy share for the European Union, 2013-2060. The two
panels compare our simulations to various mitigation pathways in the IPCC Fifth Assessment
Report, as in the main text.
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(a) Trajectories of renewable energy share between 2013 and 2040, showing the spread that is attributable
to path dependence. Green denotes years with the green party in power; red denotes years under the brown
party. The paths were produced using the retrospective model, with λB = 0.01, λG = 0.01, and λe = 0.1.
Each cluster at 2040 is a set of energy shares produced by paths containing the same number of green and
brown party wins. The bold (blue and black) lines show the renewable energy trajectories for the BBBBGGG
and GGGBBBB paths. Note that these trajectories, which begin with several election cycles under the same
parties are among the most extreme of any trajectories that have four brown party cycles and three green
party cycles, suggesting a lock-in effect.
Parameters ρvar ∆seq1,seq2
exo retro exo retro
λB = 0.01,λG = 0.01
λe = 0 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05
λe = 0.1 0.03 0.06
λB = 0.05,λG = 0.05
λe = 0 0.4 0.1 -0.14 -0.14
λe = 0.1 0.14 -0.15
λB = 0.05,λG = 0.01
λe = 0 0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.03
λe = 0.1 0.07 -0.03
λB = 0.01,λG = 0.05
λe = 0 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.09
λe = 0.1 0.01 0.04
(b) The two statistics used to reflect path dependence: 1) ρvar = V arseq/V ar(sc(2040)) which gives V arseq
in proportion of the total variance, where V arseq is the weighted average of the variance within groups having
the same number of green years in power, as described in the text. 2) ∆seq1,seq2 = s
GGGBBBB
c − sBBBBGGGc
is the difference in final outcome between the GGGBBBB sequence and the BBBBGGG sequence.
Figure C.6: Path dependence in the spread of renewable energy shares in 2040.
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that reduces costs as installed capital increases. The initial level of costs and the operating and fuel
costs are set to describe average costs in the United States. The main drawback of this approach
is that it overestimates the potential of renewable energy in some areas and underestimates it in
others. Nonetheless, it is a major advance over analytical models that have no basis in empirical
data. The planner’s strategies are used as a yardstick for investigating the effects of politics on
sustainable energy transitions. By comparing outcomes under a planner and political decision mak-
ing, we can investigate the importance of politics against a conventional benchmark. To maximize
realism and policy relevance, the baseline model builds on canonical models of energy planning.
The model equations are defined in section C.1.1.
C.4.1 Technological Learning
We allow endogenous technological learning over time (Nemet, 2006; Jamasb, 2007; Shum and
Watanabe, 2007). We model learning by doing in terms of manufacturing costs. The key advantage
of this approach is that we can use global cost estimates, as the markets for renewable energy
technologies are largely integrated across countries. Specifically, we decompose the capital costs of
renewable energy into two parts. The first part is the per unit capital cost cct , which is subject to
long-term cost reductions due to learning. We use a power law of the total renewable energy capacity
to describe prices under technological learning, which is effective at describing many technologies









The coefficient α has a convenient interpretation if re-expressed as the progress ratio R defined as
R = 2−α, which gives the ratio of the new to old costs under a doubling of cumulative investments.
Available data suggests that for solar technology, α ∈ (0.26, 0.43), and for wind technology α is
around 0.15 (Nemet, 2006). In the main paper, we will use these values but let these parameters
vary to study the effect of learning on the transition in Appendix C.4.4. We use current values for
price and capacity of solar and wind in the United States for cc0 and Q
c
0, as shown in Table C.1.
In addition to a baseline per unit cost of cc0, we assume that there are strictly increasing marginal
costs to adding more units in a given year because of production capacity constraints. To simplify,
the model does not include possible investments to reduce capacity constraints beyond economies
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The economy of scale here is independent of technological learning. We have used the exponential
form to preserve units and the parameter a to calibrate equation C.8 so that minimizing equation
C.2 would result in a 40% renewable energy share in 2050, a goal that is often invoked in various
energy commissions, such as IEA (2012). We have also included a version of equation C.7 that
includes a decline in the rate of learning, drawing on assessments of future investment paths made
available in Lantz et al. (2012), so as not to extrapolate the past learning experience beyond
plausible ranges (see Appendix, C.4.1). The construction costs of fossil fuel plants (Cf (·)) are
linear in new capacity, where qt < 0.
We derive the parameters for technological learning in the construction of solar and wind plants
from Nemet (2006). Given that the standard learning curve is a power-law and is fitted with
historical data, extrapolating it into the future without bounds could lead to unrealistically low
capital costs at some point in the future, perhaps within the horizon of this model. To prevent this
from affecting the plausibility of our results, we added a halving in the learning rate after some
threshold renewable energy capacity is reached (chosen to be Qc = 600GW ). These values were
chosen to qualitatively match the median projections for the wind industry assembled in a report
by Lantz et al. (2012).
Since the model does not allow actors to specify the distinct investments for solar and wind
technologies, we assume that the cost curve is the average of the costs for solar and wind, each
computed as described above. Notation for the baseline model and the values used for fixed
parameters are summarized in Table C.1.
C.4.2 Fuel Price Dynamics
We choose the simplest formulation for modeling commodity prices, which is the AR(1) model.
Following the empirical analysis of McNerney et al. (2011), which uses coal price data for the
period 1902-2007, we set:
pt+1 = γpt + µ+ σε (C.9)
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No decline in learning rates
Decline in learning rates
Figure C.7: Learning rate for wind energy, with and without a decline (in most of the analysis, we
assume these rates decline after 600GW ).
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where pt+1 is the log of the coal fuel price. Fitting the historical data to this model yields γ ∼
.956 ± .053, µ ∼ .144 ± .174 and σε = 0.08. Given the confidence intervals and the result of the
Dickey-Fuller test indicating that the null that the underlying process is a random walk cannot be
rejected, we adopt γ = 1 and µ = 0 (examples of realizations in Figure C.8a). In the calculations
that include a trend in the fuel price, we choose µ = 0.3, which leads prices to double in 25 years.
C.4.3 Computational Details
The model is solved using backward induction in Matlab. The outcome under a planner is illustrated
in Figure C.9. The upper panel shows the path of the share of renewable energy in the absence of a
trend in the fuel price, which is the result of applying the optimal strategy shown in the lower panel.
Each path is characterized by a constant fuel price, but the optimization yielding the strategies
is based on the assumption of stochastic fuel prices with no trend in the fuel price. At a fuel
price of $1000/TJ, additional clean energy construction is not optimal under the 5% discount rate
used here. As the fuel price increases, so do the optimal investments. Above $4000/TJ, optimal
investment curves are very similar. This is due to the convexity of the cost function for new clean
energy capital. When investments in renewable energy are large, the convexity of the cost function
ensures that additional fuel price increases have little effect on the optimal investment level.
In the lower panel, we see that optimal investments are maximal at intermediary levels of the
existing renewable energy share, which explains the initial exponential shape of the paths in the
upper panel. When the renewable energy share is low, investments are hampered by the higher
capital costs stemming from the absence of prior technological learning. When existing shares are
very high (> 70%), investments are also low because little additional benefit can be gained.
The results are sensitive to both the price process and the rate of technological learning. In-
creasing the volatility of the AR(1) price process quite naturally diminishes the importance of the
current price in determining the level of optimal investments. Thus, a high price volatility warrants
substantial increases in investments even at the lowest energy price (such that for a doubling of our
baseline volatility parameter, investments worth 0.5% of Q per year are called for when the price
is at its lowest). Conversely, if there is very little volatility, optimal investments increase at high
energy prices (Figure C.10).
Finally, the learning parameters have an important effect on investment strategies and the path
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(a) Realizations of coal price with no trend.
















(b) Realizations of coal price with trend.
Figure C.8: Fuel price process with and without trend.
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(a) The evolution over time of the renewable energy share, under constant fuel prices, as a function of fuel
prices.

































(b) Economic baseline investment as a function of the renewable energy share and fuel price in the absence
of a trend in the fuel price. The optimal investments do not change over the 50-year time scale of interest
in the subsequent analyses.
Figure C.9: Characteristics of the economic baseline, in the absence of a trend in the fuel price.
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Note 1: All values for fossil fuel energy production costs are derived from McNerney et al. (2011),
assuming coal-based production. All conversions assume a fixed factor capacity of 0.7.
Note 2: Values taken from Lantz et al. (2012).
Note 3: Values taken from EIA (2013).
Note 4: Learning parameters from McNerney et al. (2011).
Table C.1: Notation.
of investments. For all states of the world, a higher learning rate causes optimal investments to
increase, especially at intermediate stages of the transition (Figure C.11).
The state of the world is discretized, but we allow investment decisions which change the share
of renewable energy by less than a full discrete step. To do so, each level of investment can fall
between two discrete bins, and we model this as a probabilistic juxtaposition. The states of the
world can be treated as being interpolated between with a linear spline. Mathematically,
Vt+1(s
′,MCi(P
f )) = pAVt+1(sA,MCi(P
f )) + (1− pA)Vt+1(sA+1,MCi(P f ))
where sA is the discrete bin below with a value below s
′. That is, A = db(s′)e, where b(·) is a
function which translates continuous renewable energy share values to renewable energy share bins.
Then, pA = 1− (b(s′)−A), which can be interpreted as a probability of the given share falling into
bin A.
We discretize clean energy into 20 bins between 0% and 100%, and fuel prices into 10 bins
between $1000/TJ and $6000/TJ. Since the evolution of fuel prices is stochastic, 50 Monte Carlo
simulations are used to generated a future expectation at each step of the optimization process.
Investment decisions can be chosen at 100 different levels between a 2.5% decrease and 5% increase
in clean energy share.
C.4.4 Solutions: Further Results
Changes to the baseline results of the optimal economic investments strategies are shown below.
In Figure C.10, we see that the volatility of the price process is important in determining opti-
mal strategies. Figure C.11 shows the linear effect of the technological learning rate on optimal
investments for different states of the world.
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(a) Economic baseline investment as a function of the renewable energy share and fuel price in the absence
of a trend in the fuel price. Full line: no volatility. Dashed Line: very high volatility (σ = 0.3)

































(b) Optimal investments as a function of σ (volatility) for different present fuel prices, given s = 0.5.
Figure C.10: Variation of the economic optimum as a function of volatility.
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Figure C.11: Economic baseline investment for different states of the world as a function of tech-
nological learning (for a fuel price of 3000$/TJ) and for different renewable energy shares (s). The
x-axis show the extent to which the learning rate is increased or decreased.
C.5 Political Polarization: Modeling Details and Further Results
C.5.1 Optimization process
For details of the relevant equations of the political polarization model, see section C.1.2. An
illustration of the optimization process is diagrammed in figure C.12. In each state of the world
at every point in time, only one party determines its optimal action. However, both parties create
a valuation of that action, in case they can influence the probability of entering that state of the
world from a prior point in time.
C.5.2 Further Illustration of Results: Myopic versus Forward-Looking Strate-
gies
Figures C.13 and C.14 simply overlay the myopic strategy when there is no future play and the
preferred strategies optimizing over the following 48 periods of play. As explained in the article,
in the symmetric case, strategic attempts to manipulate the state variable sc cancel out because
both parties are equally committed to pursuing their ideology (Figure C.13). In the other cases,
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Figure C.12: A illustrative diagram of the political optimization model, as described in the text.
The diagram shows three time steps, with an election occuring after the second decision. Each
diamond is a distinct state of the world, and arrows show the possible transitions based on party
decisions or electoral results. On the left, the green party has multiple options from each state of
the world in which it is in power (green diamonds), but only single transition possibilities in the
states of the world in which the brown party is in power (brown diamonds). The opposite is true
on the right. The election result arrows only connect corresponding nodes, where the state of the
world is unchanged except for which party is in power. The diagram does not show the stochastic
evolution of fuel prices or the linear spline between clean energy states.
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strategic incentives to manipulate the state variable arise. For example, in Figure C.14a, the brown
party’s preferred strategy when there is no future play is the same no matter what λG is whereas
his actual strategy varies as a function of λG. Similarly for the opposite case where λG is fixed at
a low value and λB is allowed to vary (Figure C.14b).
































Figure C.13: Investment strategies of both parties, for increasing values of λ, overlaying the myopic
strategy of parties (dashed lines). We can see that dynamically optimized strategies do not differ
from a myopic strategy in the case where ∆λ = 0. These strategies are for a fuel price of $3000/TJ
(at t=2).
C.5.3 Time Structure of Strategies
We include here some plots showing how the strategies change over time. The main result is that
the dynamics of the strategies do not change over time. In addition, we see that there are election
cycles when the parties have ideologies of different strengths. This happens despite elections being
exogenous because of discounting and the convex costs of investments: parties put off investments
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(a) Policies for increasing values of λG keeping λB = 0.01, overlaying the myopic strategy of parties (dashed
lines).
































(b) Policies for increasing values of λB keeping λG = 0.01, again with the myopic strategies of parties as
dashed lines.
Figure C.14: Comparing forward-looking and myopic policies when ideological strengths are the
same and when they differ. We can see that dynamically optimized strategies differ greatly from a
myopic strategy in the case where ∆λ 6= 0.
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to some degree until the last year of the term where it becomes urgent given that they may no
longer be in power in the next period. Finally, we see that the strategic effects noted in the case
where ∆λ 6= 0 wanes as we get closer to the end period of our analysis: the shadow of the future
weakens.
C.6 Endogenous Elections: Modeling Details and Further Results
C.6.1 Retrospective Voting
In our short-sighted retrospective voting version of endogenous elections, we simply let the voters
consider the actions of the party in power to inform its decisions, as explained in section C.1.3.
However, under the decaying retrospective voting model, the effects of politics on non-election
years are very minor and the policy swings between off-election and on-election year very strong.
To construct a more realistic model of the ability of the electorate to respond to party actions
in non-election years without unnecessarily increasing the optimization state space, we implement
off-election year “contests”.
The state space consists of 4CF possible states, where C is the number of possible levels of clean
energy, F is the possible fuel price levels, which party is in power, and an additional dimension
identifies whether an election held in the previous year would have elected the incumbent party.
Let the probability of reelection of the incumbent party based on the current year’s actions be
pe and let l be 1 if the incumbent party won the previous year’s contest. Note that the two states
of the world, l = 0 and l = 1 are extremes, and we will average over them. The total probability
of election is p = αpe + (1− α)l, where pe is the single year election probability and α determines
the extent to which the electorate only considers the most recent year. The effective valuation of
an action which results in state s′ in an election year is
Vt+1(s
′,MCi(P
f )) = pV̂t+1(s
′,MCi(P
f ), I, 1) + (1− p)V̂t+1(s′,MCi(P f ), O, 0)
and for a non-election year is,
Vt+1(s
′,MCi(P
f )) = pV̂t+1(s
′,MCi(P
f ), I, 1) + (1− p)V̂t+1(s′,MCi(P f ), I, 0)
where the third argument is the political party in power (I or O), and the fourth argument is
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(a) The time structure of policies when λG = 0.05 and λB = 0.01 and p = 0.8 : election cycles and a
long-term trend due to the optimization horizon.

































(b) The time structure of policies when λG = λB = 0.05 and p = 0.8. Small election cycles and no long-term
trend.
Figure C.15: Variation in time of strategies for different present renewable shares and strong
ideological commitment of one or both parties.
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(a) The time structure of strategies when λG = 0.02 and λB = 0.01 and p = 0.5 : even though both parties
are not very ideological, the small difference between the two creates clear election cycles, albeit of small
magnitude.































(b) The time structure of strategies when λG = λB = 0.02 and p = 0.5: strategies are basically constant.
Figure C.16: Variation in time of strategies for different present renewable shares and moderate to
weak ideological commitment of both parties.
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whether or not the incumbent won the last year’s election (we average over the states in which they
did and did not).
C.6.2 Retrospective Voting: Further Illustration of Results
Figure C.17 illustrates that as λi increases, departures from economic optimality are more marked
(Figure C.17a), and that when ideological commitment is asymmetric between the parties, dynamic
strategic incentives arise due to technological lock-in (Figure C.17b). What we see from Figure
C.17a is that electoral incentives constrain politicians to some degree.
Figure C.18 is an illustration of what happens when λB > λG. We see that the accommodation
effect discussed for the case where the green party is most ideological holds for this case too, albeit
in the opposite direction: the green party concedes to the brown party, yielding a primarily fossil-
fuel-based economy. We also see that this effect goes counter to the electorate’s wish. Both parties
are pulled away from the electorate’s median preference but the green party keeps an edge because
its actions are not as extreme as that of the brown party.
C.6.3 Platform Competition: Cognitive Hierarchy Solution
Under the cognitive hierarchy model, we explicitly resolve the political stance of each party under
assumptions they make about their opposition. The political platforms of the two parties are
determined simultaneously. Initially each party assumes that the other will have a null platform of
doing nothing. Each party determines a set of optimal actions in response to this null opposition
platform, and the process repeats with this new optimal strategy. Whichever party wins the election
is committed to its platform for the election year.
To implement this commitment, we shift the election from the end of each period (under the
retrospective model) to the beginning. Each party’s evaluation of their proposed actions incorpo-
rates both their likelihood of winning under that platform, and the fact that their platform will
only be enacted if they are elected.
The strategies chosen under this alternative assumption about the interaction of parties and
voters are quite similar to those obtained with retrospective voting, as illustrated for two sets of
parameters in Figure C.19.
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(a) Policies of the parties when ideological commitments are equal.
































(b) Policies of the parties when λB = 0.01 while λG varies.
Figure C.17: Policies of the parties as their ideological strength varies under retrospective voting
when λe = 0.1. The dashed lines represent the myopic policy (equivalent to the exogenous election
policy when ideological commitments are equal as shown in Figure C.13)
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Figure C.18: Policies of the parties and re-election probability when λB = 0.05 and λG = 0.01, for
varying λe. We see that in this case, the green party accommodates the brown party. As before,
the dashed lines represent the baseline economic strategy and the myopic strategies of both parties.
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(a) Commitments are equal λj = 0.06.




















































(b) Commitments are assymetric λB = 0.01 and λG = 0.06.
Figure C.19: Cognitive Hierarchy strategies. As before, the dashed lines represent the baseline
economic strategy and the myopic strategies of both parties.
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C.6.4 Endogenous Electoral Support
To endogenize electoral support, we make λe a linear function of s, letting λe = .3s so that at
s = 1, the electorate’s weight on renewables commands support for the highest levels of investment
considered by the decision-makers. Figure C.20 shows the effect on the policies. We see that they
get shifted in opposite direction relative to the λe = 0 baseline.
C.7 Path Dependence: Clean Energy Vector Field
As an additional quantification of our model’s path dependence, we determine the difference be-
tween our model and an energy-conserving vector field. Path independent processes can be de-
scribed as a vector field, where the integral along any path between two points is equal. In non-
conservative fields, the integrals along different paths between the same points in the vector field
can differ. In this case, we define the vector field in a two-dimensional ”election space”, described
by the number of victories by the brown and green parties. The vector field consists of proposed re-
newable energy investment decisions by each party, defined as a 2-D vector. If investment strategies
are independent of the sequence of elections, then the curl of this vector field will be everywhere 0.
The field is shown in figure C.21.
Using this vector field, it is possible to inspect the renewable energy investments for any sequence
of elections. A sequence of brown party victories would result in the cumulative sum of the x-
components of vectors along the x-axis. Similar, a sequence of green party viectories accumulates
investments described by the y-components along the y-axis.
The greatest investment proposals (vector magnitudes greater than 9%) occur after 36 years (9
election cycles) under paths where the brown party won at least twice. Not coincidently, these also
correspond to the proposals where the two parties are most in agreement in investing in renewable
energy (polar angles less than 63%). The green party is most at odds with the brown party (angles
greater than 75%) early in the simulation, even though both parties are proposing small investments
(magnitudes less than 6%).
Next we inspect the z-component of the curl of the vector field, shown on the right in figure
C.21. Dark blue colors denote clockwise twisting, toward more even proposals between the two
parties. Green and red denote counter-clockwise twisting, toward larger green party proposals and
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Figure C.20: Comparison of policies when λe = 0, λe = .3 and λe is endogenous to s.
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Renewable Energy Vector Field

































Figure C.21: Left: Vector field describing proposed renewable energy decisions. The x-component
of each vector is the proposed renewable energy investment by the brown party, and the y-
component is for the green party. Numbers in black show the magnitude of each vector, and
numbers in red show the polar angle. Right: Z-component of the curl of this vector field, showing
both counter-clockwise twisting (red) and clockwise twisting (blue) flows.
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smaller brown party proposals. The most extreme values occur in early elections, with brown party
victories driving large increases in green party proposals. Otherwise, there is a general division
diagonally, with larger values of curl in the lower-right (where there are more brown party victories
than green party victories). This implies that in this region, the green party increases its proposals
after it loses more than the brown party does after it loses.
